Wednesday, May 3, 2006

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I say 51% idealism, you say 49%

Foreign Policy's Passport blog is quickly acquiring must-read status among the hard-working staff here at danieldrezner.com. Even if you disagree with the content, it's certainly thought-provoking.

Which brings me to James Forsyth's post about the Democrats and foreign policy. The hook is the release of Madeleine Albright’s new book The Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on America, God and World Affairs:

Albright is the wise woman of the Democratic Party on national security. Her prestigious Georgetown salon operates as a crash course in international relations for Dems with presidential ambitions. So, her work on the role of religion in foreign policy is required reading for anyone who wants to understand what a Democratic administration would do differently. After finishing it, the conclusion I came to was: surprisingly little. Yes, Albright bashes the Bush administration for Iraq, Guantanamo, and its religiously tinged language. But when she starts talking about the future rather than the past, she sounds none too different from her father’s most famous -- and favorite -- pupil, Condoleezza Rice. Albright’s call to “blend realism with idealism,” by promoting democracy at a gradual pace, wouldn’t sound out of place in any of Rice’s speeches about the administration’s goals in the Middle East. All of which suggests that, the democratizing baby won’t be thrown out with the Bush bath water and supports Jai's argument that Middle Eastern tyrants hoping to wait out Bush are wasting their time.
This does raise an interesting question: are people who reject Bush's current foreign policy are promoting something that looks awfully similar on a lot of dimensions? Is Francis Fukuyama's "realistic Wilsonianism" so different from plain vanilla neoconservatism? Is George Clooney clamoring for intervention in Darfur any different from the humanitarian impulse (yes, there were others) that led neocons to clamor for intervention in Iraq (a point some on the left recognize)? Is the only difference between Republicans and Democrats a slight variant in the realism-idealism mix?

Actually, yes, I think there is a difference -- but it's about process and not preferences. The primary difference between liberal interventionists and neocons is that the former group thinks intervention is more successful if it takes place through the multilateral route. Multilateralism acts as a "pleasing illusion" to simultaneously obscure and enhance American power.

Which is great, when it works -- except that neocons raise a valid point when they highlight how difficult it is to get mulilateralism to work. On Darfur, for example, the past four years have been a giant game of hot potato between the United States, the UN, NATO, the EU, and the African Union about who will shoulder the burden. Daniel Davies is correct to point out that negotiations to date have the precise cast of liberal internationalism. There are times when unilateral action has the appeal of slicing the Gordian knot of multilateral diplomacy.

Liberal internationalists are correct to point out the negative fallout of unilateral military action. But liberal like Allbright are guilty of sidestepping questions of what to do when all the diplomacy in the world won't muster the necessary international consensus.

This is one reason why Fukuyama's "multi-multilateralism" concept intrigues me. In a world of multiple, overlapping international institutions, forum-shopping becomes a possibility. This allows realpolitik tactics within an institutionalist rubric. That said, Darfur shows the limitations of this gambit when there is a lack of consensus.

[Get to the grand conclusion--ed. I don't have one -- this is an age-old policy conundrum. But I'm sure my readers can cut through this Gordian knot.]

posted by Dan on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM




Comments:

I for one, and I suspect most people who would call themselves committed multilateralists, think there is a huge difference between unilateral intervention for purely humanitarian reasons in Darfur (which I would wholeheartedly support) and Iraq (which I would not support unless it had broad international backing).

posted by: Mads Kvalsvik on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



Mads, doesn't the failure of the international community to act in Darfur cast at least some suspicion on its ability to choose when action is appropriate?

posted by: Sebastian Holsclaw on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



I thought Peter Beinart's recent article in the April 30 NYT Magazine, "The Rehabilitation of the Cold-War Liberal", did a good job of describing the ideological difference between liberal and conservative views of foreign policy. Liberals emphasize moral humility and acceptance of human fallibility, including our own; conservatives emphasize moral clarity and the need to distinguish between good and evil. (I suspect the former view would be more easily accepted abroad.)

"In the late 1940's and 1950's, intellectuals like Reinhold Niebuhr and policymakers like George F. Kennan described America's cold-war struggle differently from their conservative counterparts: as a struggle not merely for democracy but for economic opportunity as well, in the belief that the former required the latter to survive. Even more important, they described America itself differently. Americans may fight evil, they argued, but that does not make us inherently good. And paradoxically, that very recognition makes national greatness possible. Knowing that we, too, can be corrupted by power, we seek the constraints that empires refuse. And knowing that democracy is something we pursue rather than something we embody, we advance it not merely by exhorting others but by battling the evil in ourselves. The irony of American exceptionalism is that by acknowledging our common fallibility, we inspire the world.

"To understand this liberal story, it helps to understand the origins of the conservative one that we hear all around us today. George W. Bush's foreign policy is often attributed to neoconservatives, the ex-liberals and radicals who began moving right in the 1960's. But in fact, the vision Bush inherited from Reagan dates back a generation earlier, to the birth of the modern conservative movement itself. Since the mid-1950's, when William F. Buckley's new journal, National Review, created the ideological synthesis that still defines the American right, one overriding fear has haunted conservative foreign policy: the fear that Americans cannot distinguish good from evil."

posted by: Russil Wvong on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



...liberal[s] like Allbright are guilty of sidestepping questions of what to do when all the diplomacy in the world won't muster the necessary international consensus.

