Well, it's an unknown all right. A few notes about Stratfor's analysis, though:

First, it discounts Israel's stated rationale for striking targets outside Hezbollah-controlled territory -- that it holds Lebanon responsible for Hezbollah's conduct and expects it to honor commitments made to disarm Hezbollah. I don't agree with this rationale, in fact I think it profoundly unrealistic. The question is whether the Israeli government believes it. My guess is that elements of it, at least, do.

Second, if I'm trying to make it more difficult for supplies and reinforcements to reach Hezbollah, coastal targets in Lebanon are not my first priority. How much help is Hezbollah really likely to get through Lebanese ports and the Beirut International Airport? Now, I don't have access to any tactical data beyond what's available online, so if I'm missing something it serves me right for sticking my neck out. But the strategy the Stratfor guys attribute to Israel would seem to point in the direction of more strikes on routes leading from Hezbollah's territory to Syria and fewer on the Lebanese coast than we've seen so far.

Third, the fact that Israel did not initiate hostilities across its northern border suggests to me that decisions to smash Hezbollah with a ground attack -- let alone attack Syria -- are probably still being debated in Tel Aviv. It's no more than common sense not to launch a major offensive on one front when you've got resources tied down somewhere else (as Israel does, in Gaza) if you can avoid it. I'm not sure what the basis is for thinking the Israeli government has decided it can't avoid the offensive Stratfor is talking about -- not that it might not come to that conclusion eventually, but other things being equal Israel would likely have preferred to keep its northern border quiet, and the success of Hezbollah's initial raid suggests a certain level of IDF complacency, complacency inconsistent with Israel's being able to transition swiftly into a major ground offensive.

Finally, and on the assumption that returning to major ground combat in Lebanon is not something Israel is eager to do, we ought to consider what past Israeli practice toward terrorist groups tells us about what it would prefer to do now. It seems to me that killing Nasrallah and perhaps some of his close associates would accomplish Israeli military objectives well enough to make Tel Aviv open to a ceasefire and eventual prisoner exchange. Strikes on terrorist leaders have been seen much more often than major ground operations when Israel has sought to weaken groups like Islamic Jihad and Hamas; why would Israel not be waiting to see if it can weaken Hezbollah in the same way?

I don't know if this is possible. Nasrallah has evidently protected himself against assassination with fairly elaborate measures, and while Israel's information as to the location of specific terrorist leaders in the occupied territories has often been quite precise this isn't true in Lebanon. The question is how quickly would Israel give up on this option in favor of a ground offensive.

This all relates only to Israeli objectives and strategy. I can't speak at all to those of Hezbollah, except to note that Hezbollah's leaders have long made it clear they want to maintain their arsenal and military organization even as they participate in Lebanese politics. This is much more difficult to justify in the absence of fighting with Israel. I've indicated my skepticism that an Israeli government that appeared perfectly content with the status quo on its northern border is now thinking entirely along the lines of wartime strategy as Stratfor's analysts appear to believe; I am likewise skeptical that Hezbollah thought this conflict through many moves ahead.

Stratfor has since gone beyone the points you discuss and says that Israel is "prepping the battlefield." In their opinion a massive ground assault is coming soon.

My mistake, [I have to organize my notes better] the "prepping the battlefield" analysis is from OPFOR not STRATFOR. Sorry.

I think Stratfor and Zathras made some interesting points, but I don't think they really understand what Hizbullah is or what they are doing, they are trying to see it from a strictly military veiw.

Hizbullah is amazingly organized and tactical. They don't do anything ad hoc or at random. They had multiple plans for this operation, depending on the Israeli reaction. There is no doubt.

I think the most likley case is that Hizbullah is trying to suck Israel into a huge war ground war. At first, Hizbullah was probably guessing that Israel would do a limited counter attack to free the captured soldiers (because they overestimate how powerful they are and they think Israel is scared of them), but they obviously knew that something this big was likely to break out. As much as they try, I think Israel knows that it will not destroy Hizbullah via air power, so they are forced to make a decision on what to do next. Hizbullah has thousands of tactics ready in case Israel invades.

