If HEzbollah is disarmed or at least forced to go underground (the military wing), I think that would count as a very significant plus for Israel.

HEzbollah's main gain seems to merely that they can spin it as a victory -- compared to 1967 or even 1974, I suppose thats so.

As you have seen, Hizbullah will not be forced to disarm. They will only do so on their own terms. And their terms include a complete political change in Lebanon. Nasrallah has been very pragmatic in this war, he knows his strengths and weaknesses. So, he has been agreeing with government decisions he dislikes because he sees long-term gains to result from cooperation now. If he were to go against the government, he feels he would risk his organization's popularity with non-Hizbullah Lebanese. But Nasrallah knows that the Hariri gang has no popularity any more. They were trying to trade Syrian dependence for American dependence, and well, let's just say that America did not protect them so well in their time of crisis. The Hariri gang has nothing left to hang its hat on, and it is hard for me to believe that they will be able to do anything after the war.

It looks to me like Lebanon is going to move more towards Hizbullah and the Free Patriotic Movement, and especially if Hizbullah continues to be pragmatic with its actions. The big losers are Israel and the USA. well, and of course, the Lebanese people.

If Hersh's article is correct, it is a very scary thought. I am very glad to see that Israel got a bloody nose from a tiny group like Hizbullah.

The one additional think i would note is that this war was very bad for Israel in the long-run. A lot of Arabs I know take the "Crusades" model of resistance in which they see this as a long war of attrition with Israel. The see the pshycological battle with Israel as being key. And as much as the Jews want to fool themselves, Arabs still know that something like 60% of Israeli Jews have another citizenship. We know that they don't belong in their settlements, and that they are not at home in Palestine. So, win or lose in the short-run, Arabs win in the long-run by keeping pressure on Israel. They thought that they were starting to feel comfortable by making peace with Egypt and Jordan, but now they see that as totally fake.

I would just add, again, that the Jews can make peace in Palestine by giving the Palestinians equal rights and full citizenship in Israel. it would give everyone a victory. without such a solution, they will just keep fighting. A forced two-state "solution" along the lines of the clinton/barak plan will not change much in the long-term. It would be the same as what happened with Oslo (a couple years of peace degrading into renewed hate and war). But a one-state solution would solve the problem because everyone would have access to all the land and all the political institutions. It would no longer be an international war, but a national political struggle (just like with the 20% of Israelis who are Palestinian now).

The No. 1 consequence:

The United States government no longer considers Israel to be a capable and reliable ally.

Possible No. 2 consequence:

The United States government will start preparing for a Middle East without Israel, as the Israeli political system has shown such disastrous structural weaknesses that the continued existence of Israel is no longer a given.

To answer your question - I am afraid not. Although Hersh does engage in hyperbole, I think the lesson Cheney and Rumsfeld will draw is that the Israelis were not bold enough. But, given that Israel's month long performance was so poor, Israel will be seen as less of a military asset in any potential action against Iran.

I know it is poor taste to say "I told you so", but I can't help but point out that I predicted that Israel would fail to achieve its aims in an earlier thread on Dan's site:

http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/002797.html

From Jly 13 - "Israel is using the tactics it used against Arab states to combat terrorist groups - which is ill-suited. As impolite it is to say, the reason most occupations fail is quite straight-forward, the occupied people have no place to go, whereas the occupying army does. All they have to do is raise the cost of holding on to the contested territory."

From July 13 - "It does not change the fact that conducting an 18-year occupation of Lebanon did not make Israel more secure. A few days of air strikes will not do it either."

From July 13 - "Israeli intelligence did not detect the Hezbollah units which crossed the borders, destroyed a tank, killing a number of soldiers, and not realizing that another soldier was captured until it was too late. Israel did not know that Hezbollah had the ability to launch drones to attack naval vessels. Israel did not know that the Hezbollah’s Qassam rockets can now reach as far as Haifa. And as Iraq has shown us, not having reliable intelligence on the ground makes for a losing effort in battling an insurgency. Hezbollah is now hoping that there is an Israeli ground offensive, because that would play to their comparative advantage. They know the terrain better, and all they have to do is inflict enough damage to make it not worth Israel’s while."

I am stunned that anyone in the US government would even consider the statement: “The Israelis told us it would be a cheap war with many benefits,”. These chickenhawks have stilled not learned the lessons - war is not cheap, there are no surgical strikes, there are always unintended consequences. ANy thought of a "cheap war" should have been immediately dismissed. Unfortunately, the morons who believe this kind of crap have more than two years to further screw up US foreign policy. I broke my TV over the weekend. Bill Kristol was on - I threw a glass at it.

"I broke my TV over the weekend. Bill Kristol was on - I threw a glass at it."

Bill Kristol - the Jimmy the Greek of political oddsmaking. But I think Jimmy had a better record.

lots of hyperbole all around.

Israel was never going to go all the way to Beqaa or Beirut - that was just a super hawks wet dream. There goal was to go in and break hezb militarily, as a prelude to changing the political situaition in Lebanon.

The terror rockets were harmful to ISraeli civilians, and an affront to the IDF. They were not, however, existentially dangerous to Israel.

Israel did between 25% and 50% of what they set out to do. Not ideal, no, but not a victory for Hezbollah, except in the fantasy land of spin.

Israels neighbors know 1. What Israel did in the time the war took place, is something they would NOT like to happen to them 2. If Israel WAS existentially threatened, they would have kept going. Ergo, Israel deterrent poster is still secure.

What the US should be focusing on now, is NOT how to manage a ME without Israel, NOR is it how to give in to the Iranians. What we should be focusing on is how to rebuild the Lebanese state, and how to manipulate the Leb state to actually reduce Hezb power. It should also work on keeping the UNSC powers, esp France, on the line to back up this effort.

In doing these things, Id give UNSC Res 1701 a B minus. Theres too much wiggle room, but its not as empty as some critics maintain.

Certainly the Israelis need to reexamine their political leadership. I cant really see any POV from which first not going in hard, than deciding to go in hard, than delaying going in hard, then finally going in hard makes sense. Olmert will have to be very lucky, both in what happens in Lebanon and in Israeli politics, to survive. But his successor is as likely to be Lipni or Peretz or Barak, as it is to be Bibi.

Im not sure who is more exasperating, the folks on the left who cheer a Hezb victory, or those on the right who resent any Israel that isnt led by Likud, and that doesnt pursue the destruction of terr groups beyond its own material interests.

Hezbollahs prowess in this is being overstated. They took advantage of an IDF at odds with itself and its government. While this is impressive, if certainly doesnt mean they would have stood up to a true offensive, and right up until the end we never saw one. The IDF had awful tactics dictated by a AF general who thought to win the war through the air, under the command of a Defense Minister busy running for PM, who spent half his time undercutting and being undercut by the current PM who's astonishing public wilting made Edward Daladier look like Charles De Gaulle.

The legend may go down that Hezbollah stood up to the charging Israeli hordes and drove them back, but that is ridiculous. The IDF never sought to advance past a small 1-2 mile swath inside the border, and simply sent small raiding forces into adjacent towns to spar with well dug in Hezbollah forces with near equal numbers. Why? Who knows, but it was predictably stupid. When Israel finally decided at the very end to quit scewing around and launch a broad front, mult-divisional assault, they marched straight to the Litani with less casualties than they absorbed in the back and force with tiny villages at the border. It says all you need to know about how Olmert handled this debacle to note that the only time the IDF seriously advanced was when the government committed to ceasefire and withdrawal. Crazy. Basically everything Israel did was wrong. And Hezbollah just had to sit and watch, which they did pretty effectively. Right now this disasterous cease fire is allowing Hezbollah to slip right back into their positions, rearmed, and with fresh fighters. Simply judging by the heretofore excellent indicator of 'Olmert will undoubtedly choose the worst course available', the fighting will start up again in a few days once Hezbollah has had a very useful break to rearm and manuever.

Dan,

The Bush administration's policy towards Iran is independent of events related to Israel. Consider what Michael Gerson said about Iran in the current Newsweek:

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14322936/

"The View From the Top

A former Bush adviser on 9/11, Iraq and the lessons of five tumultuous years—for the president and the public.

By Michael Gerson
Newsweek

"Aug. 21-28, 2006 issue

... Behind all the chaos and death in Lebanon and northern Israel, Iran is the main cause of worry in the West Wing—the crisis with the highest stakes. Its government shows every sign of grand regional ambitions, pulling together an anti-American alliance composed of Syria, terrorist groups like Hizbullah and Hamas, and proxies in Iraq and Afghanistan. And despite other disagreements, all the factions in Iran—conservative, ultraconservative and "let's usher in the apocalypse" fanatics—seem united in a nuclear nationalism.

Some commentators say that America is too exhausted to confront this threat. But presidential decisions on national security are not primarily made by the divination of public sentiments; they are made by the determination of national interests. And the low blood-sugar level of pundits counts not at all. Here the choice is not easy, but it is simple: can America (and other nations) accept a nuclear Iran?

