Thursday, August 11, 2005

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When negotiations suck eggs....

Time magazine's Romesh Ratnesar has a long story on Condoleezza Rice and her growing foreign policy clout:

Rice has wrested control over the tone and direction of U.S. foreign policy away from war-cabinet hard-liners, curbing their unilateralist bluster. She persuaded President George W. Bush to support negotiations with North Korea and Iran over their nuclear programs, though both countries have balked at offers from the U.S. and its allies. In the process, she has cemented her status as the President's most trusted lieutenant, a relationship that makes her the most influential Secretary of State in more than a decade.

For Ivo Daalder, this turn to negotiations is all to the good -- thought that's not because they're guaranteed to succeed:

The purpose of negotiations in these kinds of situations is really two-fold: to try to resolve the issue through a mutual give-and-take and arrive at an outcome that both parties see as preferable to the status quo or, failing that, to demonstrate that you are looking for such an outcome and thus place the onus for failure squarely on the other side.

The main reason why Rice may have been able to convince Bush and Cheney that a demonstrable commitment to negotiations was now necessary is that the North had succeeded in isolating us rather than themselves. For now, the tables have turned -- opening up the possibility that the North reassesses the value of giving in or, at the very least, making clear that they rather than we are to be blamed if negotiations fail. In the latter case, we will have laid the for gaining support for a more coercive strategy, should that be desirable.

This all sounds eminently sensible.... except for a one teensy little problem -- what happens if our allies shift their position during the negotiations? Both the Iran and North Korea cases require active consultation and coordination with allies that might, just might, change their minds about what constitutes unacceptable behavior.

David Adesnik points out that with regard to Iran, even the Washington Post's editorial team thinks this:

the editors of the Post argue that

The experience of letting the Europeans do it their way, offering trade and economic incentives before bringing in sanctions or making any military threats, has been enormously important...Now, any steps taken to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons will have international credibility.

Finally, the Post adds a caveat

What remains to be seen is whether the Europeans will come through, as they have promised they would, with a tough-minded push for sanctions.

Consider, for a moment, the tension between those last two statements. What if the Europeans don't follow through? If, at that point, we strike out on our own, will we no longer have "international credibility"? In other words, is the price of credibility that we always follow the European lead?

With regard to North Korea, there is the tricky problem that South Korea has now decided to back North Korea's demands for a peaceful nuclear program. This is an logical outcome of South Korea's sunshine policy -- a problem that I mentioned two years ago.

Won Joon Choe and Jack Kim explain in the Christian Science Monitor why the South Koreans have been acting in such a peculiar manner:

Many South Koreans no longer see North Korea as a threat. Instead of a mortal enemy, North Korea has become transmogrified into a sympathetic brother in the South Korean imagination.

This transmogrification is mainly government-induced. Since the election of the longtime dissident Kim Dae Jung to the presidency in 1997, Seoul has pursued the "Sunshine Policy" - a policy designed to appease Pyongyang's murderous regime through massive economic bribery.

To sell this policy to a skeptical electorate, Kim spearheaded a comprehensive propaganda campaign to reconstruct the South's image of the North. This campaign included government censorship and intimidation of those who would criticize North Korea. As a result of this ongoing campaign, South Koreans are now increasingly kept in the dark about the true nature of Pyongyang's gulag state.

Even more troubling, however, is Seoul's belief that it may actually benefit from the North Korean nukes....

These differences between Washington and Seoul regarding Pyongyang's nukes will continue to frustrate the Bush administration's attempt to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. While it is unlikely that Pyongyang would give up its nukes without a credible threat of military action, the current leftist government in Seoul, headed by Kim Dae Jung's successor Roh Moo Hyun, would never back a military solution. Given that Seoul bankrolls Pyongyang, it would also be difficult for the US to impose workable economic sanctions. Even the Chinese, whose influence the Bush administration has come to rely on as the last best hope, have complained that Seoul's appeasement emboldens Pyongyang and renders it less amenable to Beijing's pressure. (emphasis added)

So, contrary to Daalder, there is another possible outcome from negotiations besides a fair settlement and a shifting of blame -- the possibility that our allies back down leaving the U.S. in the lurch.