Hizbullah knows the types of weapons they have, so they are just waiting. Even if Israel attacks on the ground, they will be shocked by how quiet things are at first. The only advantage Israel has is in absolute firepower. But Hizbullah has turned the entire country into a trap for when/if Israel decides to invade. The last war with Hizbullah went from 1982-2000. Hizbullah sees this as a model. They are willing to suffer losses, but they don't stop fighting. Last time they were not ready for Israel, but this time they are. If Israel invades, they are in serious trouble. In the original attack, out of the blue, Hizbullah ambushed Israeli positions, killed 8, captured 2, and blew up 2 tanks while losing none of their own. This was a perfect example of their fighting model. The whole war will be like that if Israel decides to invade (though, I am sure Hizbullah will suffer losses). I am sure Hizbullah has planned for it.

Hizbullah is shooting a limited number of rockets in an effort to tempt Israel to either invade or at some point be forced to admit that it is defeated, they are just trying to balance Israeli attacks so it does not seem like they are doing nothing. Today Nasrallah said they purposly missed some chemical plant in Haifa. Again, this is to tempt Israel to invade. If they do not, Hizbullah will just increase the violence of their strikes and will probably try to do something major. Hizbullah is not willing to fight Israel head on, and they have captured the Israeli troops and will use them as leverage in the future if Israel does not free them. So, from Hizbullah's view, they are really in the driver's seat. Israel has already proven that they are criminals, thereby justifying Hizbullah's original attack (from Hizbullah's view). In the process Hizbullah has conclusively shown that the Americans are not allies and don't care about Lebanon (will not call for a cease fire). Also, Hizbullah called on Arab countries to help support them. As many Arab governments are American puppets, they are setting them all up for defeat too. In his speeches, Nasrallah is almost explicit in this being one of his goals.

The other thing in their advantage is that Hizbullah is not something you can just bomb and defeat, you can't even kill them, they are more of an ideology then anything else. Just as killing Rantizi and Sheik Yassin didn't stop Hamas, killing Nasrallah will not stop Hizbullah. They are fighting for a greater justice then the life of any individual.

Israel is facing a no-win situation. They will not beat Hizbullah by bombing, but that is what they will probably continue to do. Because they can't win this way, at some point the bombing will have to come to an end and Hizbullah will still be holding the Israeli soldiers and Israel will be forced to negotiate for them. At that point Israel will have to give significantly more for them then they would have if they would not have bombed to begin with (because Hizbullah will have shown that bombing does not work on them) and that will be a clear victory for Hizbullah. Otherwise, like I said before, Hizbullah is just waiting for Israel to invade by the ground. Like with the last war, Hizbullah is willing to fight for decades this way. But also, in every case, Israel is running the risk of serious escalation by involving Syria and Iran. At some point, even though Syria is weak and does not want any part of the fighting (as Stratfor says), they will be forced to get involved. Either if Israel attacks them like Michael Ladeen wants at the NRO blog, or if the Lebanese casulties become to much to bear if the bombings continue. If Syria gets involved, there is almost no stopping Iran from bombing Israel, attacking American troops in Iraq and cutting off oil supplies. This case will almost surely overthrow every pro-American Arab government because they can't sit by and watch a full regional war without getting involved.

I don't see how Israel can come out ahead in this. The best situation is if Israel just accepts that it will not destroy Hizbullah and just stops bombing and does a prisoner swap with Hizbullah. Of course, this is not possible domestically for Israel. The only other option is if the "international community" steps in and forces a cease fire. Israel will not get its troops back that way, but it will not be forced into a defeat if it stands down that way. Lebanon is going to take a lot of suffering no matter what happens, it already has. let's just hope this stays local to Lebanon and does not become a full scale regional war.

From reading the Israeli press my impression is that they are trying to avoid sending in large amounts of ground troops at all costs and trying to prepare the home front for a prolonged situation of rocket and missile fire. While the military seemed to have caught by surprise with the missile attack on the Israeli naval ship, they clearly are aware of the difficult which ground troops would encounter in southern Lebanon. Also while some Israeli commentators and politicians have been speaking of "destroying Hezbollah", some of the more level-headed ones have spoken of "removing Hezbollah from the border" and "severely damaging Hezbollah", more realistic expectations.

Or, maybe it's time for a knock-down, drag-out, gud guys vs bad guys full-scale brawl designed to weaken these bozos (Hezbolla, Palestinian terror goons, etc.) that they can never be a threat again. Nice thought, but probably "cooler" heads will prevail and instead of standing beside the Israelis in their fight for survival, we'll just put them back on the leash.