What "necessary international consensus"? "Necessary" for what?

In the case of Darfur, as in most cases, a commitment to multilateralism is a commitment to impotence and inaction. Anybody who ever pretended that the multilateralist route would accomplish anything at all there was is a fool and/or a liar. That has been obvious from day one.

There's a strong argument to be made that genocide in Darfur has no impact on our vital national interests, so we have no reason to care. There's a much weaker argument that we can curry favor with Islamists by acquiescence, but the no-national-interest argument is sufficient. And it's a perfectly legitimate view.

I'd take the multilateralists seriously if they just said the plain truth out loud: They're happy as a clam if somebody kills a few hundred thousand people on another continent. It works out well for them: They get a solemnly compassionate sound bite or two on TV, which is nice, and maybe even a solemnly compassionate fact-finding vacation. Might even get to meet Bono. Then after the bodies are cold they can write a solemnly compassionate book about What Went Wrong and Never Again. It's all gravy. Beyond that, it means nothing to them. And why shouldn't it? It doesn't affect their lives.


Russil,

The irony of American exceptionalism is that by acknowledging our common fallibility, we inspire the world.

You think? I'm not too sure. Seems to me we've historically been just about the most cocksure nation that ever lived. Where's the evidence that anybody ever admired our humility, or even believed for a moment that we had any? Humility? Us?! Where? When? Who are you trying to kid?

"Humility", forsooth. Has Beinart ever set foot in Manhattan? Has he ever read the New York Times, for that matter?

Anyhow, these days, what self-described "liberals" mostly mean by "inspiring the world" is "trying desperately to please everybody", which is fairly obviously the exact opposite.

Now, if you want to talk about American liberals in the past, let's consider John F. Kennedy and FDR for traces of humility. Or how about LBJ? Yeah, he was all about acknowledging his fallibility. Riiight.


No, the truth is, our national character is a vast, obscenely vulgar hubris, combined with good-natured friendliness, alarmingly bad taste, and zero aptitude for subtlety. Hershey bars and Cadillacs with tailfins. That is what the greatest nation in history looks like. That is what has inspired the world.

I'm not even remotely joking. We rule. Who'd want to become a cheap copy of Belgium?

posted by: P. Froward on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



"except that neocons raise a valid point when they highlight how difficult it is to get mulilateralism to work"

Disagree. Had the U.S. pursued multilateral intervention in Sudan with 1/10th of the zeal it pursued unilateral invasion of Iraq, I think we'd have been there & gone by now.

How many (1) worthwhile goals that (2) the U.S. pursued with genuine vigor have (3) been frustrated by multilateral drag?

posted by: Anderson on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]




I'd take the multilateralists seriously if they just said the plain truth out loud: They're happy as a clam if somebody kills a few hundred thousand people on another continent. It works out well for them:

I'd be perfectly happy if the wingnut warbloggers said it quite openly -- they don't really give a damn about the Iraqi people or any other people in the third world, they just want to kick some Aaarab ass. And I would be perfectly happy if they admitted that they don't give a damn about the humanitarian aspect of the war -- after all you could save far more lives in Africa with just a small portion of the $1 trillion to be spent in Iraq.

posted by: Mark k on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



> except that neocons raise a valid point
> when they highlight how difficult it is
> to get mulilateralism to work.

I suspect the advocate of multilateralism (or any concensus-based process) would tell you that is a feature, not a bug. Concensus-based processes drive "high-energy, goal-directed" people (which the neocons think they are) nuts. That doesn't mean such processes are necessarily flawed.

Cranky

posted by: Cranky Observer on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



Hey, why don't we exhaust all of our multilateral/diplomatic possibilities first, while simultaneously preparing for unilateral intervention. Then, when the diplomatic gordian knot really can't be cut, we'll have prepared to kick some dictator ass by ourselves cuz the french are pussies.

posted by: Joshua Xiong on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



Not to get all political sciency on this, but...
At a certain level, this is an fundamental (insert fancy word like ontological or whatnot here) split-- do you think that process matters, or do you think that outcomes are all that matter.

If you are an outcome-based person, then sure, why waste time with the messiness of multilateralism. You can do more, with less, in half the time. You get results, and results are what matter. People (states) respect results, not process.

If, however, you are a process person, then the messy process of multilateralism is a substantial portion of the game itself. Building coalitions is not just about achieving results, but also about building an international norm that sets the stage for tomorow's international agenda.

So, the question should be: Is it about winning or losing, or is it about how you play the game?

posted by: peter on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



I can't believe that nobody here has mentioned the most important aspect of Albright's foreign policy. Namely, which broach should you wear to convey your attitude??

posted by: MKL on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



Sad that a most important point seems to be lost in this discussion. And that is oil. Yes it is true that both sides talk about bringing justice to people enslaved by tyranny. Kid everybody else but let’s not fool ourselves. There are many places where people are oppressed. Darfur is not just that, it is much much more and so horrific. But it has no oil. The mad-man of bagdad was our dog doing our dirt as he fought the long war with Iran. But then he wouldn’t come to heel. Only people who confine themselves to drivel from a canine related media outlet believe that Iraq is headed anywhere but off a cliff. And did this serve our national interest or that of the Iraqi people. Read some blogs from those who are there…Iraq is hell. Ah but the price of oil is out the roof. Now there is an important interest being served…just not a national interest.

posted by: a student of Aeschylus on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



Disagree. Had the U.S. pursued multilateral intervention in Sudan with 1/10th of the zeal it pursued unilateral invasion of Iraq, I think we'd have been there & gone by now.