In foreign-policy circles, it is sometimes claimed that past nuclear proliferation—say, to India or Pakistan—has been less destabilizing than predicted. In the case of Iran, this is wishful thinking. A nuclear Iran would mean a nuclear Middle East, as traditional rivals like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey feel pressured to join the club, giving every regional conflict nuclear overtones. A nuclear Iran would also give terrorist groups something they have previously lacked and desperately want: a great-power sponsor. Over time, this is the surest way to put catastrophic technology into the hands of a murderous few. All options have dangers and drawbacks. But inaction might bring the harshest verdict of history: they knew much, and they did nothing ...

Gerson was a speechwriter and policy adviser to President Bush from 2001 until this summer. He is now a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a NEWSWEEK contributor."

P.S., Dan,

Gerson is a Bush administration insider. He worked for President Bush, not any bureaucracy. And Bush insiders are known for their loyalty.

IMO Gerson would not have said, "... But inaction might bring the harshest verdict of history: they knew much, and they did nothing ..." unless he was speaking for President Bush.

I.e., this is official policy. It's a question of when, not if, we go at Iran.

The terror rockets were harmful to ISraeli civilians, and an affront to the IDF. They were not, however, existentially dangerous to Israel.

Just curious, but how do you respond then to comments by Sullivan, Krauthammer etc. saying that basically there could be no disproportion in Israel's response because it was facing an existential threat.

Tom suggested:

"The United States government will start preparing
for a Middle East without Israel, as the Israeli
political system has shown such disastrous
structural weaknesses that the continued existence
of Israel is no longer a given."

Considering that Israeli boots are on Arab soil,
and that Iran/Hezboolah had 6 years to prepare
a killing ground, what you are suggesting is
an Israel haters wet dream.

Even the MSM has no reports of Hezbollah
terrorists/guerillas on Israeli soil.

Surely Olmert/Peretz/Halutz deserve to lose their
jobs.

But the Hezbollah boast that they, and only they,
could throw back the Zionist invaders has proven
to be somewhat shallow.

And Israel managed to do this with a bit less
than an estimated 5% of their military strength.
And losses for the entire month appear to be less
than 1 days losses in either '67 or '73.

This will prove to be a major strategic defeat
for Iran. All that money, all those missles,
and a half-hearted invasion turns it all to
dross.

"But the Hezbollah boast that they, and only they,
could throw back the Zionist invaders has proven
to be somewhat shallow."

Well, I'm sure they will boast that and its not entirely inaccurate in that Israel did not try to hold the South, at least partly for the reasont hat they dont; want another griding occupation.

anon,

Compare the 2psi blast diameter of a 200kt nuclear weapon with a comparably scaled map of Israel.

"And Israel managed to do this with a bit less than an estimated 5% of their military strength. And losses for the entire month appear to be less than 1 days losses in either '67 or '73. "

Against an 'army' of 2-3 k fighters? Yeah! Brilliant.

"This will prove to be a major strategic defeat for Iran. All that money, all those missles, and a half-hearted invasion turns it all to dross. "

Let's see. Cost of war to the Israel: 1.5 billion dollars, 150 dead, >1000 wounded, 1/3 of the population in hiding for 5 weeks. Cost of war to Iran: Zero dead, zero wounded, 10 million dollars to replenish those missiles.

The economic cost of the war to Israel is far greater than that. They lost all productivity from at least 20% of the population for at least a month.

Caroline Glick of the Jerusalem Post has called for mass demonstrations to force elections and dump the Olmert government. She also recognizes the fearful damage Olmert has done to Israel's survival-level relationship with America - see my first post in this thread.

"The Olmert government has failed on every level. The Olmert government must go. The Knesset must vote no confidence in this government and new elections must be carried out as soon as the law permits. If the Knesset hesitates in taking this required step, then the people of Israel must take to the streets in mass demonstrations and demand that our representatives send Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, Defense Minister Amir Peretz and their comrades out to pasture.

... Yet the reason that this incompetent, embarrassment of a government must go is not simply because it has delivered Israel the worst defeat in its history. This government must go because every day it sits in power it exacerbates the damage it has already caused and increases the dangers to Israel.

... THE AMERICANS have lost faith in Israel as an ally. After he gave Israel every opportunity to win this war, even signaling clearly that Israel should feel free to go as far as Beirut if necessary, President Bush was convinced that Olmert simply didn't want to fight. The Americans were shocked by Israel's performance. They know that we can win when we set our mind to it and were flummoxed when presented with an Israeli leadership that refused to even try.

... There will be time to inquire into what has gone wrong in the IDF. There will be time to fire the generals that need to be fired. But we don't need a commission to determine what we need to do. Because of the Olmert government's failures, ever greater battles await us. As the dangers mount by the hour, we must replace this misbegotten government with one that can defend us."

Dan - Tom Holsinger I think answers your question if the view that the Bush administration will strike Iran whatever the consequences accurately reflects White House thinking.

Tom - Is there a military scenario in which the United States could possibly win a war with Iran, if Bush launches one next year? What are the chances the Iraqi government would ask us to leave Iraq?

What we should be focusing on is how to rebuild the Lebanese state, and how to manipulate the Leb state to actually reduce Hezb power.

Hezbollah must be removed from Lebanon, one way or another. It is a declared enemy of Israel (and the US, for that matter), and history shows that terrorist ceasefires in that region are temporary. Hezbollah's last ceasefire lasted six years - if that one didn't last, why would Israel trust another? Is the Israeli government that naive?

(One hopes that while Hezbollah rearms Israel expands its own military might as well.)

The Lebanese voters could vote less political power for Hezbollah. But would Hezbollah just pack up and go away?

This looks like the end to the first battle of Fallujah, with the Lebanese playing the part of the forgotten entity that was supposed to take control of that city once the troops left. Maybe it will work this time. I'm sure they'll work hard at disariming the Hezzies. We know how forward the leanese look forward to doing another a Civil War.

My pessimistic guess is that we may well be doing this all over again, with European troops caght in the middle some six months, one-year down the road. Won't that be fun?

Will the hawks tell me what a full-scale invasion really would have accomplished, again? I don't like this peace. I didn't like this war. I'm not sure what we have except another middle eastern festering mess.

Dan:
To answer your question, I think the decision to attack Iran will be driven largely by domestic factors in the US. Any serious military campaign would require a resolution from Congress - though Bush might try to squeeze Iran under the Orwellian GWOT resoultion. Getting such a resolution will be extremely difficult in the absence of some sort of closure in Iraq.

Kristol, Cheney, et al can scheme all they want, but right now there are 535 members of congress (and senate) getting an earful from their constituents on the Iraq war in their home districts. I doubt many of them will be keen to sign up for another pre-emptive (and open-ended) military campaign, based on questionable intelligence, managed by the same team of inept chickenhawks. Voters will ask a very simple question: if you botched Iraq, what makes you think you can get it right on Iran?

Tom - Is there a military scenario in which the United States could possibly win a war with Iran, if Bush launches one next year? What are the chances the Iraqi government would ask us to leave Iraq?

If 'winning' is defined as 'the current government is no longer in power', or 'Iran no longer seeks nuclear weapons', there are several. The US is quite capable of breaking things and killing people in whatever quantities are necessary to achieve either of those objectives, and those are the traditional methods of winning wars.

What is impractical is expecting occupation and reconstruction a la Iraq afterwards, for the effects on the US to be minimal, and for Iranians to like us much once it's over. However, it should be noted that expecting your enemies to like you is a generally unrealistic expectation in any case, and that it is generally safer to have your enemies fear you than to hold you in contempt.

My pessimistic guess is that we may well be doing this all over again, with European troops caght in the middle some six months, one-year down the road. Won't that be fun?
-AM

My impression is that it will take Hizbullah at least two or three years to recruit, re-train, and re-equip to their former strength.

But I share your pessimisim about it happening again. Hizbullah remains, and has not disarmed, therefore conflict is inevitable. The only question is when.

I am goping to dump this insight from "The Angry Arab Blogger" into the comments, because he may be getting closer to the truth than anyone:

I watchd Nasrallah’s speech today: a polite but firm speech. This one is directed to the Lebanese audience: to those who were displaced, but also to the wavering and neutral Sunnis in the country. There has been changes. In Tripoli’s Sunnis for example have been won over by Hizbullah: Hariri Inc lost Tripoli. There are pictures of Nasrallah in Tall Square now. Beirut’s Sunnis seem to constitute the power base of Hariri Inc (Sidon is split). Nasrallah did not invoke Iran or Syria: but promised generous compensations and aid to the families of the refugees. He acted and spoke like the head of a state in Lebanon. But that is Lebanon anyway? there is no state in Lebanon, never was, and never will be. There are statelets in Lebanon. Jumblat has his own state; Hariri Inc has its own state, Hizbulalh has a state, etc. And then there is a façade or mirage of a “central government” which exists only in name.

