The democrats filibuster Bush's deal with India, then Bush re-nominates Bolton?

Beats the heck out of giving light water reactors to North Korea.

Bolton, Bush's nominee to become U.N. ambassador, argued that such cooperation would mean rewarding a country that built a nuclear weapon in secret, using technology it obtained under the guise of civilian power. Both North Korea and Iran are believed to have tried the same route to develop nuclear weapons.

Kneejerk reaction: I don't give a damn if countries that don't want us dead have nuclear weapons programs!!!

After pausing a bit, I see that a question must be raised: how did India get its nuke technology? The US has a valid complaint against India only if it pulled a Kim Jong-Il and scammed the US into giving it civilian nuke tech that later got put to use for military purposes. (Which doesn't mean that we automatically snub India; perhaps the Pollard spy case offers some lessons on supporting an ally who cheated on you.) Otherwise, Bolton is full of cheese. A non-nuclear India in a world with a nuclear-capable Pakistan is not a good thing.

Always a realist I cannot imagine what sticking our head in the sand and pretending nuclear IP is not out there is going to do for us. It would seem to me that we stand at least a chance of getting countries to participate in international treaties if we recognize their activities. Beats taking part in another unwinnable war. Besides, as a consultant working with emerging biotech and tech companies, I know first hand of the enormous issues associated with job loss in this country. Maybe while we are at it we can figure out how to educate our own populace into other spheres of employment. Left brain things instead of right brain as has been hypothesized recently.

If the U.S. actually had a viable, consistent nuclear diplomacy strategy, then Bolton's position might make more sense. But as it stands, recognizing reality with India isn't going to do anything to further encourage small states with nuclear ambitions from pursuing them. Far more important than whatever nuclear deal Bush wrangles out of Congress is our conduct towards North Korea and Iran. We've been unable to actually put forward a credible threat against the former, which causes countries like the latter to correctly reason that the best way to stay in power is to race to dry to develop nuclear weapons as fast as possible, at which point they become untouchable. Until we solve those puzzles, the whole India mini-controversy is moot.

So, how do we get to the same place with, say, Iran?

Bolton, Bush's nominee to become U.N. ambassador, argued that such cooperation would mean rewarding a country that built a nuclear weapon in secret, using technology it obtained under the guise of civilian power.

I'm not quite sure about this. IIRC, India was never party to the NPT treaty, which most countries that develop 'civilian' nuclear power become party to in order to get the nuclear technology.

While I am not happy that India (or Pakistan) have nuclear weapons, I do not think the US can persuade India (or Pakistan) to give them up, and I'm not at all sure what rationale there is for punishing a country for breaking a deal it didn't make.... given a choice between a country that develops nukes covertly while party to the NPT, and a country that is forthright about it's intentions, I prefer the latter.

So, yes, Bolton is correct that proliferation should be discouraged, and Bush is correct that a friendly relationship between the US and India serves the US's interests. Ultimately, I think that India will be much less likely to spread nuclear technology around if it knows that doing so would hurt it's good relations with the US.... but in order for that to work, India has to have good relations with the US to hurt.

"But as it stands, recognizing reality with India isn't going to do anything to further encourage small states with nuclear ambitions from pursuing them."

Do you really think a consistant US policy would do anything to encourage them? Thats the problem here, people hear the political posturing so much they actually start to believe it. Iran isnt going nuclear for any further reason than it fits the ambitions of Iran. All the nonsense about fear of the US and so forth notwithstanding.
India has been a nuclear power for 20+ years, pretending otherwise is pointless and counterproductive.

To the best of my recollection, India kick-started its nuclear program by making a copy of a Canadian CANDU reactor. The CANDU reactor was under IAEA safeguards, the copy was not. India never signed the NPT.

If there is one thing that is likely to anger India and damage all the progress in Indo-US relations over the last 15 years, it would be the US's playing hardball on nuclear issues. The vast majority of Indians (whether fairly or not) regard this attitude on the part of Western countries as being discriminatory, condescending, hypocritical and borderline racist -- we (the West) can be trusted with nuclear weapons, but you cannot be. The fact that the West seems to be willing to treat China's nuclear weapons as a fait accompli, but regard India's possible possession of nukes as a problem is a further source of anger for Indians.