The U.S. has. Nothing has happened.

How many (1) worthwhile goals that (2) the U.S. pursued with genuine vigor have (3) been frustrated by multilateral drag?

All of them.


The elephant in the room is this: only the United States CAN act. Even if we get lots of other countries on board with a particular action, even if it's "multilateral" in the sense of being endorsed by the UN or some other international body, no other country, with limited exceptions for France and the UK, have the ability to act. The U.S. has not stopped anybody from acting in Darfur. It didn't stop anybody from acting in Rwanda. But they haven't and didn't, because they couldn't.

Oh, if the only goal is to "peacekeep," then the U.S. can hire some third world country to send some troops to act as UN forces. But if anything needs to be accomplished -- like stopping conflict -- forget it. Other countries don't have the ability to project force around the world.

posted by: David Nieporent on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



At the risk of sounding childish, i think all people wish to fight against injustice where they see it. and i don't think that the difference between the right and left is the difference between unilateralism and multilateralism. I am a leftist, but i believe deeply in the importance of acting in a unilateral way when the need exists. for example, MLK jr. fought many important battles that were basically "unilateral" and unpopular. But i think the key difference is that the right is essentially more arrogant then the left. they philosophically (or often unconsciously) believe faithfully in their own moral superiority (therefore they are conservative) and thus are more likely to think that they have the right and the duty to act on a particular thing that they believe. whereas the left generally is more circumspect in its desire to find truth, and that is why it is liberal and open to other views and more likely to be multilateral.

The trouble with the american political establishment is that most of the time the democrats are politically spineless and abuse "mulitlateralism" as an excuse to actually do nothing. as a result the true left gets convicted of weakness by association.

There should be no doubt, though, that multilateralism is essentially better then unilateralism. If your cause is important and true, it should be reasonable to expect to convince the skeptics, enabling you to act multilaterally and with honor. But humility is a necessary ingredient for this to happen. by definition, multilateralism is more true to the principle of democracy. democracy itself is born from humility. and these days, because of the lack of humility internationally, it is nearly impossible for the American government to convince the skeptics. And that is why the USA is forced to threaten, trick or buy support from those with no horse in any particular race (or a little horse. or a big horse, but lots of threats and money).

My last point is just that I don't believe that bush went to war in Iraq because of a "humanitarian impulse." I believe it was out of idealism, yes, but the idealized notion of power. I don't believe Bush cares any more for the Iraqi people that have died in this war then clinton cares for the ones who died from the sanctions. But i think that when you are in a position of utter power as bush is or clinton was, you are bound to fetishize goals at the expense of lives. Just as Saddam probably had a perfectly rational reason for attacking Iran in 1980, Bush has a perfectly understandable reason for this war with Iraq. this "humanitarian impulse" is simply that, an impulse, not real. but it is built upon a belief of their own superiority that is masked behind the words like "freedom", "justice", "civilization" and "democracy". Unfortunately, these become all the more meaningless the more they are used to justify the next massacre.

posted by: joe m. on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



I think Gandhi expressed that point best when he said:
"What difference does it make to the dead, the orphans, and the homeless, whether the mad destruction is wrought under the name of totalitarianism or the holy name of liberty and democracy?"

and yes, i know, leaving quotes like that is annoying.

posted by: joe m. on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



"Albright is the wise woman of the Democratic Party on national security."

Albright as the "wise woman"? Funny, this sounds like the same Madeleine Albright who, in a notorious interview on 60 Minutes, fell into Leslie Stahl's trap question and proudly claimed that 500,000 dead Iraqi children was "worth the price of the sanctions" (should have challenged that assumption, in the first place). That interview was replayed thousands of times on Arab media and fueled much of al-Qaeda's growth in the 1990s.

This was also the same Albright who aped Jonah Goldberg into declaring, to paraphrase, that what's the use of having such a big, expensive military if we're not willing to use it to pummel some poor unfortunate Third World country every now and then? Gotta find some excuse to let the bombs fly.

Oh, and the same Albright who pushed into the war in Kosovo which featured the terror-bombing (effectively) of Serbian civilian water-treatment and electrical facilities when the Rambouillet conference's impossible demands weren't met, and urged a continuation of that bombing campaign-- this in spite of the fact that it was the Clinton Administration that ultimately (and understandably) caved on 2 of the 3 Rambouillet demands later? (Not to mention that the KLA is, uh, hardly a model organization itself?) It's tough to compare with the Bush Administration's serial blunders, but I'd hardly say that Madeleine is qualified to speak as an authority in any way on foreign policy. She has a sketchy record herself.

posted by: Wes on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



One other itty bitty ditty here, but-- is it just me, or is the "looming war on Iran" starting to smell like 1914 all over again? It's beginning to reek of the same sort of self-fulfilling inevitability that drove the European powers to bleed each other dry and wreck the British-led world order that had lasted since Napoleon. Both the American and Iranian governments are locked in a pride-filled stand-off in which neither can back down without suffering tremendous humiliation and scorn back home, in which each has a view of the current situation in irreconcilable contradiction with the other, and in which each is effectively preparing for war.