[So you're saying screw negotiations, right?--ed.] Alas, no -- for the North Korean case in particular, negotiations are a lousy, rotten option -- until you consider the alternatives -- which Fred Kaplan did last month in Slate:

In the case of the United States, the Bush administration's top national security officials—Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and President George W. Bush himself—just didn't want an accord with North Korea, didn't want even to sit down and talk. Kim Jong-il is an evil dictator; he'd broken an agreement by resuming his nuclear program; merely negotiating with him would be rewarding him for bad behavior; signing a treaty with him would legitimize and perpetuate his reign. Bush's policy in the first term was to wait for Kim's regime to collapse and, in the meantime, to take a look at the war plans.

Then three things happened. First, Kim's regime didn't collapse. Cheney tried to convince the Chinese to cut off aid, which might have done the trick; but they didn't want millions of North Korean refugees to pour across their borders. Second, the Joint Chiefs told President Bush that the war plans were too risky; nobody knew where all the targets were, and Kim Jong-il had thousands of artillery rockets a few minutes away from Seoul; if he retaliated, hundreds of thousands of South Koreans could die. Besides, the South Korean government announced that it would not endorse—or allow its territory to be used for—a U.S. airstrike or invasion.

In other words, "regime change" wasn't happening, and war didn't look like a real option.

So my point is this -- the U.S. is favoring negotiations right now not because they're such an alluring alternative -- it's because given our resource constraints and the countries we are dealing with, the negotiation option is the best of a rotten set of alternatives.

posted by Dan on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM




Comments:

South Korean policy, while arguably wrong, is not irrational. If the Chinese are worried about North Korea collapsing and being swarmed with refugees, isn't it likely the South Koreans have the same concerns, only magnified? The South Koreans have looked at German reunification and its enormous costs, under circumstances more favorable than Korean re-unification after a North Korean collapse, and what they see isn't reassuring. Propping up the present regime is arguably cheaper than dealing with the consequences of regime change in the North. Throw in the dangers inherent in a more confrontational policy with North Korea and the South Korean stance may be short sighted but its not stupid.

posted by: Roger Albin on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



It is arguable, but it's still wrong. The fact is that propping up the Pyongyang regime is cheaper, or at least more convenient, today. Tomorrow is another story, and tomorrow is not on the agenda for South Korea's politicians.

You haven't accomplished much if you just put off a collapse for a few years while spending billions to do it and giving Pyongyang more time to build nuclear weapons it may well use. In the meantime -- whether this matters to Koreans, or Chinese, I will leave to someone else to judge -- you are winking and nodding at some of the most depraved barbarism anywhere in the world today.

posted by: Zathras on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



Great post Dan! I've be hoping you'd write something on the recent developments with DPRK and Iran.

Two questions for you and the dd-blog readers:

-Can we live with a nuclear North Korea?
-Can we live with a nuclear Iran?

Despite my personal horror at life in the DPRK & Iran, realpolitik begs us to ask that question. I've heard many analysts remark that we lived with a nuclear USSR and China for decades, and those were far more aggressive & dangerous regimes than DPRK or Iran. Hence we need to contain Kim Jong Il (a relatively simple task) and let him play evil dictator. And attempt a similar policy with Iran.

While this policy stabs at my gut as an American, it is also somewhat logical and practical.

I love to hear people's thoughts & analysis

posted by: jprime314 on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



How true - war is just as bad as negotiating, so lets suck it up and talk instead!

To jprime314 -

- How do we stop a determined sovereign nation from going nuclear?

posted by: Vish Subramanian on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



Everything has its price Vish...hence my questions. Can we live with these states being nuclear?

We have to answer those questions first before we can tell whether it is worth the economic, military, and moral price we the American public (and the world) will have to pay in order to coerce, stop, or bribe them.

posted by: jprime314 on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



Zathras - since when is tomorrow on the agenda of most politicians in democratic societies? Bush tax cuts ring a bell? We can deplore South Korean policy but we don't vote in Korean elections, and neither does Bush, Condi Rice, John Bolton, or the Chinese leadership. The first responsibility of Korean politicians is to their own electorate. Nor, to be fair, is a waiting game an automatically bad strategy. If the shit hits the fan in Korea, it'll be the South Koreans who bear the brunt of the human and financial costs. The last Korean War resulted in hundreds of thousands of casulties. The USA, due to our constrained military situation, is not presently in a position to provide South Korea with a really strong security guarantee. In time, the North may stabilize and become more rational, it may fall apart without a major confrontation, or USA power may increase. Again, South Korean policy may be wrong but its not stupid.

posted by: Roger Albin on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



Here's a radical idea. If the South Koreans are so sure that DPRK is no threat, and continue to undermine our stategy, why not pull all our troups out and let the chips fall where they may? Sure, it could be a replay of Saigon 1975. Maybe just the threat would shock them to their senses.

posted by: Larry on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



"The purpose of negotiations in these kinds of situations is really two-fold: to try to resolve the issue through a mutual give-and-take and arrive at an outcome that both parties see as preferable to the status quo or, failing that, to demonstrate that you are looking for such an outcome and thus place the onus for failure squarely on the other side."