I'm not as knowledgable as to the nuts and bolts of this situation as other commenters. However, I am old enough to remember 1973, 1967 and even 1948.

The Arabs (and Iran, yes I realize they're not Arabs) talk a much better game than they play. They have always been defeated by Israel (and abjectly so).

Damon Runyon once said, "Yes, the race is not always to the swift, or the battle to the strong, but that's the way to bet".

r, maybe it's time for a knock-down, drag-out, gud guys vs bad guys full-scale brawl designed to weaken these bozos (Hezbolla, Palestinian terror goons, etc.) that they can never be a threat again. Nice thought, but probably "cooler" heads will prevail and instead of standing beside the Israelis in their fight for survival, we'll just put them back on the leash.

Well, if that was that easy to destroy Hezbollah, why didn;t Israel do it in its 20 yhear occupation of Southern Lebanon ?

Of course, maybe our interests don't coincide completely with those of Israel. We would like to see Hezbollah destroyed but probably not if it means turning Lebanon back to the civil war stage. Oddly enough, we should consider our interests rather than Israeli interests --- after all thats we do when considering foreign policsy elsehwere (whether it beneffits the US rather than another state).

Yost -- your points are generally correct (although Iran has never fought Israel directly), but I think Hezbollah and evevn Hamas have some deep rooted popular support. Exterminating a partly undergroiund organization is a lot more difficult than wiping out a corrupt and inefficient Egyptian army. See the US and Iraq for an example.

The Arabs (and Iran, yes I realize they're not Arabs) talk a much better game than they play. They have always been defeated by Israel (and abjectly so).

Well, in wars for territory, they've been defeated.

If Israel's goal is to annex southern Lebanon, and they can avoid sparking WWIII, I think they'd probably win.

Of course, they'd then be stuck fighting another interminable counterinsurgency against angry Lebanese who would coalesce around an even stronger Hezbollah.

Generally speaking, the analysis in 6 and 7 displays a particular illness which seems to be infecting the right wing. That is, the belief that military superiority and will (to crush our enemies) are sufficient in this war-thing being fought in the middle east.

a particular illness which seems to be infecting the right wing.

Of course, the left wing's illness is having no alternatives, just criticism.

DivGuy, could you offer up an different approach?

Many seem to think that Lebanese people will rally behind Hizbullah if Israel invades the country. However, I wouldn't be surprised if this confrontation costs Hizbullah popular support. Lebanese people may think Hizbullah is plunging the country into another conflict just when it was coming out of one.
If Israel can limit its incursion to Hizbullah's territory and avoid humiliating the whole population, it may even get the support of the government of Lebanon in crushing Hizbullah.

Of course, the left wing's illness is having no alternatives, just criticism.

DivGuy, could you offer up an different approach?

First, rightwingers are calling for a campaign of massive destruction wreaked against civilian targets. I don't think one needs to have a fully coherent policy proposal to oppose that.

Second, the idea that there are no alternatives suggests you haven't made even the slightest effort to look them up.

America
Abroad, calling for engagement and negotiation as opposed to Bush's inexplicable hands-off approach.

Brookings Institute, insanely detailed policy paper on Israel/Palestine problem.

Center for American Progress, plan for redloyment of troops in Iraq.

The problems in the Middle East are being exacerbated by Bush's refusal to join in and help broker an end to the conflict. The left wing line is pretty clearly that our responsibility has always been to defuse these sorts of problems, and that's what we should do today.

A whole lot of the right wing seems to think that the will to kill more civilians is necessary. I'm opposing that position.

Another one:

Suzanne Nossel, arguing for a ceasefire negotiation and UN peacekeeping.

Isreal couldnt hold Southern Lebanon before, there is no reason to think they have the political will to absorb the costs of holding it now. Sure, they can grab it for a while, but sooner or later they will be obliged to return to their borders. Unless Hezbollah can be decisively defeated and a new power structure established, invading will be a long term negative for Israel. This is a tough nut to crack, and probably impossible so long as Hezbollah has a Syrian refuge to fall back on. Unless Israel has some secret agreement or understanding with the Lebanese, I dont see the endgame here.

It seems my first post didn't get through.