What's scary is the way the logic evolves here. After all, if we are going to war, then Iran is basically seizing the opportunity throughout the UN Security Council haggling period to arm itself to the teeth and establish a formidable Russian-made air-defense perimeter. Iran is also buying up short- and medium-range missiles (think-- attacks on Persian Gulf ships) at a rapid clip and increasing communications with the Shiite militias in Iraq. Which, in the brain of a Pentagon planner here, probably translates into, "If a war is inevitable, best not to delay too long, lest it be more painful." Scary. The coming Iran War really is getting that whiff.

posted by: Wes on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



Mads, doesn't the failure of the international community to act in Darfur cast at least some suspicion on its ability to choose when action is appropriate?

Perhaps. It casts more suspicion on *your* ability to choose when action is appropriate.

posted by: J Thomas on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



I suggest the self-proclaimed 'student of Aeschlyus' take some time away from reading the Greek classics and a little more time looking at contemporary issues before chiding us all. Darfur and the Sudan has plenty of oil, and if you look at who holds the contracts the reason for China and France's opposition to UN action will rapidly become apparent. (Hint: it's not the US, not because of any altruism on the part of ExxonMobil but because we placed barriers on trade with the Sudan.)

Many similar parallels could be drawn with pre-invasion Iraq, particularly Kurdistan vis-a-vis Darfur. The best remedy in my opinion would involve an enforced no-fly zone and a contract for a firm like Blackwater or Executive Outcomes to send in like 500 men. Despite such low barriers necessary to stop the Janjaweed, no one wants to do it, because its a lot easier to sit on the sideline and bemoan others lack of action than to actually do what is necessary when that would require getting your hands dirty. (Another hint: no matter how many US Marines we sent into Darfur tomorrow with complete international consensus, Darfur wouldn't turn into a paradise within 3 years, which according to most people speaking out against our action in Iraq is the allowed length of time before failure must be declared and everyone should go home. Funny how little difference there is in terms of progress between Kosovo/Afghanistan/Iraq and peoples perceptions of them.)

posted by: BishopMVP on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



Had the U.S. pursued multilateral intervention in Sudan with 1/10th of the zeal it pursued unilateral invasion of Iraq, I think we'd have been there & gone by now.

We wouldn't nearly have had time to give up in sudan yet. We'd still be "making progress". Maybe we'd be counting guerrillas killed as a sign of progress. Maybe with a great big effort we'd actually temporarily stop the genocide, and the bad guys would be patiently waiting for us to leave.

Or maybe we'd attack the sudan government, figuring that without their logistics the genocide would stop, and we could go home after the regime change.

Or maybe you're right, maybe we could do a quick in and out, some airstrikes, some commando raids, some nice photo-ops of the troops giving food to starving-looking natives,and then we're gonet. And after that when somebody said, "What about the genocide in Darfur?" we could just grin and say "There *isn't* any more Darfur genocide! We solved that!".


Seriously, I haven't been keeping track. Do we have some sort of plan set up for darfur? How we're going to win and have an exit strategy and stuff like that?

posted by: J Thomas on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



I'd be perfectly happy if the wingnut warbloggers said it quite openly -- they don't really give a damn about the Iraqi people or any other people in the third world, they just want to kick some Aaarab ass. And I would be perfectly happy if they admitted that they don't give a damn about the humanitarian aspect of the war -- after all you could save far more lives in Africa with just a small portion of the $1 trillion to be spent in Iraq.


Hm.

I dunno if I qualify as a 'wingnut warblogger', altho I'm fairly sure I'm more militant than most of the commentariat here.

Kicking arab ass for the sake of kicking arab ass has no appeal. Wars are expensive- especially the way the US fights- and I like tax cuts. Letting people decide how to spend their money instead of having the government do it has a lot of appeal- who knows how to spend your money better than you?

Then there's the appropriateness of telling people who swore an oath to defend the United States of America to go and defend people who aren't Americans. If the leader of a country is screaming about how he hates America or doing things that harm our interests, fine, he's asking for an ass-kicking, send him a polite note asking him to knock it off, and if he doesn't, send in the Marines & have an election when the SOB is gone.

But the government of Sudan isn't doing any of that. What they're doing is something that's foul, wrong, unjust, etc... but doesn't harm the US, directly or even indirectly, and therefore doesn't meet the criteria that must be met for deploying US forces to be appropriate.

So what to do?

Nobody else wants to deploy forces for the same reasons the US doesn't want to deploy forces- further compounded by relatively few nations having logistics sufficient to support a significant force deployment in Sudan.

I'm not willing to order members of the US military to solve Sudan's problems, but I'm quite willing to hire someone who is willing to risk their lives to defend Sudanese peasants.

If there's a consensus that 'something' should be done, but nobody is willing to commit their national military to do the job, how much money will they contribute to the task? Is it enough to hire that outfit that brought a measure of sanity to Sierra Leone back in the '90s?

posted by: rosignol on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



The question to answer is not 'how to intervene, under what auspices', but rather 'why?'. The why will dictate the how. If you're just looking to help or to appease domestic angst then seeking out partners makes sense; if you're looking to help in order to leverage power in other areas that may have nothing at all to do with good will then the how becomes a tactic within a strategy that may prove distressingly 'dynamic'. When it comes to the promotion of democracy, to whatever degree one may choose to pursue it, such a tactic is ultimately self serving and it would be naive and dangerous to view it any other way.

posted by: saintsimon on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



Wes speculated:

'One other itty bitty ditty here, but--
is it just me, or is the "looming war on Iran"
starting to smell like 1914 all over again?'