There is a major, fatal flaw in this reasoning. It presupposes that all the actors are negotiating in good faith. That is so obviously not the case that only a diplomat could be blind enough not to see it. If diplomacy is being used as a weapon by one side to buy time, space, or work on flipping your allies, it takes on an entirely new character. Negotiating for its own sake isnt simply counterproductive, it is dangerous.

The bottom line here is that diplomats and appeasers on the one hand will utterly refuse to sanction (or certainly attack) rougue nations. They are therefore de facto allied with the rogue states that negotiate because it costs them nothing, while knowing full well that no combinations of carrots or sticks is more valuable to them than their nuclear weapons. They will have all those carrots once their arsenals are impregnable anyway, and that is certain.

We cant win with these variables, either our credibility or our world image or most likely both will suffer no matter what we do. So we need to change the constants. China wont reign in North Korea? China _will_ chain in NK if we make it American policy to arm Taiwan with nuclear weapons (on submarine platforms) if NK is not disarmed. That changes the leverage.
The Euros wont play ball on Iran? Make it clear that Iran will be bombed and then blockaided and thats the end of the story. Their public stance of antiviolence will be appalled but their actual stance of wanting Iranian commerce will take the hit in the pocket book. They will act.

The mistake is thinking that negotiation is different than war. We are fighting for our lives at the table just as much as on the field. Giving the initiative to the enemy is a mistake in any war.

posted by: Mark Buehner on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



Larry, we're already more than half way there, and this is one of the reasons for the present situation. Our actual troops on the ground in Korea are a modest number, and have been so for some time. The real US commitment has been that our ground troops would act as a "trip wire" and in the event of a shooting war, we'd reinforce substantially. The South Korean Army is large, well trained, and well equipped. Right now, how would we fulfill our commitment to reinforce our ground troops substantially? Thanks to our misadventure in Iraq, we can't. We can still supplement the South Korean defense with naval and air power, but even here we have constraints and our reaction forces and speed of reaction has been eroded significantly. Our leadership knows this, the Chinese know this, the North Koreans know this, and the South Koreans know this. The Bush administration isn't at the negotiating table in a position of strength and this is partly a self-inflicted wound.
Now, lets say we go the whole hog and pull out if the South Koreans don't follow our lead. We've then abandoned an ally whose security we guaranteed for decades because their democratically elected leadership differs with our policy makers, who have themselves contributed to this unfortunate state of affairs. South Korean democracy is a huge achievement for both Korea and for our foreign policy. Would you want to risk throwing it away because of problems with this negotiation? This isn't the corrupt and ineffectual Thieu regime of South Vietnam. South Korea is both a real democracy and a major industrial power. This would be more like abandoning Czechoslovakia to Germany at Munich. Would you abandon Taiwan to the People's Republic because of a policy difference? Should we have abandoned West Germany when Willy Brandt pursued Ostpolitik against our government's strongly expressed disapproval?

posted by: Roger Albin on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



Roger, the fact is that we are in such a weak position that we cannot influence the behavior of an ally that desperately needs us for its very survival. Facts are facts. I would offer SK the following proposition: You have been getting a free ride on our protection services for 50 years. We ask only that we pull together or release us from the obligation. It's only fair. My guess is that they would come to their senses. Maybe they would even decide to protect themselves; a very positive outcome for the US.

I don't think that the US is so wealthy and powerful that we can provide protection for allies that stick their thumbs in our eyes. And no, I do not include Taiwan in the list of miscreants.

posted by: Larry on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



Sound's like Bush is working for Rice.

Not the other way around.

Bush...The new definition of what a leader is...

posted by: James on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



"Sound's like Bush is working for Rice."