FWIW, I think the possibility of officially sanctioned proliferation of nuclear weapons from India is very small. However, bribery and corruption is endemic in India and the possibility of unofficial leakage does exist. The nuclear establishment has the usual gamut of security procedures and clearances, but who outside of it can really say how secure it is ?

While nonproliferation is a laudable goal, is the current regime the best way to promote it? Keep in mind, Pakistan's nuclear weapon was pretty much made in China, and the U.S. looked the other way because of the help Pakistan was providing in organizing the mujheideen against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Indeed, China's past proliferation activities seem to have been erased from the record books.

With this past in mind, why punish India for taking what is an entirely sensible route? At the time of India's nuclear tests in 1998, Jaswant Singh (India's foreign minister at the time) noted that other nations enjoy nuclear deterence without having nuclear weapons, such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea. India had no such nuclear umbrella. Why should a nation sacrifice its self-defense for a policy it never favored?

For all the critcisms leveled at Bush in foreign policy, his handling of India is quite remarkable, given the instability in neighboring Pakistan, the ramshakle nature of India's domestic politics, and the lingering distrust that many Indians hold towards the U.S. for its past alliance with Pakistan.

I tend to share Dan's view, on the theory that the horse in this case has been gone for some time and fussing with the barn door is besides the point now.

A technical question for those with knowledge in this field: Milbank and Linzer speak of new Indian access to "...sensitive U.S. nuclear technology that can be used in either a civilian or a military program." Does anyone know what this means, precisely? What kind of technologies are referred to?

There seems to be a great deal of agreement on this issue, at least among your posters. Pragmatism is fashionable and it definetely seems foolish to fall on the side of idealism when the stakes are so high.

I know Bolton is smart, but how does he come up with such dumb you-can-have-it-all ideas?
Chances of missile sent our way from India: close to nil.
Chances of missile sent our way from China (in Bolton's view): dangerously high.
Number of nukes this new policy addes to the Indian armory: zero. (Or insignificantly small.)
And the Indians become friendlier and get their missiles under better control.
Most important, it's nice to have friend in the region to rival and offset the power of the (other) country which will soon enough be joining us in the ranks of superpowers.
Drazner is too kind to construe this as a close question. But it does make one ask again why send a fanatic and a fool to the UN?

I hate to agree with y'all, but nearly everyone is right today. Go figure. Yes, it's hard to justify a policy that "punishes" the second-largest nation in the world for something any global giant with nuke-tipped larger AND smaller neighbors would naturally want. Sooo no brainer.

But why refrain from letting India on the Sec. Council? This seems a more interesting question. Fear they might cut private deals with China and/or Russia? Prior commitment to give Asia's second seat to Japan?

Will Bush's warm reception and this one-for-three affirmation of Singh be good enough for the folks back home? Anyone with his/her finger on India's pulse here?

I think there's more to this deal than simply a desire to placate India. By making it easier for India to build nuclear reactors, I think the Bush Administration also hopes to reduce the country's thirst for oil, thereby helping to keep a lid on global oil prices. It should be noted that this impetus has already led the US to help finance the construction of nuclear reactors in China.

Eric makes an interesting point. As with the earlier offer of fighter planes and other armaments to India, this announcement opens the possibility of major equipment exports. As well, construction of new nuclear power plants overseas might help reduce the resistance to eventually building new plants in the United States.

I think its a misnomer to mix oil prices and nuclear energy. Most energy is produced by coal unless all you have is oil (Saudi Arabia) or you are smart enough to have nuclear power (France). Coal is just cheaper and more abundant. Until fuel cells become common place nuclear energy wont affect oil prices much either way. Zathras makes a good point about making nuke plants commonplace. Its not just going to be commonplace, but inevitable as time goes by, particularly if we go ahead with electric cars and so forth.

So, how do we get to the same place with, say, Iran?

Impossible as long as the mullahs are in power. So regime change is a necessary first step toward that goal.

How the regime gets changed is another (much thornier) issue.

Nice article. Impossible as long as the mullahs are in power. So regime change is a necessary first step toward that goal.I like this.