We have read much about how increased democratization or democratic pressures makes more bearable the lives of citizens. But it has another effect -- it destroys states that should not exist. See Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, USSR (and for that matter, the Austro-Hungarian empire and the Ottoman Empire). Within a few weeks, it may become clear that what Lebanon is destined to do is to fall apart.

If anyone thinks this was a success, all I can say is I hope they have many more just like this.

Dave, StevinVT & Rosignol,

The only military scenario in which we could lose to Iran is the Ehud Olmert Master Plan For Screwing Up Bigtime. That won't happen now.

I was writing a just-shelved article titled "How the Bush Administration Will Screw Up on Iran" in which I would have fearlessly predicted just this scenario. Even the Pentagon's Army & Air Force generals now know that timid half-measures, starting with an air-only campaign, can't work.

Especially as most of Iran's nuclear weapons program is located in North Korea, just as Saddam Hussein's was located in Libya. I know it is an article of faith by lefties that Iraq had no WMD program 2000-2003, but Quadaffi of Libya confessed. Iraq did have a nuclear weapons program and it was in Libya.

No amount of bombing Iran will affect its nuclear weapons program in North Korea. It's invasion or nothing, and we're going to invade. We'll bomb first, to eliminate as much as possible of Iran's nuclear delivery systems before we invade, but we'll invade. That's what Gerson just said.

The force disparity between the U.S. and Iran is far, far greater than that between Israel and Hezbollah. There is no question whatever that we can eliminate Iran's mullah regime in a few months. It might take only 4-5 weeks but IMO will be more like 8-10.

Occupying Iran afterwards will be a problem. Conquering it won't be a problem - more of a logistic exercise as it is three times the size of Iraq, and we'll have to go through the Zagros Mountains to get to Tehran.

Dave, the chances of the Iraqi govt. asking us to leave are about as great as those of the Mexican govt. asking us to leave Texas.

StevinVT,

You are projecting Clinton administration behavior onto the Bush admnistration despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. This may be a matter of faith by you. I have to break this up for space reasons, so the Gerson quote will follow in my next post. Michael Gerson said:

Here's the Gerson quote:

"... Some commentators say that America is too exhausted to confront this threat. But presidential decisions on national security are not primarily made by the divination of public sentiments; they are made by the determination of national interests. And the low blood-sugar level of pundits counts not at all. Here the choice is not easy, but it is simple: can America (and other nations) accept a nuclear Iran?

... All options have dangers and drawbacks. But inaction might bring the harshest verdict of history: they knew much, and they did nothing ..."

Gerson is one of President Bush's most loyal insiders. He is saying what President Bush believes, and will do.

rosignol,

We're going in and staying. The staying will be ugly, but we'll do it. Events force people to do things they'd rather not.

The future of our country and the world is like a small boat on a large river and we are heading for a waterfall. We are rapidly reaching a point where no matter how hard we paddle, and no matter in which direction, we can not get to shore before we plunge over the edge.

The waterfall is, the inevitability of powerful technologies, falling into the hands of many different peoples who prefer to destroy rather than build, because of their seething anger over perceived injustices. The mess is spinning rapidly out of control.

The course that President Bush and his administration seems to have chosen, is one of pushing more and more Islamic peoples, whether they are from Indonesia or Persia or the Middle East or North Africa… into the camp of our most ardent enemies. As President Bush said if you are not with us then you are against us.

And with his comments, many who agree with the President have even tried to marginalize some our best friends, for example, the French and the Canadians and the Germans even though some of these counties have soldiers fighting and dying along side our soldiers in Afghanistan. They will no doubt forgive us. But our enemies may not because, this president appears to have difficulty differentiating his policy between Alqaeda, Hamas,, Fatah, and Hizbullah… even though they are very different organizations with different goals.. We invaded Iraq even though their leaders and people had neither threatened nor attacked us. We chose not to invade Saudi Arabia even though most of the funding for the attack on 911, and 14 of the 19 hijackers and even bin laden himself were from S A.. We have botched an unnecessary war in Iraq that is hemorrhaging blood and treasure, weakening our country at a time when this same President is running our counties financial affairs into the ground with huge amounts of borrowing and deficit spending.

This may seem like error or ineptitude, but I fear it is neither. These actions are likely those that one might choose if you believed in end times, and wanted to speed us all towards Armageddon. It is scarier when you realize that radical fundamentalist Islam and radical fundamentalist Christianity both share a belief in the inevitability of this cataclysm. In other words, it may be that we have several world leaders who are paddling hard down-stream towards the edge.

In the spirit of the teachings of Jesus we have a solution. Today we are spending about one half billion dollars a day (500,000,000 dollars daily, including down stream costs) on the war in Iraq and far more than that in other useless and even destructive ways. The only way to save ourselves is to return good for evil. We have to begin doing good works for those who may not like us very much and even hate and fear us. It will take time to turn people around. We will suffer attacks for a time and must show restraint by responding parsimoniously. The first step is to work towards a one-state solution in the area of Palestine and Israel. Each side rightfully claims that land and fears sharing it under a democratic rubric because a flood of immigrants from either side could cause the expulsion or destruction of the other. There are solutions where people of all faiths can reside and have citizenship in one nation that encompasses the "Holy Land".

Will there be those who oppose this, and violently. The answer is yes, but returning good for evil is the only way in a nuclear, bio-engineered, digital world, otherwise the violence will lead us over the precipice. Each side will tell you they are fighting for great reasons like justice, or freedom, each side thinks it has God on it’s side. We must find the middle or we will perish

Tom H:

You have to find yourself an army, a tax base, and a somewhat willing body politic first. It's not that the US is exausted. It's that there is no manpower at hand to execute an attack.

Isreal's latest war was badly thought out, but there was at least a recognizable, actionable provocation first. What do we have here that merits a shooting war? WMDs? Gee, our government's credibility on that subject is so excellent.

Look, TH, I don't know where you get your info. But if this gang of Dr Strangeloves that are whispering in your ear really are helping run this country, then our government has truly gone mad.

so-called Moderate,

We have the manpower to conquer Iran. They don't have an army - it's just a collection of regime protection forces with little military capability whose missions, in order, are: don't overthrow the mullahs, oppress the populace, and keep the others from otherthrowing the mullahs.

Occupying Iran afterwards is the problem - we'll have to call up almost all the National Guard, Army and Marine reserves for three years.

You underestimate the Bush administration's capacity for self-delusion. (GASP! - how can a Democrat do that?!) They'll convince themselves that either occupation will be easy, or that we don't have to it.

So we'll invade and only afterwards discover that we can't leave.

Reality is like that.

> Occupying Iran afterwards is the
> problem - we'll have to call up almost
> all the National Guard, Army and Marine
> reserves for three years.

National Guards have all reached their deployment limits, or will by Election Day. Not sure about the legal status of the Reserves but I imagine most Reserve members will resign rather than take on another unending occupation.

So Bush commits the nation to war without taking into consideration the views of the polity, eh? As good a reason for impeachment as any I have every heard.

Cranky

"So-called"? I would have gone with "self-appointed", myself.

I underestimate the Bushies capacities for self-delusion? Very possible. But W has not done a single thing that indicates he is preparing for war with Iran. No beefing up of recruitment. No lengthy statements about the need for Iran to disarm or else. No big points about the connection of Iran with terrorism in the west. No stepping towards a quick pullout from Iraq (so we can invade Iran). So, if I accept your premise, it appears Bush figures all we have to do is say "invade" and it will happen, no mees, no fuss. With all the chastening experiences of his Presidency, I figure he may have learned something.

Bush, too, has to look internally. At this point, he has no casus belli a rational man would accept. Sure, as commander in chief, he can order the troops to invade. And he will face impeachment if he does so. I suspect Karl would be able to get the President to notice that.

As for Bush wanting to invade Iran -- I'm sure he does, and I'm sure he's expressed that thought to his advisors. As for atually doing it -- well, I still believe that there are rational people who can tell Bush "not possible" and that he will listen to those people". I have no basis other than I don't think our government is run by madmen. (How Moderate of me)

Cranky,

Congress can change that, and will once we've conquered Iran.

Life and reality are not static.

Tom H,

My thinking was less Clinton and more akin to Rove or Delay. It now appears quite possible that the GOP will lose the House in November and if it retains a majority in the Senate it will be by pretty thin margins (2-3 votes max).

So to get a resolution authorizing force against Iran, Bush will need to peel off at least half a dozen dems in the House and hold all the vulnerable moderate GOP members (shays et al) on board. In the Senate, he will need to keep Snowe, Collins and Chafee (assuming the latter is reelected) on board.

Given what happened to Joe Lieberman, I think any moderate GOP or Dem in the Northeast is gonna think very long and hard before signing up for a war in Iran. In short, I just don't see the numbers unless Iraq somehow works itself out.

I am not saying this because I think it is a good thing. Though I despise the present administration, I do think Iran is a serious threat (far more than Iraq ever was) and we need to keep the military option available.