In what sense?

Is one set of world powers - say Russia,
England and France - threatening war if
another world power - the USA I guess -
goes to war in Iran?

As much as it offends the 'rest of the world',
only the USA has the ability to project it's
military power accross the ocean.

It doesn't seem much like 1914 at all.

More like AD 14 with the USA taking the
place of the Roman Empire and the French,
Germans and Iranians taking the place of
the Gauls, Goths and Persians.

The main differnce is that we happen to
alive while all this crap is happening.
So we find it slightly more interesting
than that ancient history.


posted by: Ted on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



As much as it offends the 'rest of the world',
only the USA has the ability to project it's
military power accross the ocean.

It doesn't seem much like 1914 at all.

As it happens though, the USA is the only world power that happens to be across the ocean from iran.

So that particular point shouldn't carry much weight.

posted by: J Thomas on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



As it happens though, the USA is the only world power that happens to be across the ocean from iran.


As it happens, the USA is pretty much the only world power.

What makes a country a world power is the ability to project significant force anywhere in the world.

Russia is the only other nation that can do it, and the only way they can do it involves an ICBM.


So that particular point shouldn't carry much weight.


You were saying?

posted by: rosignol on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



Bishop mvp chose to ignore the core truth of my argument and then, morphed the debate into a bizarre conclusion that compared outcomes for Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. My arguments were straightforward and I stand by them.

My first argument is that there was little of any altruism involved in President Bush’s and the neo-con’s desire to go to war in the Middle East. And it is nonsense to compare Secretary Albright’s view of foreign policy to the views of President Bush’s administration which made the decision to go to war out of a desire for power, oil and the goals of "The New American Century". At first the claim for war was to protect the U.S. Then the war was justified on the grounds of nation building…bringing democracy to Iraq and the Middle East. This, even though President Bush derided nation building and criticized the previous administration for doing so, President Bush flip-flopped when it suited his purposes. The truth of the matter is, we went to war for oil, a major factor, but not the only factor, but a necessary factor, in the decision to go to war in Iraq, period. I stand by that assertion.

My second point was to say that this administration would not go to war for purely altruistic reasons and that Darfur had no oil. This was a comparative statement and I stand by it. The three largest oil-producing countries in the Middle East have hundreds and hundred of times the proven oil reserves as Darfur. The top twenty list of countries with proven oil reserves doesn’t include the Darfur region which probably has 1 to 2 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. Brazil; by comparison has nearly 20 times the proven oil reserves of Darfur and even so, isn’t considered an especially oil rich nation. Darfur has less oil than anwr in Alaska. As of today, Darfur appears to not have enough oil to power the US for even 1 year. And therefore is not likely to get Neo-con’s attention unless they are dragged by their ankles and forced to do the right thing by the political mainstream on both sides of the aisle. When I said Darfur had no oil I hoped it was clear to bishop mvp and others that the issue was no oil… of sufficient quantity to the Neo-Cons… such that they would be interested in going to war only for the sake of doing the right thing and protecting innocent people who are the victims of an ongoing genocide.

Finally, I was disappointed that you chose to disrespect my name, student of Aeschylus when you pretended to respond to my argument. I have not , nor will I disrespect your choice to call yourself bishop mvp. Let us all just cut through the crap and recognize that the present administration's foreign policy is an unmitigated disaster for our country. The sooner the appologists for President Bush stop defending the incompetence of this administration the sooner we can work together to repair the damage.

posted by: student of aeschylus on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



"This is one reason why Fukuyama's "multi-multilateralism" concept intrigues me. In a world of multiple, overlapping international institutions, forum-shopping becomes a possibility. This allows realpolitik tactics within an institutionalist rubric."

How is this different from Rumsfeld's 'coalition of the willing?' In other words, how is this different from the neocon view of international relations?

Steve

posted by: Steve on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



is the "looming war on Iran" starting to smell like 1914 all over again? It's beginning to reek of the same sort of self-fulfilling inevitability that drove the European powers to bleed each other dry and wreck the British-led world order that had lasted since Napoleon. Both the American and Iranian governments are locked in a pride-filled stand-off in which neither can back down without suffering tremendous humiliation and scorn back home, in which each has a view of the current situation in irreconcilable contradiction with the other, and in which each is effectively preparing for war.

The big difference I see is that iran is too weak to win a war in iran, while we're too weak to win in iran.

Very different from WWI, where france was too weak to win in france but germany was too weak to win in france.

That didn't sound quite right. However, everybody knew ahead of time that WWI would be a disaster. They had thought all along that kind of warfare was unthinkable, and that the prospect of WWI happening would be enough to make sure that people found some alternative. Then it happened anyway. But iran doesn't look like a disaster coming. If anything goes wrong we can just call off the attack and it's over. As Rosignol pointed out, we can reach them but they can't reach us. It's a risk-free war, there's no possible way to lose. It wouldn't be like WWI unless it went nuclear, and Bush has announced that there's no chance of that.