Mark, France is far from the only industrialized country "smart enough to have nuclear power". Japan, Germany, and South Korea, among others, also depend on nuclear power to handle a large percentage of their electricity needs. Also, I'd recommend reading this Wired article on China's nuclear energy ambitions:

http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.09/china.html

All assessments of the nuclear deal made so far ignore the one truly predictable response: Pakistan will seek parity treatment, and this will put the Administration in a bind. I personally happen to agree with Dan's original thesis - bringing India's nuclear activity up to modern standards and subject to inspection is progress, at several levels. It would make India's inevitable nuclear development arguably safer; and it would aid India's energy development in a way that would minimise CO2 emissions. However, looking at the South Asian security dimension, Pakistan inevitably seeks the same deal as the US offers India - always. The big question is can the US afford to offer the same deal? If not, what consequences does that have for Musharraf's ability to discipline religious extremist support for terrorism within Pakistan?

The big question is can the US afford to offer the same deal?

There isn't much reason to. Pakistan was originally an ally because the US wanted friends to help counter the Soviet Union, and Pakistan wanted to be friends with someone who could deter the Soviets.

The Soviet Union doesn't exist any more, the US's main concern in central asia is islamic militancy, and how helpful Pakistan can be in resolving that problem is questionable.

Pakistan wanted to be friends with someone who could deter the Soviets.

Pakistan wanted to be friends with someone who could deter (diplomatically, militarily, financially) India. To the extent that Pakistan has been concerned with the Soviets, it has been largely their relationship with India. The one exception may have been immediatedly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, although even then Zia seemed to regard India as a far greater threat than the Soviets.

Nice article. Impossible as long as the mullahs are in power. So regime change is a necessary first step toward that goal.I like this.

Iran can never be a peaceful ally of the US as long as it is ruled by totalitarians. Tyranny will never truly befriend supporters of liberty (or anyone else for that matter). So Iran has to somehow stop being run by such people before a positive relationship between our governments can exist.

One hopes that the change will come, and it will look more like '89 Czechoslovakia than '89 Romania.

erg says: Zia seemed to regard India as a far greater threat than the Soviets.

True, and as he implies, this has always been the case with Pakistan: India is the threat they see.

But what interests me, as an Indian in India, is the extent to which that is mirrored here: the number of Indians who seem focused on Pakistan and feel pushed around by that (much smaller) country. I think there's less of it since we had our own welcome regime change a year ago, but it's there nevertheless.

That focus on Pakistan, I believe, is our greatest millstone in a number of ways. I see such things as a Security Council seat and nuclear capability as far more trivial than ridding ourselves of that focus, than finding self-confidence in ourselves and not in one-upmanship with Pakistan. I think Manmohan Singh is far less preoccupied with that focus than his predecessor(s), which is a good thing.

"Most important, it's nice to have friend in the region to rival and offset the power of the (other) country which will soon enough be joining us in the ranks of superpowers."

That's nice in theory but pure fantasy in practice. India has no plans to act as a US proxy in even the slightest way-- Indians have bitter memories about the ways they were used as a Soviet proxy in prior decades, and they have no plans to do anybody's bidding but their own. They're cautious with China but they're equally suspicious about US intentions, too.

I think many Americans (possibly including Bush) seriously underestimate the extreme anger felt by India toward the US over the UN Security Council issue. It's not just that India is big and a rising economy; on a per capita basis, India contributes far more to the UN (in dues as well as peacekeeping troops) than almost any other country except maybe Germany. For the US to then turn around and actively oppose a permanent seat for India on the Security Council, seems to all intents and purposes to be a stab in the back-- basically, the sense being that the US is perfectly happy to talk niceties to India when its own interest is at stake, but then gives India the shaft when India itself seeks its rightful rewards. Many of the Indian dailies (in multiple languages) have been full of anti-American rancor over this. This compounds similar frustration in India over e.g. the determined US opposition to India's plans for the pipeline with Iran.