Speaking of which, I think your estimates of the force required for an invasion are grossly naive. Iran is a country of 70 million with a strong sense of persecution by foreigners - particularly the Americans and British. Moreover, there is a tendency in neocon circles to inflate estimates of popular discontent in Iran. I spent some time there in 01 and my sense of the place is that people want to reform the Islamic revolution not discard it. Foreigners, particularly westerners, will never be greeted as liberators. It is not a mere matter of logistics, it is a question of total war.

Tom,

Maybe you already concede the point, since an occupation of Iran would begin the day we invade, but I would be surprised if Iran's regular forces engage us in the kind of open battle where we would have the advantage. You are almost certainly right that our armored columns could seize Tehran and other key cities in a month or so, but the real resistance will only begin then. Regime loyalists will probably be pervasive enough to deter the Persian majority of the population from collaborating with us, if any are so inclined, and guerrilla warfare will reproduce all of the conditions we are facing in Iraq right now, only on a scale five times as large.

My understanding is that about two-thirds of the regular Army and Marines and a similar proportion of reservists are committed to Iraq. I do not see how a volunteer military can occupy Iran with the forces available. You would have to bring back the draft for the prolonged and much larger war of occupation we would face in Iran, and that would quickly bring things to end.

You make a very interesting point about Iraq having outsourced its WMD program to Libya and Iran's to North Korea. May I ask if this is just a reasonable inference on your part or do you have actual evidence that Libya agreed to supply Saddam Hussein with nukes?

Mr. Gerson states with commendable concision and frankness the tendency of the Bush White House to be more acutely aware of the consequences of doing nothing about Iran than of the consequences of doing something about it. I don't fault the Bush people for their concern (doing nothing to stop Iran's nuclear program really would be disastrous for us and our friends and would backfire on Iran by forcing Saudi Arabia to go nuclear). But if the alternatives are as bad as they seem to be, there should be a greater openness to less orthodox ideas for placing the world order on a stronger footing. We shouldn't embrace a fatalism of the kind you seem to see as inevitable until the line of war has been crossed.

If we really are careening to war, I don't think we could do worse than to propose the sort of future that I suggest on two web pages here:

http://members.aol.com/davidpb4/strategy1.html

Dan asks: "will the failure to eradicate Hezbollah cause the Bush administration to change it's approach to dealing with Iran?"

The answers in this thread go off on various hypotheses about an imagined desire or plan by the Bush Admin to invade Iran. Perhaps, but I doubt it.

The actions and statements by the Administration suggest that they have a different approach in mind for the short term (which, given that almost half of Bush's second term is over, is rapidly becoming all that is left to this Administration). Bush has said that he will not accept Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons. He has also said that it is unacceptable for Iran to continue to export terrorism. The Administration has not discussed with any specificity the means by which it intends to pursue those goals, other than the pursuit of sanctions at the UN. Nor has it said what the consequences to Iran will be if it becomes clear that neither goal can be achieved by means short of military force.

Other than speechifying, what has happened is that the Administration took a backseat to the British-French-German efforts to negotiate a solution by offering Iran various benefits for abandoning its weapons development program (which predictably came to nothing). With multiple deadlines having come and gone in that effort, Sec. Rice is now pushing for UN-approved sanctions. She has said that she expects them to be in place by the end of the year. Assuming that any such sanctions are ever approved, it seems most unlikely that they will cause the Iranians to abandon their nuclear program.

Kissinger has said that he believes the US should be willing to accept very grave and considerable risks to stop Iran from obtaining nukes, and has also said that he generally agrees with the approach being taken by the Administration. He has not specified whether he thinks those risks should include military action, other than to say that the US cannot take the military option off the table. As Kissinger also pointed out, the most analgous historical situation is the Italian invasion of Abyssinia. Then as now, all of the impacted powers -- the US, the EU, Russia and China, as well as Israel -- agree that the acquisition of nukes by Iran is unacceptable. Yet they have been unable to come up with any agreement or common policy to achieve the common goal or prevent the looming disaster that the Iranian acquisition of nukes clearly threatens. Kissinger has consulted with the Administration, and in that regard, I suspect that he reflects the Administration's thinking.

In contrast, Kristol has called for a preemptive strike to destroy the Iranian nuke program, but his call for such action has not been echoed by anyone close to the Administration, let alone anyone speaking on or off the record for the Administration.

In terms of the impact of the recent fighting in Lebanon on the Administration's plans for dealing with Iran, I think the major impact will be on its assessment of the role likely to be played by Israel in dealing with the threat posed by the Hezbollah-Iranian connection. For the Israelis, the possibility that the Iranians may acquire nukes is unacceptable at an existential level -- it presents the realistic possibility that Israel as a nation will be eradicated. Certainly, no responsible Israeli government could accept such a situation. Nor could the Israelis have any confidence that normal calculations of costs and benefits would deter the Iranians from using nukes (directly or indirectly) against Israel, even given the likelihood of Israeli retaliation in kind. That such a weapon, once developed, could be delivered to Hezbollah or some other radical terrorist group committed to the destruction of Israel at any cost simply increases the risks to Israel, since such a weapon once delivered to Hezbollah or some similar group may not remain under Iranian control. The US and the EU would face the same risk, albeit to a lesser degree.

Quite apart from the danger of a possible nuclear exchange between Iran and Israel, the development of a nuke by Iran would significantly raise the risks to Israel in taking any effective action to stop Iran (or others) from funding and arming terrorists such as Hezbollah in the future. Israel, and the US, could be faced with a situation where there would be no realistic means to cut off the supply of rockets and armaments that threaten Israel's existence. Isreal's inability to destroy Hezbollah's base of operations or its means to wage continued war on Israel will undoubtedly embolden both Hezbollah and Iran, to say nothing of other like-minded terrorist organizations bordering Israel.

The results to date of the fighting in Lebanon heighten all of these dangers, and narrows even further the options open to the Israelis, and thus similarly narrows the options available to the US. From the existing circumstances, the most likely scenario in the short term is that the Israelis will find themselves facing a choice between two disastrous alternatives: a prememptive strike against Iran, perhaps including the preemptive use of tactical nukes, to destroy the Iranian nuke program; or acquiescing in the Iranian acquisition of nukes.

For the US, it must now factor in the increased possibility that Israel will be forced to take action to destroy the Iranian nuke program. If Israel did so, the likelihood that the conflict in the Middle East would spread widely and quickly spin out of control is quite high. From the US perspective, there will be considerable domestic pressure effectively to abandon the Isrealis, supported not only by traditional "realists" such as Scowcroft or the Walts-Mearsheimer crowd, but also the "peace" faction of the Democratic party. Once could hear that subtext already in the calls from various quarters -- Rep. Dingell comes to mind -- in the US for it to play a role of neutral "honest broker." Tose domestic pressures, too, will act to constrain US options, and will likely gain strength as a result of the inconclusive result (and horrendous PR for Israel) coming out of the fighting in Lebanon.

Thus, while the Bush Administration continues to work on Plan A -- efforts to get agreement to a sanctions resolution at the UN and then to make the sanctions stick -- I would be astonished if they were not also working on Plan B -- getting the EU, Russia and China to focus on the threats posed by these escalating dangers to all parties, and then forging a common approach, including the threat of UN-sanctioned force, if all else fails. That it is far from an assured thing that any of that can be achieved just underscores the dangers all around.

StevinT,

Google me. I have far more political expertise than military, and my military stuff gets into surprising places - compare the three paragraphs of Gerson's article quoted above with the middle sections of The Case For Invading Iran.

The Democrats have less than a tiny chance at regaining either house of Congress because they don't know how to shut up. The more the public hears from Democrats they less they like them. This in addition to the effects of gerrymandering, which I am especially familiar with.

My father was a Democratic party operative - for a while he was the chief hatchetman for the most notorious political boss in California in the last 50 years - and my godfather was Phil Burton, father of the modern gerrymander. Phil taught me how to count.

The effects of gerrymandering are so potent that the Democrats have a better shot at the Senate than the House - the Senate can't be gerrymandered.

Leiberman ran an awful campaign. It was a race to the bottom which he won. The only lesson from the recent Connecticut primary is that Leiberman sucks. Lamont's idiot blogger supporter sent Leiberman a hanging curveball and Leiberman just stared at it. Anyone with decent campaign skills would have used that incident to win.

David B.,

Libya did not agree to provide Iraq with nukes. They agreed to jointly develop them in Libya - Saddam Hussein provided his research to date, technicians & scientists, and money. Development is not production. Iraq's nuclear program was aimed at rapid production after developing all the necessary expertise - it's called "breakout".

Iran is presently engaged in breakout. IMO its first nuclear test will be sometime in the interval between Tuesday, August 22, and the end of this year - most likely in late October. Iran's first nuclear test will be a joint one with North Korea.

North Korea last year had enough weapons-grade plutonium to make 5-7 nuclear weapons. They have more now. This does not include stockpiles of weapons-grade U-235, which is far more dangerous in the short run as it can be used to make missile-ready warheads without the need for testing. The latter use gun-type triggers of the sort employed in the Hiroshima bomb.