I linked to leftish policy papers, including Brookings on policy options in Israel/Palestine, a redloyment plan for Iraq from the Center for American Progress, and a call for US engagement with Lebanon from America Abroad.

My point was that DrKnow seems to want others to do his research. I'm helping out this once to show that the "no ideas" canard only works if you never put any effort into looking up ideas.

I add that I don't think one needs a comprehensive policy position to oppose calls for a massive escalation of conflict in the middle east, especially calls for actions that would lead to massive US attacks on civilian targets.

ah, I think my link-heavy posts are getting caught in the spam filter. I'll try once more, but I apologize to Dan for creating problems here.

It seems my first post didn't get through.

I linked to leftish policy papers, including Brookings on policy options in Israel/Palestine, a redloyment plan for Iraq from the Center for American Progress, and a call for US engagement with Lebanon from America Abroad. These are all easily accessible on their websites.

My point was that DrKnow seems to want others to do his research. I'm helping out this once to show that the "no ideas" canard only works if you never put any effort into looking up ideas.

I add that I don't think one needs a comprehensive policy position to oppose calls for a massive escalation of conflict in the middle east, especially calls for actions that would lead to massive US attacks on civilian targets.

DivGuy,

I've read 2 of the 3 above that you cite previously. I am not asking you to do my research, just didn't know what you felt were reasonable alternatives.

I'm sincerely interested in a solution, but I think most of the "left wing" ideas assume that Palestinians genuinely are looking for a two-state solution.

The reality is that they are looking for a one-state solution. Its called Palestine.

Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah openly support the destruction of Israel.

Less spoken about but perhaps more importantly, are that Arabic speeches in the past have included thinking to the effect of: "We'll take one half for now through negotiation, and when we are able, we will take the rest of Palestine in the future."

The flip side of this argument, is that there is little evidence that the Arabs truly would allow the existence of Israel if they had the ability to destroy it.

So I'll ask it differently, which proposed solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict accept the reality above?

Unless Israel has some secret agreement or understanding with the Lebanese, I dont see the endgame here.

Mark, I think this is they key. Not necessarily a secret understanding, but at minimum, calling the Lebanese government's bluff. They have said that they have no control over Southern Lebanon, and therefore cannot control Hezbollah. If Israel does provide the Lebanese this control, then perhaps things change in Lebanon for the better.

I'm sincerely interested in a solution, but I think most of the "left wing" ideas assume that Palestinians genuinely are looking for a two-state solution.

The reality is that they are looking for a one-state solution. Its called Palestine.

Often, I like to cite evidence for my claims.

The latest polling reports I've seen found:

Indeed, a majority of Palestinians are willing to accept the two-state solution, even when this entails a formula whereby Palestinians recognize Israel “as the state of the Jewish people” and Palestine “as the state of the Palestinian people.” In June 2003, 52 percent supported and 46 percent opposed this formula, and by September 2005 support rose to 63 percent and opposition dropped to 35 percent.

I'm wondering - what is the upshot of your belief that the Palestinians will not support a two-state solution? Do you think that Hamas and Hezbollah and their supporters need to be "wiped out"? Are you supporting the attacks on civilians - or on the meaning of the word "civilian" - that would be necessitated by this strategy?

I also note that you began by saying the left "no alternatives, just criticism".

You've now stepped back from that to argue that leftish ideas are based on a set of suppositions with which you disagree. That seems to be true of, well, all political disagreements.

And you've acknowledged that there are a wide variety of ideas from the center/left foreign policy establishment on how to deal with these issues, and you've acknowledged you've read their papers. I can only really conclude that your initial post in this thread was purely dishonest.

DivGuy,

Read my first post more carefully.

I said the illness was "no alternatives, just criticism"- I did not connect this explicitly to the Arab-Israeli conflict, it was a general point. I know there are alternatives on the left, in fact, the most informed ones I've seen are those put out by leftist political parties in Israel, such as Meretz (no American bias/arrogance on your part, huh?)

I was questioning whether you had the "illness" with respect to the Arab-Israel conflict. Which is why I asked YOU for alternatives, not whether there were any.

Be careful over there with the accusations.

DivGuy,

Do you mind reading my prior post again? I think you may have missed the evidence part (I'm not going to track down a link for every statement, this isn't a PhD dissertation).