FWIW, China *has* been supporting India's bid for a permanent seat on the Council, a fact that has not been lost on India's leadership. (China's been cool to Japan's bid, though they seem to have backed off of even that lately.) Likewise, India and China have lately been inking a flurry of trade deals with each other and will soon be among one another's biggest trading partners. If anything, the two Asian giants have been moving rapidly in the direction of an alliance, or at least a mutually beneficial partnership, to the exclusion of US companies as middlemen. While India is still maintaining its independence, it's total fantasy to believe that we can make India into a "regional counterweight" or the like in Asia. India's going to do what's best for India-- which in many cases will include closer ties with China-- whether we in the US like it or not. (One might add that China's own very tepid experiments with local elections, currently, are being done with a considerable amount of inspiration from India.)

BTW as for the Indian nuke issue, I basically agree with the sentiments of most others here that it's a fact that India has been a nuclear power for some time (alongside Pakistan of course), and in some ways the current agreement might even help to guide India's nuclear development so that the technology doesn't fall into the wrong hands. OTOH, this is going to make it next to impossible for us to push counterproliferation against Iran. No easy answer to that dilemma.

erg says: Zia seemed to regard India as a far greater threat than the Soviets.

True, and as he implies, this has always been the case with Pakistan: India is the threat they see.

But what interests me, as an Indian in India, is the extent to which that is mirrored here: the number of Indians who seem focused on Pakistan and feel pushed around by that (much smaller) country. I think there's less of it since we had our own welcome regime change a year ago, but it's there nevertheless.

That focus on Pakistan, I believe, is our greatest millstone in a number of ways. I see such things as a Security Council seat and nuclear capability as far more trivial than ridding ourselves of that focus, than finding self-confidence in ourselves and not in one-upmanship with Pakistan. I think Manmohan Singh is far less preoccupied with that focus than his predecessor(s), which is a good thing.

"Iran can never be a peaceful ally of the US as long as it is ruled by totalitarians. "

Never heard of the Shah of Iran ?

One commenter asked the question:

"A technical question for those with knowledge in this field: Milbank and Linzer speak of new Indian access to "...sensitive U.S. nuclear technology that can be used in either a civilian or a military program." Does anyone know what this means, precisely? What kind of technologies are referred to?"

Speculative answer: uranium enrichment (gas centrifuges). I surmise they already have a plutonium-based weapons program using their heavy water reactors. Uranium enrichment would allow them to fuel conventional light water reactors for electricity production, particularly Tarapur. Of course, they could turn this to highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium production too, if they build a big enough base.

If one has serious concerns about global climate change, then encouraging India to install new, additional nuclear power plants should be a big goal. Otherwise, it's dirty coal, Iranian natural gas, or expensive imported liquefied natural gas (think Enron's Dahbol). If the latter, the US and every other economy will be competing for a very limited resource in the years ahead.

BTW, I'm a nuclear engineer with VBM (Very Biggest Multinational).

Never heard of the Shah of Iran?

The Shah wasn't a totalitarian. He was a monarch.

Autocracies seek control over things that threaten their power. Monarchs derive their authority through simple force. Totalitarians, whether Communists or Islamists, derive theirs from force and from a complex class-warfare-based philosophy that seeks to micromanage citizens' thoughts and everyday lives.

Monarchs, to preserve power, must insure against rival force. Totalitarians must insure against rival force and rival philosophies on the meaning of life - a combination of the worst qualities of banana republic dictators and fringe cult leaders.

Monarchies are a lot easier to reform than totalitarian states. The king can be less of a fink and maintain the security of his office; it happened in Great Britain, in Pahlavi-era Iran, and in modern-day Morocco and Jordan. For the Iranian mullahs to reform and stay in power essentially requires them to say, "We used to say that Allah wanted this list of things, not we says that Allah wants something else." How can they possibly do such a thing and retain any resemblence of legitimacy?

(Maybe now you know why David Koresh didn't surrender.)

Add to that the reputation of the US for (usually) opposing totalitarianism, more frequency than we oppose dictatorships. We've given the Myanmar/Burma regime no reason to worry about us. The Middle east, on the other hand, is a high priority. Islamists will never accept the prerequisites for genuine peace, which include abandoning dreams of bringing Israel and Europe under Islamic rule.

I don't mean to downplay the threats of monarchy. It simply lacks certain threats inherent in totalitarianism, threats that make reform impossible rather than merely difficult.

So Alan would you disagree that one could be both a king and a totalitarian? If not, was the Shah not both?