Plutonium nukes use only implosion-type triggers which require testing to make certain those will work on missiles. U-235 gun-type triggers are very wasteful of scarce weapons-grade uranium - 20+ kg required, as opposed to @ 12kg for an implosion-type U-235 trigger, or 7-9kg for an implosion-type plutonium trigger.

South Africa under the defunct Afrikaner regime secretly developed implosion-type U-235 triggers in the 1970s, and then manufactured about 9-12 U-235 weapons for a cost of about $250 million.

IMO Iran already has several U-235 missile warheads with gun-type triggers, and will have about 5-10 more missile warheads with implosion-type plutonium triggers within @ 100 days +/- 30 days of its first nuclear test, which will be of an implosion-type plutonium trigger.

oog, Dave, I left something out.

North Korea and Iran have a joint nuclear weapons development & production program - it is effectively one program. North Korea's weapons-grade fissionables are available to Iran, which is funding North Korea's R&D + production programs.

Iran also has its own in-country R&D/production program., but it is not as advanced as North Korea's.

Weapons-grade fissionables produced in North Korea are flown to Iran via China and Pakistan. The Chinese have been complicit in this since 1994 - they gave (i.e., did not charge for) the complete plans and schematics for an implosion-type plutonuim missile warhead to North Korea and Pakistan @ 1995. Khan sold that to Libya, who turned it over to us when Quadaffi of Libya surrendered to us if we let him stay in power.

Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) is riddled with Al Qaeda supporters. Any plane flying North Korean nukes over Pakistan to Iran gets a free pass.

This is the best article i have seen so far about the war with Lebanon:
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/750500.html

This guy is 100% right. And your right wing people should read it with great care.

And us Injuns want all you white people to leave the Americas and go back to Europe.

Joe M.,

Molon labe.

Let's see....by your standards, that is the standards of the pre-emptive attack lobby, if Iran believed that we were preparing an attack to stop them from developing nuclear weapons ...using your logic, they, Iran, would be justified in launching a pre-emptive attack against US, right? But of course not, they are not justified. Why, because our country has a corner on justice and freedom. Only we, and our friends are justified to attack pre-emptively. And if you don't think we are right and we are "just "look at our track record. Forty-five years ago We overthrew an elected government in Iran. For nearly a quarter century we propped up a brutal tyrant who tortured their people and ran their country for our benefit (the Shaw of Iran, Reza Pahlavi). And now we are attempting to organize forces against Iran for an attack. It is a deeply flawed principle that allows for a pre-emptive war, based on the justification that a country we hate is developing nuclear weapons. Since our ground forces are stressed, and after the lesson of Lebanon, my guess, if President Bush chooses to attack, he will use air power almost exclusively. And Then the region will explode. Hopefully the President and his advisors will refrain from an insane attack upon Iran that in the end will not play out to our advantage.

I won't comment on most of the speculation on this thread, and I can't answer Dan's question because I have no contacts in the Bush administration able to address it.

I would note, though, that as a result of the war Iran is likely to expand its financial commitment to Lebanon, as its Hezbollah ally strives to service its traumatized base of supporters by providing relief and reconstruction services at the same time it seeks to replenish its arsenal. How large this expansion may be I don't know, but it could be considerable.

Tom,

I'm reassured that you don't dispute my assessment of the prospects for a US military occupation of Iran. If it is true that we also cannot win a standoff war, in which we don't occupy the country on the ground, then logic would seem to take war off the table.

If Iran conducts a nuclear test on the schedule you predict, it will do President Bush an enormous favor by (1) scaring the American people into voting for Republicans this fall and at the same time (2) sparing the United States the actual need to go to war by making the cost suddenly prohibitive.

RHD,

Two comments on your very thorough overview of the Lebanese situation and its wider implications.

First, the US has a vital interest in nuclear arms control quite apart from Israel's security, although Israel's situation makes the problem more urgent. If Southwest Asia goes nuclear, North Africa and parts of Latin America will follow, and the nuclearization of East Asia is also on the horizon. Our interests converge with Israel's on this point but Israel does not drive our policy.

Second, my understanding is that Hezbollah's ambition to rearm south of the Litani river is not its true red line, which is the right to arm itself north of the river, where no international troops are expected to deploy. It is of course possible that Hezbollah will be free to rearm south as well as north of the river, but what it needs is a sanctuary and it will still have one north of the river under the current ceasefire agreement.

I don't think this is necessarily bad for Israel, at least in the short-term, because to rocket Israel from farther north Hezbollah would need to use missiles of unquestionably Iranian origin. Iran would need to be prepared for a war with Israel if it resupplies medium and longer range missiles to Hezbollah north of the river or if the ones already there are used to hit Tel Aviv.

I'm not sure Iran wants to provoke a war with Israel before it has nuclear weapons. Tom Holsinger above argues that the timetable is much shorter but intelligence assessments that have been made public suggest that it will be several years before Iran is nuclear. If so, Israel may have won a temporary respite.

The question is whether Israel will try to preempt Iran's program. All of the public assessments I have seen suggest that Israel lacks the capability to do so. The question then is what the United States will try to do.

I think you are right about the need to mobilize all of the permanent members of the UN Security Council plus other major powers (Germany, India, Japan). But we may need to do more than simply try to convince them of the dangers of uncontrolled nuclear proliferation. Many of these states, rightly or wrongly, also see American behavior as a threat to the world order. We may want to propose some new limits on our right to wage war if the others accept new responsibilities to keep nuclear weapons limited to existing states.

Dave,

A two year occupation by 200,000 troops and total 3000 KIA for the conquest and occupation campaigns is acceptable - lesser duration than Iraq but far, far more intense while it lasts. Read my article.

Iran and Iraq are not the same. Saddam had many billions of dollars of old Soviet munitions stored in Iraq - an amount equal in tonnage to the whole US strategic munitions reserve. Iran has less than 5% of that.

More importantly, our occupation of Iran won't have enemy terrorist-supporting states - Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia on its borders the way Iraq does now. The absence of readily accessible foreign sanctuaries makes an enormous difference. This point is especially critical.

I am aware of such distinctions. You aren't. As another example, Iran has a restive tribal minority group on its southeastern border called the Baluchs. They don't like the mullahs, didn't like the Shah either, and will be equally happy to see us when we show up. The Pakistanis have fought the Baluchs on their side of the border for years and have only recently gotten the upper hand.

The Baluchs are mean.

Tom,

Sorry to misunderstand your view of an occupation. It would be helpful if you could address the following issues.

First, Saddam's arsenal certainly contributes to the problem in Iraq but I don't believe the threat of IEDs now is primarily a function of the prewar arsenal. I don't see why Iranians would run out of IEDs quickly under American occupation or would lack the explosives necessary for suicide bombings or the weapons necessary for hit and run attacks. The Iranians are unlikely to resist by fighting a high intensity war on the ground.

Second, Syria and Iran do not drive the insurgency in Iraq, which is overwhelmingly domestic. It certainly helps the Sunnis of Iraq to have foreign sanctuaries but these are not essential. The more important sanctuaries in Iraq are the cities the insurgents are able to recover when we abandon them for lack of troops. Iran will be no different unless we can quickly supplement our forces with friendly Iranian ones.

Third, the problem for America will be to stand up an Iranian government, army, and police within a short period of time. To do so, Iranians would have to vote for a new government and then support new security forces. This is not inconceivable because the present regime has alienated much of the younger population, and elections may be difficult for anti-American insurgents to obstruct if they are held immediately and the wrong people don't win.

But as in Iraq, the problem will be security. To occupy Iran with 200,000 troops is only 50,000 more than what we have had in Iraq. Given the much larger size of the Persian majority, these will not be enough if we have to deal with the same ratio of insurgents to population and do not have the immediate and effective support of Iranians on our side. Going in with only 200,000 troops in my view would be a huge if not reckless gamble.

It won't mitigate the situation if the actual casualty rate for Americans is low; if we cannot exit the country without a high risk that it will return to its former state, these casualties will seem pointless and endless, undermining political support at home. If the gamble doesn't succeed in the immediate aftermath of an invasion, our enemies will gain confidence and our friends will see only our refusal to make a stronger military commitment.

I am quite aware of the fact that Iran's population is only about half Persian, and the Baluchis could be quiet in the way the Kurds are in Iraq. But the one absolutely certain way to guarantee a long and hopeless struggle would be to turn an invasion into an ethnic war between minorities backed by us and a Persian majority fighting for what it believes to be its survival and ethnic patrimony. I'm not sure you are suggesting that we pit minorities against the majority, but if you are, we would be forcing the Persians into the same position as the Sunnis in Iraq. Only in Iran, Persians are the majority.