Either we accomplish our objectives quickly or we fail to accomplish them quickly but we announce that we did anyway and get out. We have all the initiative. There's absolutely nothing iran can do except wait for us to attack, and there's nothing they can do while we attack, and there's nothing they can do after we attack. So it's bound to be a short war. Nobody thought WWI would be a short war. They just had no choice but to fight to keep the other side from winning.

WWI started by accident. They'd made plans for it in case they had to fight, and they did everything they could to avoid it, but then the diplomacy failed. But we're going to attack iran because Bush wants to and for no other reason. Bush thinks we can get an easy victory that will help republicans win the next election. The diplomacy isn't failing, we have no intention to allow diplomacy to succeed. This war would not happen at all except that Bush wants it to, and it will happen entirely on his schedule. Very very different from WWI which nobody in the world wanted.

Before WWI there was a network of alliances that dragged in lots of nations. Also a collection of colonial empires. So a lot of africans wound up fighting in europe where many of them promptly caught tuberculosis and died. But the USA has no allies in this, and neither does iran. The only way it could turn out bad is if iran gets allies like russia and china, slightly too late to prevent the war.

Nobody had any illusion that WWI would be an easy victory. But the american consensus is that iran will be easy. First we knock out their air defense and their cruise missiles and navy. Then we destroy whatever military units or arms depots might be troublesome. We destroy their nuclear program with special forces, taking lots of photos ro prove what it is we're destroying. And in the process we execute as many nuclear physicists and engineers and technicians as we can find, since the people are more important than the machinery. We confiscate all the uranium and plutonium we find and ship it back to the USA. In the meantime we destroy whatever civilian infrastructure is particularly useful to a nuclear program, and execute a bunch of top government leaders and religious leaders. Then we pull out and let the iranian reformers run a regime change. It should take six weeks maximum, essentially no US casualties, and cost at most $300 billion. Piece of cake. Very different from WWI.

Iran is like a punching bag, there's absolutely nothing they can do to stop us from anything we want. The only way it could go wrong is to somehow turn into a nuclear war with russia and/or china. And there's no way that could happen. Everybody knows it would be a disaster. We've thought all along that kind of warfare is unthinkable, and the prospect of nuclear war is enough to make sure that people find some alternative. We've made plans for it in case we have to fight, and we'll do everything we can to avoid it

posted by: J Thomas on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



Perhaps I need to call Juan Valdez back to give me another cuppajoe this morning to understand J Thomas's post, who until now I had pegged as a man of reason.

That posting is all over the place. Invading Iran will be easy, a piece of cake and they can do nothing but wait for it? You mean kinda like Iraq & Afghanistan, which were also supposed to be a "cakewalk"? It wouldn't have longer-term effects like creating more 911's for us?

Correct me J Thomas, while I find something strong to spike my cafecito.

posted by: St. James the Lesser on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



Bush thinks we can get an easy victory that will help republicans win the next election.


Okay, Mr. Thomas, it's put-up-or-shut-up time.

How much would you care to wager that the US initiates force in Iran before the election in November 2006?

You've predicted it. How confident are you that the prediction is accurate?

posted by: rosignol on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



> But iran doesn't look like a disaster
> coming. If anything goes wrong we can
> just call off the attack and it's over.
> As Rosignol pointed out, we can reach
> them but they can't reach us.

If the very serious thinkers of serious thoughts really think this, and are actually preparing to create their own reality on the basis of this thought, then yes, I would say we have a possible WWI approaching.

Cranky Observer

posted by: Cranky Observer on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



"But liberal like Allbright are guilty of sidestepping questions of what to do when all the diplomacy in the world won't muster the necessary international consensus."

I haven't read Allbright's book, but she doesn't strike me as the sort of person who is in the habit of ducking questions. And this is not a hard question for liberals to answer, at least in the abstract. If you can't get a consensus, then you need to consider the possibility that what you are proposing is a bad idea (case in point: Iraq). If you remain convinced that it is a good idea, then you have to decide whether the issue is important enough to be worth irritating your allies. If so, you act unilaterally.

posted by: Kenneth Almquist on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



There is a critical difference in the moral perceptions of the critics and supporters of the Bush foreign policy, and of unilateral intervention more broadly. This all takes place against a background where the US has unprecedented power to act unilaterally, and, more importantly has the *unique* power to act unilaterally. Sidestepping the various factual claims (e.g., I'm pretty sure that Student of Aeschylus is completely wrong about the role of oil in the Iraq invasion--the only reason it mattered was because it gave Saddam funding for his activities), the issue comes down to how one feels about purtiy of motives.

Most supporters of intervention in particular cases believe that *multiple* reasons for doing something are at least additive and possibly multiplicative. The typical hawkish interventionist believes something like this: If a regime is a) hostile enough, b) dangerous enough, and c) repressive enough, then there may well be good practical and moral justification for taking it out. The presence of a US interest (from a security point of view) adds to or even magnifies the practical and moral case for intervention. Judgment is required in any specific case because of the need to weigh available means, decide if the potential target is really bad enough, etc., but the principle is to see if there are enough reasons, and strong enough reasons, to tip the balance. A regime that's repressive and hostile might only pass the test if it is dangerous enough, and a dangerous and repressive regime may only get into the bullseye if it is hostile enough.