I thought he was working for Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Ashcroft, and Rove. You guys change your mind about who is pulling the strings so often, it almost sounds like the guy agrees with different advisors on different occassions. Could it be?

posted by: Mark Buehner on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



We have no "obligation" to the the South Koreans. We can pull the troops out any time we wish and incur no loss of honor. And we should do so. Immediately. And the Japanese should amend their constitution. If China wants to let a united Korea go rogue, it will have more negative repercussions for it than for us.

posted by: Richard Heddleson on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



Its very much in our interest to have a world of democracies. One of things that made NATO work was our willingness to tolerate policies on the part of of our European allies that we thought were ill-advised and sometimes were ill-advised. Following the suggestions of George Kennan and other smart policy makers at the beginning of the Cold War, we took a long view and we have been rewarded amply. In the 3rd world, we have often been impatient and looked at short term goals, often with destructive consequences. There can be very few circumstances under which we withdraw security guarantees from a real, working democracy and this isn't one of them.
Nor is it by any means clear that the South Koreans have chosen incorrectly. I think so and so do most of the other contributors to these posts but we could be wrong. Its easy for us to talk about taking a hard line here in the US but Seoul is just below the border and changed hands about 4 times during the last Korean war. Finally, this isn't some dictatorial client state we're discussing. This is a large, vigorous, democratic state with an increasingly important scientific community and is becoming increasingly influential throughout Asia. Maintaining strong relations with South Korea is an excellent investment for the future.

posted by: Roger Albin on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



"that diplomats and appeasers on the one hand will utterly refuse to sanction (or certainly attack) rougue nations"

You mean countries that noone else belives has WMDs and the US does ?

So how many WMD's did the US find in Iraq ?

Gosh, guess the french are humilitated at the sheer number of WMD's found , after they claimed that saddam didn't have any.

posted by: ab on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



Withdrawing troops is not the same as withdrawing security guarantees. We could certainly return our troops quickly to make good a security guarantee from places where they are now welcome in the event they were once again welcome in South Korea.

The long term view is that Korea is now a stable democracy amply able to defend itself from most threats. Are we to occupy every democracy in that position?

It is not at all clear that leaving troops in country maintains strong relations with South Korea. Our relations with South Korea would more likely improve if we withdrew. Is it better to stay so long we have to leave at the request of the country, as in France or the Philippines?

posted by: Richard Heddleson on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



Could this be a economic move by S. Korea

Is it possible that S. Korea views N. Korea as a source of cheap labor, allowing it to compete with China in the world market?

posted by: Johnny Upton on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



"You mean countries that noone else belives has WMDs and the US does ? "

Ok... theres one example. And now i suppose you have a counterexample of the UN sanctions working? Hmm... Of course after Iraq, Libya voluntarilly gave up its nuclear program which very much did exist, so there is that on the 'lets actually do something' side of the table. But I suppose you have all kinds of examples of how sharing our feelings with the fascists has caused them to turn over their weapons without any frowns?

posted by: Mark Buehner on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



"Of course after Iraq, Libya voluntarilly gave up its nuclear program which very much did exist, so there is that on the 'lets actually do something' side of the table. But I suppose you have all kinds of examples of how sharing our feelings with the fascists has caused them to turn over their weapons without any frowns?"

Actually, Libya was moving towards normalizing relations with the rest of the world before Iraq - before 9/11, even. In general, I'd say negotiations and sanctions will freeze the state of a country's weapons program, even if they don't shut it down completely - the post-mortem on Iraq's weapons would tend to suggest this.

As for your earlier remark that: "It presupposes that all the actors are negotiating in good faith. That is so obviously not the case that only a diplomat could be blind enough not to see it. If diplomacy is being used as a weapon by one side to buy time, space, or work on flipping your allies, it takes on an entirely new character. Negotiating for its own sake isnt simply counterproductive, it is dangerous."

You're not just supposing that one side isn't acting in good faith, you're supposing that the other side doesn't even consider doing anything else _but_ negotiation. Any additional time generated by negotiation can and will be used by both sides to strengthen their overall hands... and while there's certainly some calculus which measures how long negotiation decisively benefits one side rather than the other, I'd think the number of instances where one side can risk no negotiation, or extremely little negotiation, are exceedingly rare. You've certainly got a long way to go if you want to prove that the lead-up to Iraq was such an instance.

posted by: Chris on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



"Actually, Libya was moving towards normalizing relations with the rest of the world before Iraq - before 9/11, even."