My understanding is that about two-thirds of the regular Army and Marines and a similar proportion of reservists are committed to Iraq. I do not see how a volunteer military can occupy Iran with the forces available. You would have to bring back the draft for the prolonged and much larger war of occupation we would face in Iran, and that would quickly bring things to end.
-David Billington

You are mistaken. We have around 130,000 troops in Iraq, out of a total active strength of something like 1.4 million (~2.3 million if you include reserves). I realize that a lot of those people are support personnel, not combat infantry, but the 'we don't have the manpower' argument does not seem to have much basis in fact.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_number_of_active_troops

What is true is that fighting a war with Iran will be a major war, which will require a lot of re-deploying of forces... which is not necessarily an entirely bad thing. It's not like Germany is like to invade (or be invaded) by anyone these days, but the US still has something like ~70,000 troops there, due to organizational inertia as much as anything else.

[...]

I think you are right about the need to mobilize all of the permanent members of the UN Security Council plus other major powers (Germany, India, Japan). But we may need to do more than simply try to convince them of the dangers of uncontrolled nuclear proliferation. Many of these states, rightly or wrongly, also see American behavior as a threat to the world order. We may want to propose some new limits on our right to wage war if the others accept new responsibilities to keep nuclear weapons limited to existing states.
-David Billington

Your analysis is fundamentally flawed in that it assumes that the other UNSC members want to preserve the existing world order in the long term. The current world order is one where the US is supreme, China and Russia in particular would like to replace it with one in which China or Russia are supreme. If Tom is correct about the Chinese being complicit in the NK and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs, and by extension the Iranian program which is dependent on the NK program, there is no circumstance under which China can be persuaded to take action against Iran (...and Russia's involvement in the development of Iranian nuclear reactors, and opposition to taking any substantiative action against Iran, is already a matter of public record).

The UNSC is not going to solve this problem because several of the permanent members of the UNSC do not want the problem to be solved.

As far as 'new limits on our right to wage war' is concerned... are you aware of the traditional limit on the right of a nation to wage war to protect it's interests?

Rosignol,

My argument for the US accepting restrictions on its freedom to wage war in return for other powers accepting obligations related to nuclear arms control would alter the world order in the sense of reducing everyone's unilateralism. That is the only basis on which I think effective cooperation could work. Of course, if China or another power believe they can replace America as a global hegemon, then cooperation will not be possible. But we have not offered what I propose and I would like us to propose some version of the idea before letting events in the current situation run their course.

Regarding the US military, I was under the impression that, of the total number of ground combat brigades, a majority were committed to Iraq. If that is not true, then I stand corrected.

BTW in my post to Tom Holsinger above I may not be correct to discount the continuing importance of the prewar arsenal as a source of explosives for IEDs in Iraq. The question today is not whether Iran has far fewer artillery and mortar shells than prewar Iraq for guerrillas to use as explosives, but whether the number Iran has today is enough to sustain an insurgency as intense as the one in Iraq for many years.

Tom,

On the domestic side:
I'm not buyin your logic. In fact, it sounds a lot like the Democrats logic in the summer of 94 when the GOP started to show major gains in the polls. They thought gerrymandering would save their butts.... and in the end the GOP picked up something like 40 seats. I don't think the Dems will be nearly as successful, but a pick up of 15-20 seats - enough for a majority, is now quite possible. Cook report polling suggests a pick up of 10-25 seats for the dems is quite possible at this point.

On the military/invasion side:
200,000 for 2 years and 3000 KIA sounds, to put it mildly, a bit modest. With 3/4s of that number, we are at serious risk of failing in Iraq after 3 years - a country that is barely a third the size of Iran. Iran is a much tougher nut to crack. It is much larger, the regime has considerable legitimacy and the have a long-standing distrust of the US government (coups, downed airliners, sanctions, etc) and a cultural sense of persecution by western powers. All are perfect kindling for a nasty domestic insurgency.

Worse still, Iran has its own set of minority issues (Azeris and Kurds) that will complicate things regionally:
1) An invasion of Iran could force the Turks to invade northern Iraq to prevent a large Kurdish rump state, comprised of Iraqi and Iranian territory from coming into being.
2) It could encourage the Azeri minority (25% of Iran's population - largely in the north around Tabriz) to rise up and try to break with the Persian majority to join their brethren across the border in Baku. That, in turn, could have a ripple effect on the NK situation because Armenia would lose its only ally (Persian Iran) that it shares a common border.
3) Almost certainly, a Persian insurgency could find refuge in Afghanistan and Iraq, both of which have Shia populations with close ties to Tehran. The Hazara in Afghanistan in particular owe a debt to Tehran for Iran's efforts to protect them from persecution under the Pashtun Taliban.
4) Instability in Iran would likely reignite the civil war in Tajikistan where the US has only just succeeded restoring a measure of stability.

Plus, let's not forget oil will hit $120 a barrel win Iran goes off line and Bush's record in Iraq suggests that it will be at least 2-4 years before production is restored. Bush is at 37% right now. Imagine when gas hits $5-$6/gallon.

I guess my botton line is that I find your analysis a bit too neat. It sounds eerily like those predictions by the Weekly Standard, AEI and others before Iraq. In the blogosphere and in the pundit world, it seems such analysis may win kudos. I, however, deal with many of these places and countries on a regular basis and in a very up close and personal way. Painful, often tragic experience has taught me that the real world is a very, very messy place - full of nasty unintended consequences. It gives me a great deal of pause before advocating large-scale foreign adventures.

> A two year occupation by 200,000
> troops and total 3000 KIA for the
> conquest and occupation campaigns
> is acceptable - lesser duration than
> Iraq but far, far more intense while
> it lasts. Read my article.

Acceptable to whom, exactly? The parents of the 3000 soldiers who died in Iraq? Or to the 20-something neocons who love to talk "war, war" but who can't seem to find their way to the local recruiting depot?

Are we going to have an actual national debate this time? I don't think the WMD stampede is going to work again even in the US, and the US could also be facing sanctions from other nations if it starts another war unilaterally.

A question for the rest of you: do you think that there are people left even in Cheney's office who actually believe this kind of Serious(tm) nonsense (apparently based on the game Risk(tm) rather than any actual understanding of geopolitics (not to say humanity))? Or has enough reality set in even in the Feith Memorial Office to put the brakes on this garbage?

Cranky

Israel did between 25% and 50% of what they set out to do. Not ideal, no, but not a victory for Hezbollah, except in the fantasy land of spin.

Amusing, stupid, but amusing.

It's not clear what Israel achieved in a purely tactical sense, actually. They claim a certain kill ratio - if there is any lesson from Iraq and prior wars of a guerilla nature, it is that such claims are at best fantasies.

What is clear is that the Americans and the Israelis achieved a stunning series of own-goals: Hezbullah emerged on stronger politically and is looking to even increase its strength by wrong-footing the Americans in terms of political and social services to the displaced populations.

In short, the US and Israel achieved nothing but the exact inverse of what was desired, and a disappearance of Hezbullah militia will only be in the form of that militia morphing into a (highly theoretical) part of the Lebanese armed forces.

Delusional spin is pretending this was anything but an outright disaster for US and Israeli interests, based on a truly incoherent, delusional misreading of the political and even military context.

Stupid whanking American spin aside

My argument for the US accepting restrictions on its freedom to wage war in return for other powers accepting obligations related to nuclear arms control would alter the world order in the sense of reducing everyone's unilateralism. That is the only basis on which I think effective cooperation could work.

I think that various parties (the Russian and Chinese governments in particular) have decided that it is in their interest to covertly undermine the US's position as part of a long-term plan to at least achieve pairity and re-establish a bipolar or multiploar geopolitical environment.

To achieve this end, they will encourage proxies to stir up trouble (NK, Iran, etc) while frustrating the US in international forums (the UN, etc). When the US takes action despite a lack of UN sanction, it gets portrayed as a unilateralist warmonger who lacks appropriate respect for global opinion.

This is not new, it's been going on for years.

Of course, if China or another power believe they can replace America as a global hegemon, then cooperation will not be possible.

This is what I am saying, yes.

There is a silver lining, of course- our relations with the Euros will become immensely better once they realize what the real alternatives to American pre-eminance are. As someone once said, we can count on them to be there when they need us.

But we have not offered what I propose and I would like us to propose some version of the idea before letting events in the current situation run their course.

I can tell you what will happen- the other parties would accept the US's promise to not invade anyone except under certain circumstances (UNSC approval?), and would then proceed to covertly break whatever promises they made in order to compel the US to break it's promise. The objective would be to discredit the US by showing that it's promises are worthless.

Lounsbury,

Try reading the analysis of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict on Lebanese newspaper websites, and then get back to us... you are frankly uninformed.

Jim:

I'd be careful about the Lebanese newspapers (Beiruit Star) and bloggers in English. They don't necessarily represent opinion in the Shia South. These guys are really really scared/angry with hezbollah. But, frankly, they are also pretty impotent.

My guess is that the final result of all this will be that Lebanon may finally split up. If this does not result in a bunch of Syrian protectorates, this may not be a bad result in the long-term, but probably means a big mess in the short term.