Given the promises of a "two-state solution now, one-state solution later"-- would you expect polling in 2003-2005 to be any different?

Doesn't the election of two political parties (Hamas in Palestinian authority, Hizbollah in Lebanon) that calls for the destruction of Israel provide more evidence? (Please don't tell me the "social services arm versus military arm" bit, there were clear political consequences to electing Hamas and they were chosen anyways.)

So, multiple polls of the Palestinian people can be dismissed because of some anecdotes you've heard about Arabic speeches?

Your evidence was at best tangential to your claim.

Under your methodolgy for evidence, the earlier election of Fatah showed that the Palestinians supported a two-state solution.

Whoops, Hamas didn't participate in the '96 elections, so I guess one could argue that the Palestinians didn't have a choice then. It seems like a hard stance to hold, given that support for the peace talks in the 90s was quite high, but I guess you could hold that.

My argument rests primarily on the polling data. You argued that hte Palestinians so powerfully oppose a two-state solution that the US should act as if it is not a possibility, and the polls argue that this is incorrect.

So you rely on polling data and reject election results. You work for the DNC?

DivGuy,

Did you just read what Mark said? Polling data versus actual elections? And the elections data is more current?

Here was my point, if you somehow missed it...

Doesn't the election of two political parties (Hamas in Palestinian authority, Hizbollah in Lebanon) that calls for the destruction of Israel provide more evidence? (Please don't tell me the "social services arm versus military arm" bit, there were clear political consequences to electing Hamas and they were chosen anyways.)

joe m:

Don't underestimate the rage at Hezbollah in Lebanon, if Israel climbs down now, and does engage in a protracted war involving all of Lebanon. A UN cease fire would work best for such a strategy. So, yeah, there is a way Hezbollah can lose this thing.

Whether it is Israel's most likely step is another thing. If the US put real, honest to gosh pressure on Israel now, it might be able to force something like this. Unfortunately, Bush is willing to sacrifice positive development in Lebanon over the past year in order to let the Isrealis have their way. I think this is one instance where it is pretty clear US and Isreali interests are different in the short-term, and the US is not acting in its best short-term interest. I think we can agree that inflaming the shia is not going to help our cause in Iraq, where we have our troops.

(Long-term is a debatable question, and I'm not going to try to start that debate today.)

First, election data is not necessarily a perfect match for individual issue data.

The Republicans won the election in 2004. They support social security privatization. However, when the issue came up for debate, majorities of the country opposed the legislation and it was never implemented.

Now, the recognition of Israel is a bigger deal than social security, so election data may be a better proxy here. But it's still a proxy figure, not a direct statement of public opinion on a specific issue - which is what DrKnow was talking about.

However, DrKnow's initial post requires a much higher standard than mere public support. He's arguing that leftish foreign policy alternatives should be dismissed because they are based on the incorrect belief that "the Palestinians" support a two-state solution. But what does that mean, exactly?

Now, no one is arguing that all Palestians support a peace plan. Obviously, "The Palestinians" are not a single bloc. Some are against a two-state solution. Hamas won 44% of the vote to Fatah's 42%. Polls a bit earlier showed strong, but certainly not absolute support for a two-state solution. The point has always been that enough support a peace plan now, and the support will grow as domestic institutions are strengthened.

It seems to me that a slight majority - which is the best you can make out of this data - opposing a two-state solution is hardly reason to dismiss all policy proposals working toward that.

My point is that peace talks have significant support among the Palestinians. It's a possibility, and it's the best reasonable solution I know of. That seems like more than enough reason to build policy proposals based around a two-state solution.

"My point is that peace talks have significant support among the Palestinians. It's a possibility, and it's the best reasonable solution I know of. That seems like more than enough reason to build policy proposals based around a two-state solution."

First of all, most people believe in deeds, not words, when dealing with people you have been fighting with for decades. Secondly, if the Palestinian people believe a peaceful 2 state solution is their most important issue, they wont elect a party that doesnt even recognize the existance of Israel. Finally, there isnt an Israeli scenario on the table anymore that doesnt ultimately end in a two state solution. All the Palestinians would have had to do is wait, if nothing else. Now they have to wait longer, because the supposed majority who want peace and coexistance cant begin to control the minority who are going to attack Israel no matter what anyone says. There is nothing Israel can do about that faction except try to kill them when they kill Israelis.