Proves my point, no walk, just talk. Libya would have continued to negotiate until the stars burned out, because ultimately they had no incentive to rid themselves of a weapons program we didnt even know the extent of. Until they were given an incentive, fear. Funny how when it comes to negotiations, we're always _right on the cusp_ of a major breakthrough. I mean sure, Gadafi blows up planes and nightclubs just for kicks, but really he just wants to be loved.

"You're not just supposing that one side isn't acting in good faith, you're supposing that the other side doesn't even consider doing anything else _but_ negotiation."

Correct. If you consider the other side to be Europe, the UN, and China. Under these circumstances. I defy you to produce evidence to the contrary (and not more talk please).

"Any additional time generated by negotiation can and will be used by both sides to strengthen their overall hands"

Thats impossible. Its a zero sum game. Once a nation has a full nuclear deterrant the game is up, embargo becomes impossible, attack becomes impossible. As I said, they can wait out the clock and will get all the carrots on the table and dull all the sticks without giving up anything.

"I'd think the number of instances where one side can risk no negotiation, or extremely little negotiation, are exceedingly rare"

Perhaps but its immaterial because there will always be the appeasement minded who will allow them to go through the motions of negotiations while actually doing nothing.

"You've certainly got a long way to go if you want to prove that the lead-up to Iraq was such an instance."

That is in the past, although i might argue that a full decade of 'negotiation' never accomplished our goals there. What it did do was allow Hussein to play the world like a fiddle and prove how easy it can be. There is _nothing_ more dangerous than an empty threat that everyone knows is empty. One would think Europe would have learned that.

posted by: Mark Buehner on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



"Proves my point, no walk, just talk. Libya would have continued to negotiate until the stars burned out, because ultimately they had no incentive to rid themselves of a weapons program we didnt even know the extent of. Until they were given an incentive, fear. "

Rubbish. If "fear" was the incentive for Libya, why didn't it work for Iran or NK?

"That is in the past, although i might argue that a full decade of 'negotiation' [in Iraq] never accomplished our goals there."

What goals?

"Once a nation has a full nuclear deterrant the game is up, embargo becomes impossible, attack becomes impossible. "

No. Embargos and attacks will always remain possible. The stakes for pre-emptive attacks rise, however, and the threat of blackmail grows. That's SK's problem, however.

posted by: nbc on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



Johnny Upton asked:

Is it possible that S. Korea views N. Korea as a source of cheap labor, allowing it to compete with China in the world market?

Yes and no. Yes, many South Korean businesses, Hyundai in particular, are salivating at the prospect of setting up factories in North Korea, and the business elite's support is critical for implementing the Kim-Roh "Sunshine Policy."

At the same time, South Korean businesses don't view China as a competitor. And rightly so, as Korean companies and Chinese companies rarely go head-to-head in the marketplace. Instead, they see China as a cheap labor market to be exploited until something better comes along (i.e. North Korea).

posted by: Matthew J. Stinson on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



Rubbish. If "fear" was the incentive for Libya, why didn't it work for Iran or NK?

We haven't crossed their leaders' "line of death" and killed their relatives. Muammar had personal experience with the sharp point of the stick.

That's SK's problem, however.

Whose provlem depends on the range of their ICBMs.

posted by: Richard Heddleson on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



"Proves my point, no walk, just talk. Libya would have continued to negotiate until the stars burned out, because ultimately they had no incentive to rid themselves of a weapons program we didnt even know the extent of."

Er, no. Let's review the meaning of the words "moving towards". Libya had been cut off from the international community after the Pan Am bombings, and was actively working towards gaining international acceptance by buying off the families of the victims in a series of international legal settlements. Libya stopped boming years ago, and it had been making friendly noises towards the US and the EU for some time prior to 9/11 - it's certainly no stretch to say that they'd eventually have given up their weapons program in exchanged for normalized relations even if Iraq hadn't happened.

"If you consider the other side to be Europe, the UN, and China. Under these circumstances. I defy you to produce evidence to the contrary (and not more talk please)."

I'd certainly point to Taiwan and China as such an example. Or don't you think it's the case that China really and truly is constantly improving its army behind the mask of endless saber-rattling?

"Thats impossible. Its a zero sum game. Once a nation has a full nuclear deterrant the game is up, embargo becomes impossible, attack becomes impossible. As I said, they can wait out the clock and will get all the carrots on the table and dull all the sticks without giving up anything."

Really? North Korea has nukes; don't they still have an embargo? And attack was politically impossible on North Korea even before they had nukes, since they've held the population of Seoul hostage with conventional arms for some time now.