As to the US opposing totalitarianism and supporting freedom and all that, if anything has become clear over the last fifty years it is that the US (like all countries) supports countries that support its policies and goals and opposes countries that doesn't support them. Things like democracy and totalitarianism are largely irrelevant. If country X has a totalitarian fascist government that is friendly to US business then that's fine. If it has a democracy that is friendly to US business that's fine too. Better for PR reasons I suppose but that's about it. But there is no US tradition of backing democracies in the underdeveloped world that oppose US interests. And there is a tradition of backing all shades of morally dubious non-democracies that are supportive.

As to the specific case of modern Iran, I'd certainly agree that change is needed there. I'd also say though that 'regime change' is something that has to come from within. We should just be ready to support it when it comes and not mess with it if it doesn't do everything we want.

Peter

There are a lot of problems with the U.S. assisting India with its civilian nuclear program.

First, by doing so, the U.S. violate the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG)'s requirement that controlled items should not be sold to nations lacking _full-scope_ IAEA inspections. The U.S. had been trying for several years to get Russia to adhere to NSG requirements with regard to India. Russia finally decided to adhere. Now, U.S. cooperation with India will undermine Russia's change of heart.

Second, why is the U.S. subsidizing India's nuclear energy sectors? (For that matter, why is the U.S. subsidizing its own nuclear energy sector?) While roughly fifty percent of India's energy-usage comes from burning wood and dung, only twenty percent comes from electricity. Of this electrical usage, roughly three percent is derived from nuclear energy. The rest comes from burning coal, natural gas and other sources (e.g., wind).

Nuclear reactors would be great for base supply usage, but Indian power grids are a long way from that order of magnitude of usage. What India needs is peak supply usage, for which natural gas-driven electrical sources -- if it could compete against an unsubsidized and de-nationalized Indian civilian nuclear energy sector -- would make much more economical sense.

By subsidizng nuclear energy sectors, nations like India prevent healthy competition from other potentially safer forms of alternative energy production.

Mr. Chimera,

You ask "why is the U.S. subsidizing India's nuclear energy sectors?" Who said we were? We might give them Import-Export Bank lending but they stiffed the US taxpayer on Dahbol already. Whether Im/Ex should even exist is a question beyond nuclear and certainly debatable on its own merits. What our government appears to be doing is ALLOWING domestic companies to do nuclear business in India once again.

The big sales would be between the Indian power system operators and commercial multinationals who sell nuclear power plants and supplies (ie fuel). Centrifuge technology would probably be sold on a tech transfer basis as they have lots of little, hi-tech parts and can be home-grown. US companies could certainly make big improvements in the output of India's existing reactors (power uprate for Tarapur?)

Is your point that India gets half its energy from burning wood and dung an argument AGAINST nuclear or FOR it? Sounds to me like more nuclear power would contribute to a better way of life for the Indians. Perhaps you think dung burning is too colorful and charming a native practice to Westernize with electricity.

As to the NSG, bi-lateral argeements on controls can be just as effective but just as pointless for India's existing nuclear weapon capability.

As to competitive options to nuclear, I'll let the Indians make that decision. Perhaps you'd like to raise our gas tax to make bicycling more attractive too?

First off, Whitehall, you're right: If India wants to protect its government-owned nuclear sector from competition with alternatives (including natural gas), then that is India's decision to make. But here the decision for the US gov. to make is whether to allow American civilian nuclear companies to do business with India's government-owned civilian nuclear sector.

My bottom line is that until India gives up its nuclear weapons and signs the NPT, the USG should not permit nuclear exports to India. Period.

In advocating that the USG permit American companies to do business in India, you're basically advocating that the USG flush the NPT, IAEA and NSG down the toilet. I don't fully understand your point about using bilateral controls in place of adhering to the NSG prohibition against selling controlled goods to nations not under full-scope IAEA safeguards.

Are you saying that because India already possess nuclear weapons, the USG might as well disregard NSG prohibitions and pick up where the Russians (who fairly recently decided to stop providing fuel for Tarapur) left off?

Or are you going further, arguing that the USG should abandon NSG restraints completely in favor of bilateral arrangements so that American companies can make money? I personally don't think its in America's interest want to abandon the NSG. Moreover, doing nuclear business with India would undermine the USG and the rest of the G-8's efforts to proscribe nuclear commerce with nations that haven't adhered to the additional protocol to the NPT.