The Palestinians have been given the opportunity to reign in the terrorist faction many times. They have failed to once again, and whether it is because the majority doesnt actually want the peaceful 2 state solution enough to fight for it or they just arent strong enough to win is immaterial to the Israelis. Its not possible nor morally necessary for the Israelis to make the Palestinians come to the table in good faith.

It seems to me that a slight majority - which is the best you can make out of this data - opposing a two-state solution is hardly reason to dismiss all policy proposals working toward that.

Sorry, no one is dismissing all policy proposals for a two state solution. I don't know anyone, besides Palestinians (and a few extremist Jews and Christians) that is arguing for anything BUT a two-state solution.

The difference with the so-called "leftist" proposals is that they require Israel to put at risk its own security by trusting that your "hunch" (based primarily on poll data by your own admission!) that Palestinians' "support will grow as domestic institutions are strengthened."

Israel is willing to do even that, though at a significantly more moderated pace, and after the Palestinians have demonstrated some good faith. The left, and more notably Europeans, have consistently established performance standards for the Palestinian side (choose your standard- stop killing civilians, dismantle terrorist infrastructure, and the latest: just withdraw the Hamas charter clause for the destruction of israel), that after not being met, are either downgraded or ignored.

There comes a point in time, when you say "here are the terms of agreement, and if one side doesn't meet them, then there is no agreement."

When does the "left" reach that point?

"It seems to me that a slight majority - which is the best you can make out of this data - opposing a two-state solution is hardly reason to dismiss all policy proposals working toward that."

When they choose to fight a guerilla war, a lot less than 50% will pretty much do it. If we got 80% in support of a 2-state solution we might have enough Palestinians willing to rat out Hamas to make things worse. 50% isn't even close to enough when we are talking about a population that has routinely turned to terrorism.

And we must remember that there is nothing approaching Western political freedom in Gaza and the West Bank. Hell, anywhere in the Arab world for that matter.

The one staters are walking around with guns and lots of backing from Syria, Saudi, Iran, and others. The live-and-let-live voices of moderation keep their heads down lest they get accused of collaborating with Israel. For accused collaborators, punishment is swift, severe, and to our Western sensibilities, due process is sorely lacking.

Does anyone think Israel could get away with attacking Hezbollah inside Syria, if they strictly avoid attacking anything explicitly Syrian? If I've learned anything about military history, it's that you do the most damage to the enemy when he breaks and runs away (c.f. Basra Death Road, 1991). Assuming Israel does eventually launch a ground attack in southern Lebanon, I find it hard to imagine that Hezbollah will last terribly long in a straight fight against the IDF. And in fact, as lessons from Iraq & Afghanistan, Ho Chi Min and Mao Zedong, and even our own George Washington show us, it would be foolish for them to make the attempt. Their route to victory is through simple survival, not the "decisive battle". It's more likely that they melt away ahead of the Israeli advance, concentrating occasionally when isolated and temporarily weak Israeli targets present themselves, but generally keeping out of the way.

So given that, and the analysis from Stratfor (which incidentally was mirrored in an article on Haaretz), the most likely scenario seems to be a few more days or weeks of Israeli bombing to take out the larger missiles and block as many avenues of retreat and reinforcement as possible, followed by a substantial ground invasion to finish the job. However, if Hezbollah is able to find safe haven in Syria, Israel can not finish them off. This is not an entirely useless result, as in all probability Hezbollah's heavy weapons end up mostly destroyed or left behind, which buys northern Israel a degree of security (though temporary, because if Hezbollah is not destroyed outright, sooner or later they'll be back). But what if Israel continues to pound them even over the border into Syria, but does limit itself (insofar as possible) to hitting only Hezbollah targets there? Does Syria respond? Does Iran?

It's really hard to see what Iran could do about it directly. Over the long term, sure, more support for Hamas and what, if anything, remains of Hezbollah. But in terms of short term direct action, it's hard to see. Would they fire long range missiles at Israel and risk the inevitable response? Everyone says they could close the straights of Hormuz. Ok, maybe they could, for a while. But if they actually fire on a tanker there, they would be giving Bush the cassus belli that he's been looking for. The cost to Iran of closing the straights could well be an American air campaign that both eliminates the Iranian gulf coast missile batteries as well as of course degrading their nuclear program. Could that possibly be worth it to them? I'm having a hard time seeing it. Not to mention the fact that this would end up cutting off their own oil exports too, which, as near as I can tell, are their primary source of hard currency. How do they fund their nuclear program without their oil exports? How do they keep the masses in line without that cash flow?