Critics of unilateral interventions stress *purity* of motives. They see different motives as interfering destructively, or subtracting, or otherwise cancelling out in the case for any given intervention. When supporters of intervention provide multiple reasons for doing something, critics argue that these supporters are shifting their justification or engaging in hypocrisy. Hence the constant attempt to delegitimize Operation Iraqi Freedom by picking at each motivation separately, insisting that one motive had to be the *real* motive, or alleging that national self-interest in an invasion by definition rules out humanitarian motivations. Hence the idea that it would be okay to go into Darfur *because* we have little security interest, in contrast to Iraq where our humanitarian interest is tainted by self-interest.

I think that spreading liberal democracy is in our interest, if we can do it at acceptable cost, so I'm particularly subject to this moral purity critique--anytime I advocate anything that would promote human rights my motives are tainted. But I also think that the moral purity position is seriously defective. I would think someone dotty if they married a particular person or chose a particular job or went to a particular college on the basis of a reason-by-reason analysis without combining those reasons. "What do you mean you're marrying her because she has good character and she's attractive? Her attractiveness means that you're a hypocrite or a fool for claiming to care about her character." That's pretty much how the critics of intervention carry on the debate.

posted by: srp on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



Rosignol, this sort of thing is fluid and hard to predict.

Bush might get evidence that the next unilateral attack would lose him more support than it would gain, and change his mind.

The JCS might look at the attack plan and offer to all resign unless he backs off.

Some other line of political attack might pay off to the point that the elections would be safe without an attack on iran.

The russians or the chinese might make a mutual defense pact with iran. (And might not publicly announce it.)

There are lots of things that might happen within the next 5 months. The rumors in DC last October were that the attack would come in early March. Already 2 months later than the earliest date they could prepare for.

I claimed "Bush thinks we can get an easy victory that will help republicans win the next election." I don't see how to test that adequately to win a bet.

Do you want to bet the attack won't come before our 2006 election? Do you have some sort of inside info about that? Are you willing to share instead of win a bet?

posted by: J Thomas on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



St. James, I may have been too scattered in that post. What I was trying to say was that the current situation seems to me very little like pre-WWI.

WWI was a full mobilization, which neither side is considering.

WWI was a war between coalitions with a significant part of the military might of the whole world arranged fairly evenly between them. Iran is predicted to have the insignificant military might of iran on one side, opposing a relatively small portion of US force weakened by being projected halfway around the world. Far different.

Nobody ever thought they could win WWI easily. Everybody knew it would be a bloodbath but they couldn't see any way to avoid it. Americans believe we can win quickly in iran and pull out and suffer no adverse consequences of any sort. Or at least no adverse consequences nearly so bad as the horror of iran getting 5 nukes in 5 years. We don't expect a bloodbath on our side, we expect we'll take some tiny number of casualties, largely from accidents and friendly fire and such.

WWI came because of an interlocking collection of alliances. Nobody wanted it but an unforeseen incident triggered it and nobody could figure out how to stop it. But war with iran would be impossible if Bush didn't want it, and the USA is making every effort to sabotage any attempt at diplomacy that might thwart him. Very different.

posted by: J Thomas on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



Srp, thank you. It's refreshing to see a post that recognises aggressive-war theory.

If anyone is interested, there's an old book by Anatol Rapoport The Big Two that covers this in some detail in an entertaining and nontechnical way.

The idea is that any nation that's considering starting a war will usually have multiple groups that could veto it, or that could at least strongly help or hinder. The more of those groups that line up in favor, the more likely the war. Rapoport listed ten or so groups or issues that tend to matter.

Like, it's much easier to start a war that looks ahead of time like it will be an easy win. Most of our big bloody wars started that way -- the american civil war started with predictions by both sides that they'd win easily and the war would be over in months. But many small quick wars started with that prediction too, the prediction can't always be wrong. (We thought iraq would be fast and easy. And it was, we just didn't quit while we were ahead.)

It helps when there's a vital resource to win, or a strategic position. (Iraq has both, oil and a spot for airbases that can bomb anything in the middle east or the 'stans.)

It helps when there's a religious disagreement. (Muslim versus christian/atheist/agnostic/american-way.)

And so on. When the military wants war, and big business wants war, and the majority party wants war, and the religious leaders want war, when it looks good for the economy, when there appear to be big benefits and few risks, then the decision to start the war is most likely.

We like to think that the USA doesn't intentionally start wars of aggression. But history shows otherwise. We only start a small fraction of the wars we *could* start, and the ones we do tend to be the ones where the largest number of predicted benefits from the war all match up.

posted by: J Thomas on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



The world needs a cop -- a Human Rights Enforcement Group, which will 1) identify gross violations of human rights which "justify" intervention, and 2) provide international support in a Coalition of the Willing for that intervention.

Such an HReg would be democracies, only.

Darfur pretty much shows how the UN has failed, and will fail, due to having non-democracies in the UN with the same moral authority as democracies.

The US should be training, and equiping, Indian army for joint NATO - US - Indian actions, like in Afghanistan. And possibly Darfur, when the new peace proposal fails.

posted by: Tom Grey - Liberty Dad on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



The world needs a cop -- a Human Rights Enforcement Group, which will 1) identify gross violations of human rights which "justify" intervention, and 2) provide international support in a Coalition of the Willing for that intervention.

Who pays for it?

Who benefits?

As an idealist I like the idea of an altruistic group that controls the whole world and prevents all bad things from happening.