But the idea that military and international relations are a zero-sum game is just so ridiculous that I'm not sure what else to say. I suppose the mindset of "if I don't get everything I want exactly when I want it then I've lost" does explain a lot of neocon thought, though...

posted by: Chris on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



"Rubbish. If "fear" was the incentive for Libya, why didn't it work for Iran or NK? "

Huh? Your argument is that all rogue regimes must respond to the same buttons being pushed at the same pressure? Mmm, ok.

"No. Embargos and attacks will always remain possible. The stakes for pre-emptive attacks rise, however, and the threat of blackmail grows. That's SK's problem, however."

Ok, let me rephrase. Embargos and attacks become pragmatically implausible. The nuclear math is very clear. Nuclear powers cant have 'small wars' against each other and hope to survive. The squirmishes between Russian and China, Pakistan and India, ended as soon as both sides were armed with nukes. Think it through. We put a naval group outside Wonsan harbor to interdict traffic, NK launches missiles at your boats, you bomb their missile launchers, they attack your planes and shoot rockets at your bases- etc, etc, etc. Either the fighting stops cold or it goes nuclear, because neither side can afford to be defeated and the more decisive the military victory the more certain the use of nukes by the other side. Believe me, hundreds of very very smart Zjivagos on both sides spent 50 years trying desperately to figure out how to fight a conventional war between nuclear powers. Just cant be done in any remotely sane way. One of the big problems with having this discussion is that a lot of people trying to argue about this topic arent that well educated in military theory or history, particularly of the Cold War. A nuclear arsenal is the ultimate international get out of jail free card.

posted by: Mark Buehner on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



"Er, no. Let's review the meaning of the words "moving towards". "

Yes, in a very Zeno-esque way. IE never getting there. Look you are arguing against reality. MAYBE Libya just HAPPENED to surrender its nuke program 3 months after Iraq was taken down. I believe the onus is on you to explain this remarkable coincidence. Might have beens dont equal facts.


"Libya stopped boming years ago"

After they were BOMBED.


"I'd certainly point to Taiwan and China as such an example. Or don't you think it's the case that China really and truly is constantly improving its army behind the mask of endless saber-rattling?"

You think negotiation has prevented China from invading Taiwan, and not the US navy? I dont think i understand what your point is.

"Really? North Korea has nukes; don't they still have an embargo?"

No. Ships sail in and out every day. Missile and probably nuclear technology is spread all over.

"And attack was politically impossible on North Korea even before they had nukes, since they've held the population of Seoul hostage with conventional arms for some time now. "

Exactly. Because that precise set of circumstances is exactly analogous to having a nuclear weapon. That is why it is _critical_ for us not to allow other regimes to gain nukes (or similar threats against allied population centers). I agree, at this point, we cant attack NK. My entire premise is that it is _madness_ to allow false negotiations go on with nations like Iran when they use the cover to develop that deterrant.

"But the idea that military and international relations are a zero-sum game is just so ridiculous that I'm not sure what else to say."

You havent said much of substance eiter way.

"I suppose the mindset of "if I don't get everything I want exactly when I want it then I've lost" does explain a lot of neocon thought, though..."

Everything I want is for a terrorist sponsoring rogue nation not to have a nuclear arsenal. That is too much to ask? How do you negotiate that down to 50%? What is half a loaf of Iran having nuclear weapons?

posted by: Mark Buehner on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



And one more warning from the neo-con camp: this newfound liberal alliance with realism had better get something very clear. The second Iran goes nuclear, it suddenly becomes a Realpoitic _necessity_ that we _oppose_ a democratic revolution in Iran. However much we want a free Iran, the chaos inherint in an overthrow is such that allowing a dying islamo-fascist regime access to nuclear weapons in a crumbling nation would be inconceivably dangerous.
Will liberals be happy lining up against internal democrat revolution and alongside fascist police states? I'll pretend for the moment that hasnt been the de facto leftist position for the last 2 decades.

posted by: Mark Buehner on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



"Look you are arguing against reality. MAYBE Libya just HAPPENED to surrender its nuke program 3 months after Iraq was taken down. I believe the onus is on you to explain this remarkable coincidence. Might have beens dont equal facts."

Libya was _actively pursuing_ normalization of relations with the rest of the world for _years_ before 9/11 - that IS a "fact". It's much more likely that MAYBE Libya's desire to achieve those relations just HAPPENED to combine with a Bush administration desire to show the benefits of the Iraq doctrine. Libya publically eats some crow, and gets taken off the terrorism watch list. Tit for tat... and Libya could hardly be worried about US military action, given that our entire army's tied up in Iraq for years to come.