"Israel did between 25% and 50% of what they set out to do. Not ideal, no, but not a victory for Hezbollah, except in the fantasy land of spin.

Amusing, stupid, but amusing.

It's not clear what Israel achieved in a purely tactical sense, actually. They claim a certain kill ratio - if there is any lesson from Iraq and prior wars of a guerilla nature, it is that such claims are at best fantasies."

The war they fought the last two months was essentially a conventional infantry war, with Hezb protecting fortified strongpoints, using Antitank weapons etc. The fact that they used builtup areas for cover hardly makes it a guerilla war.

I have seen no other serious analysis of the kills apart from the IDF's and I have no particular reason to think the IDF was wrong.

"What is clear is that the Americans and the Israelis achieved a stunning series of own-goals: Hezbullah emerged on stronger politically and is looking to even increase its strength by wrong-footing the Americans in terms of political and social services to the displaced populations. "

AFAICT, most non-shia lebanese, even as they resent Israel, are quite resentful of Hezb for bring this on them. As for politics among the Shia, I see no evidence the Hezb is any stronger now than they were prewar, or than they would have been had Israel not responded to the kidnapping.

"In short, the US and Israel achieved nothing but the exact inverse of what was desired, and a disappearance of Hezbullah militia will only be in the form of that militia morphing into a (highly theoretical) part of the Lebanese armed forces."

They have achieved the movement of the Lebanese army into the South, which may be the beginning of the strengthening of the Lebanese state there.

"Delusional spin is pretending this was anything but an outright disaster for US and Israeli interests, based on a truly incoherent, delusional misreading of the political and even military context."

That Hezbollah was in position to build up it force to the extent it did was indeed disastrous. given the situation as of the beginning of July 2006, its not clear there was any good outcome. And of course Israel was handicapped by tactical mistakes, relying on air power early on, and delaying a strong ground campaign. Still, the outcome is far from disastrous.

"Stupid whanking American spin aside"

All the rightwing spin ive seen agrees with you, and wants Olmerts head. I think they are misreading the larger political context.

"I'd be careful about the Lebanese newspapers (Beiruit Star) and bloggers in English. They don't necessarily represent opinion in the Shia South. "

is there a vibrant free press in the Hezbollah controlled parts of Lebanon?

"Just curious, but how do you respond then to comments by Sullivan, Krauthammer etc. saying that basically there could be no disproportion in Israel's response because it was facing an existential threat. "

I would suggest that there is a middle ground between existential threat, and trivial threat. Israel faced a serious threat, that warranted a serious but restrained response. And Israels response WAS restrained, from dropping leaflets before bombing, to allowing aid planes to pass through (Peres revealed that today) etc, etc. Its a tragedy that 900 Lebanese were killed, just as its a tragedy dozens of Israelis were killed. Its quite possible that more than 900 Israelis could have been killed by rockets, had Hezb been left alone. But even killing 900 Israelis would not end Israels existence. IF Israels existence were threatened, I would see MUCH less restrained Israeli tactics as justified

Dave,

I regret that a too-long explanation of technical military matters is required to show you the errors in your assumptions. It starts with your contention that the occupation campaign begin the instant the forefront of a conquest campaign passes by. That is not true. It takes several months for those to get going, just as in Iraq where the Baathist ruling Sunni Arab minority made all possible preparations in advance to do so.

You are correct, however, in focusing on ethnic issues as the core of the occupation campaign. As a pratical matter Iran is effectively an empire - a core of a little more than 50% Persian Farsi-speakers, and a conglomeration of minorities. We will have little trouble with the areas where non-Persian minorities form the great majority, excepting the really raunchy tribal ones like the Baluchs who hate everyone else equally. Fortunately there aren't many of those. Unfortunately the Baluchs are really, really, mean.

In addition to your unfounded assumption about the speed with which an insurgency campaign could start, due to your ignorance of the fundamental differences between regular and irregular forces, you do not at all comprehend the importance of nearby secure foreign sanctuaries.

I don't have the time to even begin explaining these matters while blog posts aren't an adequate vehicle to present the information.

Here’s an example of my track record in these matters. The proportion of Iraq’s population which is Sunni Arab has dropped from @ 22-25% prior to the U.S. invasion to 15% or less today. This is due to ethnic cleansing by the Shiite majority and the Kurdish minority - the Sunni Arabs are fleeing to Syria and Jordan. It looks like the Sunni Arab population of Iraq will drop to maybe 5%.

I predicted this three years ago on this board:

"The differences between us pacifying Iraq's Sunni Arab tribes, and not doing so, will chiefly be these:

(1) how many Sunni Arabs remain in Iraq once we leave. Note that the Iraqi armed forces are being rebuilt with an all-new, i.e., non-Sunni, cadre. Unreconciled Sunni Arabs in Iraq will have the following choices once our occupation ends - (a) becoming reconciled, (b) becoming gone or © becoming dead.

(2) whether there is a significant prosperous and peaceful Sunni minority in Iraq to serve as a model for reconstructing the Sunni majorities in other Arab countries. It will be much more difficult for us to succeed with the latter if we don't.

Keep in mind that we will win the war on terror. The major question is how many Arabs survive the experience.

Posted by Tom Holsinger at October 28, 2003 08:48 PM"

> due to your ignorance of the fundamental
> differences between regular and irregular
> forces, you do not at all comprehend the
> importance of nearby secure foreign sanctuaries.

> I don't have the time to even begin explaining
> these matters while blog posts aren't an adequate
> vehicle to present the information.

I used to call this kind of deluded nonsense "Clancyesque", but since 2003 the author-of-fiction Tom Clancy has proven to have a much better grasp of geopolitical and military affairs than those that sup at the feet of the Great Men Wolfowitz and Gingrich. Perhaps that is due to the amount of time he spends with real soldiers, particularly enlisted men.

Cranky

Cranky,

Regular forces are trained to do reconnaissance in combat. Irregulars (insurgents, terrorists and the like) simply can't do that. They must insead do their reconnaissance in advance of combat - hit and run is their only relatively safe means of engagement.

So, unless an enemy comes to an area the irregulars have prepared an engagement in (which also requires some knowledge of what force levels are coming at them), they must wait until an occupying force has settled in long enough that they can do their covert reconnaissance of the occupation force's structure/force levels/order of battle plus its positions and movement patterns.

This takes time. It takes at least weeks. As a practical matter for a new country of operations, one which has just been conquered, it takes at least two months. The Baathist insurgency in Iraq took that long and it was about as well prepared in advance as an insurgency could be.

This is only the tip of the iceberg.

I'd studied guerrilla campaigns for decades but didn't really understand these points until an Army reserve MP major explained MP security operations to me. His emphasis on how random changes in patrol operations screws up an attacker's planning, and even deters attacks, was an AHA! moment for me.

So this discussion does involve some technical miiitary issues requiring expertise not available to amateurs to understand.

Tom,

I am not an expert on tactical military matters, although I have studied some of the more general literature on insurgency. Thank you for your patience.

By day one of an invasion I had in mind the example of the Fedayeen Saddam who attacked our columns as we moved on Baghdad in 2003. I would expect Basijis to harass any advancing US columns in Iran. But that is not the same thing as the locally-rooted hard-core insurgent activity of the kind that I think you mean, for which I agree that a couple of months would be needed for it to get going.

On sanctuaries, there are two questions:

The first is whether insurgents can be effective without contiguous territory that is safe from attack, not how valuable it is to fight with such territory. You haven't specifically addressed this difference and I'm certainly willing to defer to your military knowledge if you do. But if we are talking about the bulk of Sunni insurgents who are not foreign, who replace their losses locally, and who mostly use weapons from the prewar arsenal or improvised with local components; if these people cannot sustain a war without Syria and Iran as sanctuaries, I would be interested to know what these sanctuaries provide that is indispensable.

The second and more important question is whether in Iran, as in Iraq, there would be a kind of internal sanctuary afforded by an occupying power that is unwilling to mass murder the civilians who provide cover and support for the active insurgents. While counterintelligence and policing, backed by paramilitary and military forces, can eventually end this civilian support, until it ends the insurgents have an invisible sanctuary that may be more important than any external safe havens. And if there is a long delay in establishing a permanent police and intelligence presence in a city or rural area, the insurgents will be that much more free to operate there, as has been the case in Iraq. The question is how long a delay there would be in Iran and whether that should be a factor in our decision to invade.

Dave,

Historically the difference between successful and unsuccessful insurgencies has almost always been an adjacent sanctuary, i.e., significant support from an adjacent country whose government supports the insurgents.

If they've got it, they often win. If they don't, they rarely win.

Our major problem in Afghanistan is the Taliban's receipt of significant support from Pakistan. Pakistan is a de facto sanctuary for the Taliban. Al Qaeda is pretty much gone from Afghanistan. We're fighting the Pushtun tribes on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border, and they are supported by major elements of the Pakistani army and Pakistani intelligence.

While those would love to help our enemies in Iran too given the chance, there is a minor problem of a particular ethnic group I mentioned. The ones who are really, really, mean. The border area between Iran and Pakistan is called Baluchistan.