But I notice that this seems to work best when it's a small group of superheroes who have individual superpowers who choose to dedicate their lives to fighting evil.

No organization that is managed democratically will be very effective at ridding the world of the particular evils that you decide are most important. People will disagree on priorities.

So how about the US joins a group of democracies led by switzerland, which has an admirable human rights record itself and also an active interest in the rest of the world. And we agree that we'll do whatever the swiss tell us to, to police the world. No?

I tell you what. How about we put our excess enthusiam into alternate energy until it pays off and our GDP is growing at 7% or so, and then we start siphoning off resources to policing the world. The less poor we are, the less pain it is to sacrifice our treasure to defeat evil all over the world. The more of an economic superpower we become the easier we can afford a giant military.

We need to defeat evil within our means, if we defeat more evil than we can afford now, we won't be able to defeat nearly as much evil later.

posted by: J Thomas on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



Tom Grey, saw your site briefly. Caramba! Being a "libertarian paternalist - progressive Conservative" must be a full time job.

A nation's foreign policy works on the basis of interests. This was a painful realization to me because it lacks nobility, no?, but unfortunately it cannot be any other way for now. It turns out that "Right" and "Wrong" aren't the best standards for a foreign policy because the different cultures of the world view the world so very differently. But everyone can understand Interests and one can expect to predict a nation's actions if they are based on that rather than what might be "right" or "just".

This explains why the U.S. felt compelled to rid Iraq of a despot but does nothing in Darfur or Rwanda. (srp, your post was beautifully written and reasoned, but you must be kidding if you still believe Iraq wasn't about oil.)

You say that democracies have greater moral authority than non-democracies and thus should be the ones to decide what merits intervention. The world's most successful democracy has a Decider running the place and the world is uneasy about it. Also, there have been instances of successful non-democracies. So just because people go to the polls every few years isn't a high enough -- or clear enough -- standard.

posted by: St. James the Lesser on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



There are times in world history and situations that may demand either a unilateral or, a coalitional military action against an enemy. The problem here is that President Bush chose a failed strategy cloaked in deceptions. As a consequence we have motivated many who were tilted in our favor or sitting on the fence, to decide on supporting the other side. A successful strategy would have been to focus on the destruction of Al Qaida and the rebuilding of Afghanistan and developing a government that was modeled on the most moderate examples of good institutions and good government in the Moslem world we could find. To do this we would need help to "cut and Paste" elements of governance to be found in Turkey, Indonesia, and yes, even Iran.

Clearly there are many problems in all those countries and I hold not one of them up as a perfect example. If we had first focussed on winning in Afghanistan killing Osama Bin Ladin et al and rebuilding a model state then we would have garnered good will and cooperation for our country and our objectives. Instead we squandered good will and cooperation we might have parlayed into victory. But what would one expect from a group like the neo-cons who wanted there to be a new pearl harbor so they could justify aggression. What do you expect from a president that announced this war as a " great crusade"? Are these people more ignorant or more evil.

One can argue forever whether or not we should have attacked Iraq. The fact is now we are there and we are loosing this war. We are being lead by a failed administration that is draining our country of blood and treasure and hasn’t a clue about how our aggressive unilateral behavior is pushing other countries miscreant groups to fear us, organize against us and seek WMD.

posted by: student of aeschylus on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]



Actually, we seem to be winning big in Iraq from a strategic point of view. The jihadis decided to come in and make a stand against us and managed to totally discredit themselves by a) getting destroyed militarily and b) killing lots of Shia and then Sunnis. The foreign jihadis were always a numerically small part of the enemy, but their qualitative importance was high (politicallly in terms of spreading the al Qaeda brand and tactically with suicide bombing).

In the meantime, the Sunni resistance has ebbed because they've figured out that they're outnumbered by the Shia and are actually safer with us around. The criminals and former regime elements can't surrender, of course, so they're still killing and kidnapping mindlessly, but there is no longer much point to it.

The last problem is the Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigades. That is going to get ugly one way or another, I'm afraid. The more moderate Shia leaders have been urging us not to make a martyr of Sadr, saying they can handle him politically, but I'm skeptical. Still, we should give them a chance to show they can do it while preparing for some serious clean-up around Baghdad if they can't.

The other goals of the invasion have also been advanced. We hear no more "weak horse" talk (except when they make fun of us for overreacting to casualties), Every government in the area now believes that we actually might step into them when they attack our interests, which has clearly had some chastening effect on Syria, Egypt, Libya, and even our good friends the Saudis. We've begun the long-term, halting project of legitimizing liberal political structures in the Middle East.

Most importantly, we are no longer pinned down by Saddam Hussein. People who think that taking out his regime makes it harder to deal with Iran are dead wrong. If Saddam were still in power, the Iranian nuke program would be going forward completely unimpeded, and we wouldn't even be able to contemplate the use of force. We also paid a huge political price around the world in trying to maintain the collapsing sanctions regime. Our degrees of freedom are now much greater.

Finally, there is a huge humanitarian upside to all this. Iraqis report high degrees of optimism in polls, they have free and open media, the marsh Arabs are getting some degree of restoration, the Kurds have been able to develop their area, etc. A lot of scary stuff goes on in Iraq, but it is no longer a Republic of Fear.

posted by: srp on 05.03.06 at 03:12 PM [permalink]






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