""Libya stopped boming years ago"

After they were BOMBED."

You're oh so wrong here. Reagan bombed Libya in 1986, and the Pan Am bombing happened in 1988.

"You think negotiation has prevented China from invading Taiwan, and not the US navy? I dont think i understand what your point is."

You asked if Europe, the UN, or China ever did anything to strengthen their position while "talk" was going on. I say China, at least, knows all about strengthening its hand during the quiet periods.

(Let's also point out that in the past few years, during the North Korean impasse, South Korea has increasingly become an important trading partner for China, to a point where it's at least as important to China as North Korea is. So China's position on a North vs. South war is now much more conflicted than it was before the negotiations. Yet another example of how a "good" country can use negotiating time to its advantage.)

""Really? North Korea has nukes; don't they still have an embargo?"

No. Ships sail in and out every day. Missile and probably nuclear technology is spread all over."

Pardon me, you're correct on this one. Some sanctions still exist, but they're mostly enforced by the Korean side.

"Exactly. Because that precise set of circumstances is exactly analogous to having a nuclear weapon. That is why it is _critical_ for us not to allow other regimes to gain nukes (or similar threats against allied population centers). I agree, at this point, we cant attack NK. My entire premise is that it is _madness_ to allow false negotiations go on with nations like Iran when they use the cover to develop that deterrant."

We _can't attack_ Iran either, because _our army is stuck in Iraq for years to come._ In this case, if we're to have any hope at all of threatening Iran, we _must_ have foriegn allies working with us. And even if Europe's too gutless to do anything about it, the negotiating logic Ivo Daalder laid out at the beginning of this thread still holds true: to the rest of the world, we look like the good guys vs. Iran. It's not much, but it's better than threatening Iran without the resources to back it up.

"Everything I want is for a terrorist sponsoring rogue nation not to have a nuclear arsenal. That is too much to ask? How do you negotiate that down to 50%? What is half a loaf of Iran having nuclear weapons?"

Er, half a loaf would be foriegn assistance in giving Iran nuclear power technology that couldn't be adapted for weapons, which I believe was the offer that was on the table. Iran has passed on that offer, but, again, given that the US doesn't have the available forces to do jack squat about it, what else were we supposed to do?

"The second Iran goes nuclear, it suddenly becomes a Realpoitic _necessity_ that we _oppose_ a democratic revolution in Iran. However much we want a free Iran, the chaos inherint in an overthrow is such that allowing a dying islamo-fascist regime access to nuclear weapons in a crumbling nation would be inconceivably dangerous."

Funny, we seemed to make it through the fall of the much-more-scary USSR ok. It's our actions towards Russian nukes since that leaves much to be desired...

And again (and again, and again)... we might have a credible deterent to use here if we weren't tied up in Iraq.

"Will liberals be happy lining up against internal democrat revolution and alongside fascist police states? I'll pretend for the moment that hasnt been the de facto leftist position for the last 2 decades. "

Yeah... you're just being obnoxious here. Goodbye, Mr. Buehner.

posted by: Chris on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



Oopies...Mark Buehner got it but not the way he thinks
he got it.

>James:
>Sound's like Bush is working for Rice."

>>Mark:
>>I thought he was working for Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Ashcroft, and Rove.
>>You guys change your mind about who is pulling the strings so often, it almost
>>sounds like the guy agrees with different advisors on different occassions.
>>Could it be?

More accurate version of above sentence:

"Sound's like Bush is working for Rice/Others."

Better? But since the article was more about Rice
she was given the only nod.

But you are right..Bush is working for Rice, and
Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Ashcroft, and Rove.

Not the other way around.

>>it almost sounds like the guy (Bush) agrees with different
>>advisors on different occassions. Could it be?

Yep...You hit the nail right on the head...Congrats.

Thanks for making the post more accurate.

posted by: James on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



Let me just sum up my reaction to the last two posts:

Huh?

posted by: Mark Buehner on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]



It isn't rocket science. Not only is South Korea twice the size of NOrth Korea, it is an economic powerhouse, compared to a rival that can't feed its people and relies on arms and elicit drug shipments to stay afloat.

They can pay for their own defense.

posted by: Cutler on 08.11.05 at 09:48 AM [permalink]






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