"Israels response WAS restrained"

A statement that would have done Humpty Dumpty proud.

Down the rabbit hole and into the looking glass world we go.

Self-delusion certainly worked well for you war-war lot in Iraq and Lebanon. Third time lucky in Iran?

Tom,

Your analysis of the situation is just plain wrong.

1) The Taliban are unlikely to support a Shia/former regime insurgency for Iran. Keep in mind the Taliban consider Tehran an apostate regime and they almost went to war in 98-99 (Hence, Iran's silent assent to our taking down the Taliban in 01).

2) There are plenty of sanctuaries for an insurgency in neighboring countries, including Iraq and Afghanistan, where there are plenty of groups/factions/warlords sympathetic to the current regime in Tehran.

3)I am not so sure that we will have "little trouble" in regions where minorities predominate in Iran. Iran ain't Iraq with its seething sectarian/ethnic tensions, so it is hard to predict. Yes, the Azeris might consider moving into alignment with Baku, but they could also decide to throw their lot in with Tehran. After all, the Azeris do have a pretty big stake in the existing power structure (cabinet ministries, key positions in the clerical heirarchy).

4) You keep harping about the Baluchi. The Baluchi are relative incosequential in the equation. No insurgency is gonna base itself in that part of Pakistan for a very simple reason: water. As in, there is none. That's why only a very small number of Baluchi live in a huge territory, while the other 90 million or so Pakistanis are crammed in the rest of the country.

5) I still think your assumption that the Islamic regime will just collapse, ala Saddam, is hopelessly naive. The revolution has real legitimacy in Iran and Khomenei is a truly beloved figure - especially among the lower classes. While Iran is not a democracy, it is not a crackpot dictatorship either. Sure, there is plenty of discontent, but I am not sure that translates into the regime dissolving on contact.

6) Lastly, you assert throughout your writings that Iran will have the bomb will test it this year. That is quite a declaration. Care to provide any support for either of those assertions?

It is precisely this type of self-deluding analysis by armchair warriors that has gotten us into such a mess in Iraq. I hope we are all smart enough not to be seduced by the their siren song this time.

"While the United States was focused on the chimera of an Iranian nuclear bomb -- a possibility that, assuming everything we have heard is true, remains years away from becoming reality -- Iran has moved to redefine the region"
Stratfor, August 8, 2006

SteveinVT,

I mentioned Afghanistan and the Taliban only to show a current example of how an adjacent foreign sanctuary giving significant support to an insurgency operates as a titanic force multiplier for the insurgency. The Taliban would be a non-issue, and the war in Afghanistan effectively over for us without support from Pakistan's ISI.

The Baathist insurgency in Iraq now would be, and in the past would have been, far, far less of a problem absent support and funding from Syria and Saudi Arabia. The Syrians provide no funding, but they do provide sanctuary, bases and volunteers (not as much as i the past though - they've learned that few come back). The Saudis provide funding and volunteers, but again a lot less volunteers than before.

Iraq's Shiite militias would not be much of a problem to us absent support and funding from Iran's mullah regime. That has been huge both in quantity and proportion.

Any support from Pakistan's ISI to a mullah-led insurgency against us in occupied Iran (after our invasion) would have to pass through Baluchistan. The Baluchs would view this as an income opportunity and significantly increase the cost of providing such support through extortionate demands for tolls and "protection".

Just as the Baluchs would regard the presence of American forces as recreational opportunities.

IMO the collapse of Iran's mullah regime, absent our invasion, is 3-5 years out. The idjits have run their oil extraction/export infrastructure into the ground through mismanagement and corruption (lack of capital investment) - the same is true in Mexico.

The mullah regime has to import lots of refined petroleum products because they've so messed up their refinery capacity, and their oil extraction/export infrastructure is rapidly approaching the same state. Our sanctions contribute to this, but only to a marginal degree.

There isn't enough graft to go around in iran even now. Things will blow when Iran's oil export income collapses from a rapid decline in production, and that day is approaching just as it is in Mexico.

The mullah regime has had nuclear weapons for almost 15 years - it bought some x-Soviet nuclear weapons in the early 1990's. Those have since decayed into uselessness, but have been immensely useful for research.

IMO Iran has had 1-2 working nuclear weapons for at least a year now, either purchased from or made from fissionables/components manufactured in North Korea. See my article.

The big question is how many of Iran's nukes are suitable for use as missile warheads. Right now only the ones using U-235 triggers are, and they have IMO at most 2-4 because those use gun-type triggers which are very, very wasteful of weapons-grade U-235.

Once they test one or several plutonium implosion-type devices, they'll be able to retrofit all their stocks of plutonium warheads into ones suitable for use on missiles in a few months.

Trent Telenko's posts at Winds of Change have a lot more information on this.

My opinion as to the date of Iran's first test is based on my personal assessment of open-source material, including the statements of Iranian officials.

Tom,

"The mullah regime has had nuclear weapons for almost 15 years - it bought some x-Soviet nuclear weapons in the early 1990's."

Could you give an exact citation of the published source for this? Thanks.

Dave,

Do a search at Windsofchange.net for Telenko Iran Soviet nukes purchase, and ditto for a Google search.

I don't have the links to the sources you ask for. Trent has put them in several of his posts at WOC.

So, Lebs Armee stayed totally out of the conflict
and hid in a ditch as the Blue and Whites crushed marionites, druse, sunni and shiia alike.

Maybe the halfbillion in army money paid for some
anti-tank rockets, maybe some of it was slipped to
the people defending and wham! there goes 30 tank/apc
and a couple copters, even ships, bye bye Blue-whites, hello cedar trees armoured divisions.
Easier than bringing the stuff in
over the mountains from Iran, or even syria. If I were the lebs I would be buying more anti-tank systems now and slipping them to the patriots.

Tom,

I entered the search terms but turned up nothing. Did you check out the independent substantiation of this claim for yourself?

test message to see if this goes through.

OK, Dave, here goes again. I tried to respond to you earlier but the board software said the post had to be approved, and the dearth of posts today indicated that the software was eating posts.

Here is a Winds of Change thread with the links and summaries you want:

http://www.windsofchange.net/archives/008611.php

Look in particular at Trent Telenko's posts Nos. 26 and 27.

Here is another link:

http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/1825_1864.html

Tom,

Thanks for the links.

None of the references in these links confirm that Iran obtained Soviet nuclear weapons in the early 1990s; they are all reports of rumors or unsubstantiated allegations, although some turned up in reputable newspapers.

The transfer to which I think you refer was the rumored acquisition of some ex-Soviet warheads in Kazakhstan by Iran without the codes necessary for them to work as nuclear weapons. This wouldn't surprise me if it happened but from your words I thought you were saying that Iran had actually obtained nuclear weapons capable of being used as nuclear weapons. Glad to learn that this was not the case.

Dave,

They didn't buy the codes with with the warheads, they bought them separately. The major problem with those warheads was that they were past their useable lifespan when sold.

The Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces used liquid-fueled ICBM's which required periodic fueling and defueling cycles that drastically reduced their service life. Basically they were worn out after about 7-10 years, and placed in reserve.

Soviet plutonium production was drastically effected, just as everything else was, by the relatively small numbers of competent production staff and the scarce, expensive, nature of the components fo nuclear reactors and the reactors themselves.

This dramatically reduced the marginal cost of cooking the last bits of plutonium-240 and other radioactive impurities from Soviet weapons-grade plutonium (as pure as possible P-239 is desirable).

It was significantly cheaper overall for the Soviets to accept the higher degree of impurities in the fissionables in their nuclear warheads, which really dramatically reduced their effective storage life, and constantly send the warheads back for disassembly and recooking of their fissionables.

So they matched the service life of their ICBM warheads to the service life of their ICBM's.

This meant there was (and still is) a constant parade of ICBM warheads between the assembly plants/reactors and the ICBM fields.

My information is that the warheads the Iranians bought were past their delivery date, and decayed into pretty much uselessness within 5-8 years after the mullahs bought them.

The chief of Strategic Rocket Forces during Yeltsin's first term said that he was more concerned that his crews would throw in free delivery when they sold nuclear warheads than he was about them selling the warheads alone.

oog, preview is my friend

drastically ICREASED the marginal cost of cooking the last bits of ...

Who knew that New Jersey was so elegant and accurate with words when it came to the Middle East and France:

"Sir, France's insistence ("Paris insists Hizbollah removes its weapons", August 16) that Hizbollah be disarmed before a French-led United Nations force is deployed in southern Lebanon recalls Aesop's fable about a meeting of mice whose ranks have been ravaged by a fearsome house cat.

One mouse proposes that a bell be placed around the cat's neck as an early warning system. After that proposal is unanimously acclaimed, a second mouse rises to raise a pesky logistical point that often bedevils UN resolutions: "Which of us is going to bell the cat?" "

http://pienso.typepad.com/pienso/2006/08/cat_and_mouse_g.html