In conclusion, I think Israel *could* likely get away with attacking Hezbollah in the border area just inside Syria, and from a strictly military perspective, would likely be wise to do so, if the situation arises. I admit I don't know anything about that area though, so if it's heavily settled in such a way that large scale civilian casualties would result, then the opportunity may be illusory.

Assuming Israel does eventually launch a ground attack in southern Lebanon, I find it hard to imagine that Hezbollah will last terribly long in a straight fight against the IDF

Is 20 years long ? Hezbollah managed to survive for that long not just against Israel but against other factions in the brutal, bloody Lebanese Civil war. Of course Hezbollah wouldn't last against the IDF in an open fight, which is why they would resort to an underground fighting. Imagine a far more organized and better equipped underground army (with more popular support, certainly in the Shia areas) than the Sunni insurgents in Iraq and you have an idea of what a headache it could be to destroy Hezbollah without massive civilian damage.

I can well see Israel knocking out many Hezbollah positions near the border and creatign a buffer area. I cannot see them taking South Beirut for instance, as that is precisely the sort of brutal bloody urban battle that they would like to avoid.

I think Israel's goal is indeed to create a buffer zone to reduce danger from missiles, and possibly to take out Hezbollah's military leadership. I think they can create the former, the latter is likely to prove quite difficult.

I think erg is right. The good news is that Israel understands the terrain they are on better than anyone. The IDF doesnt want to blunder back into Lebanon and get caught up in another indefinite proxy war.

The problem is time is not on Israel's side, even with a buffer zone. Hezbollah has shown itself capable of launching thousands of rockets and missiles into Israel- that capability is only going to enhance with time. Better range and more lethality. In the long run, a buffer zone with UN monitors or peacekeepers could work to Hezbollahs advantage, keeping the Israeli ground forces at bay while they launch their endless supply of Iranian rockets. That is a real threat to Israeli security.

I dont see the endgame here for Israel. Whats the point of isolating southern lebanon when its adjacent to Syria? All the infastructure bombing will be repaired enough to resume arms transfer in weeks. If there is not going to be a ground operation, everything they have done is pointless. If there is going to be a ground operation, they are telegraphing the advance and giving the terrorists ample time to go to ground or retreat to Syria.

So, it's all reactive on Israel's part against big bad Islamic terrorism, eh? I think not. For Israel, this is a "politically safe" time-- if strategically suicidal-- because few in Congress would dare risk the Jewish vote criticizing Israel. But did Bush screw Olmert as he screwed the East Euros (example: Belarus opposition now put in prison for five years and not a word from Bush, who saw Putin's soul). Let us recall that Olmert came to Bush requesting $10 billion-- yes billions!-- in return for vacating 45% of West Bank. Olmert is in troulble; with the coalition he cobbled, he has to pay off both rich and poor and can't afford it because Minister of Finance Netanyahu tried to break free of US dole of $4 billion/year. So, did Bush say: O.K., I'll give you the doe, but first I got a job for you to do to get people's minds off Iraq in November. First, attack Hezzbollah (preprepared plan of attack and impliment at first provocation). Then invade Lebanon; then go after Syria...then, of course, finally go after Iran. Don't worry, as you get bogged down, the US will come to your aid. No one will object, for fear of seeming "anti-Israel," and I-- GW Bush-- can be a "war president" again asking the people to support my party's majority over the "cut and run" Dems.

But, Olmert, whose sons refused to serve in the army and wife is a leftist, had become a sort of pacifist. Now he may regret Bush welching on him when the polls don't rha, rha for Israel's Juggernaut. Bush is not reliable and Olmert never led-- and never went to war. The generals are repeating 67, but while we rush them bombs to finish off Hezzbollah's Shiites and attack Shiite Iran, we are trying to create "our" own Iraq regime from the Shiites of Iraq. It all sounds to me like Bushit and I'm scared for our kids in harm's way...Oh, you say, "ain't my kid going to Iraq." Well, if you feel that way, since this is YOUR America, maybe I should leave because it's not the America I believed in all my life..