Second, you write: "The big sales would be between the Indian power system operators and commercial multinationals who sell nuclear power plants and supplies (ie fuel). Centrifuge technology would probably be sold on a tech transfer basis as they have lots of little, hi-tech parts and can be home-grown. US companies could certainly make big improvements in the output of India's existing reactors (power uprate for Tarapur?)"

To begin with, India claims it can fuel its own reactors, but doesn't want to. (It wants Russia or the US to do that.) It has three or four U enrichment plants, used for weapons-usable fissile U or naval fuel. India could use these enrichment plants for its own fuel needs. Or it could use these plants something under 30000 SWU of enrichment for weapons. Which do you prefer? (You're an engineer at a VBM; I can imagine your answer.)

Moreover, India does not a output improvements for Tarapur, which meets base load, in the short or medium term. The point about Indian energy usage, most of which comes through burning wood or dung, is that there's no need to rush to add base load capacity any time soon. What India desperately needs is to meet peak load demand, for which turbines using natural gas and cleaner coal is economically the better alternative.

Finally, you write: "Sounds to me like more nuclear power would contribute to a better way of life for the Indians. Perhaps you think dung burning is too colorful and charming a native practice to Westernize with electricity." Man, don't pile on this dung: as if more base load electricity from the reactors you want the US to build is _sufficient_ to improve the lot of India's poor -- because it's clearly not. That's so disingenuous. When (1) India establishes the necessary infrastructure to make use of the order of magnitude increase in MWe that nuclear provides, (2) there's a demand for base load over peak load, and (3) India signs the NPT, then maybe your point will hold. But all three of those things are a ways away.

One more thing, Whitehall. It's Miss Chimera. But I appreciate the presumption.

Chimera, it's a widely-known fact that had the NPT been signed a few years later, or India gone nuclear a few years earlier, India would've been a signatory. It was all a matter of timing. Do you really think it's fair to let Communist China maintain a nuclear weapons but not a democratic India (a country that China invaded once, I could add), just because the former finished its nuke program a decade earlier? I could add here that China's record with nuclear proliferation is noticeablely worse than India's.

And your comment about India not needing additional energy sources because of its wood and dung resources is utterly laughable. Go to some Indian news sites and start looking for articles about the power outages that have been hitting Delhi and Bombay as a result of inadequate electrical capacity. Or for that matter, talk to an executive at an Indian multinational about the problems his/her company's had on the electrical front. Some of these problems are due to shortcomings in the grid, but a lot of them stem from an insufficient supply of megawatts.

My, my, my, you boys have such short memories.

First, India was aligned more with the Soviet Union throughout much of the latter 20th c, while Pakistan played in the American sandbox.

Second, your point, that India would have been an NPT member if either India had exploded its what Dehli called a "peaceful nuclear explosive" earlier or if the NPT had entered into effect long after 1970, is really besides the point. (And don't forget that Article V of the NPT, which used to make peaceful nuclear explosives kosher, was largely India's contribution to pre-NPT negotiations.)

What's more to the point is that you don't seem to care about the NPT either? Yes, China assisted the Pakistani nuke program. So, by throwing the NPT, IAEA, and NSG out the window by helping India, these two wrongs can make it all right. Wait... no it doesn't.

If you think the NPT isn't worth keeping around, just say so. At least we know what we're disagreeing. But stop dancing around the issue.

Third, you write: "[Y]our comment about India not needing additional energy sources because of its wood and dung resources is utterly laughable."

What's laughable, Eric, is your inability to read _and_ comprehend. (I'm just joking, sugar. I'm sure you did just fine on your SAT verbal.)

But when, pray tell, did I write specifically that? Oh, wait, I didn't write that. What I said was that India does not need to meet _base load_ electricity demand, but rather _peak load_ electricity demand in the short-to-medium term. (If you do not know the difference, Eric, look it up.)

Nuclear electricity is not the best way to meet this peak load. Electricity derived from natural gas- or coal-powered is the better economic choice.

But, please, keep selectively quoting me out of context or, better yet, misquoting me. I'll enjoy responding to you.

Miss Chimera

So Alan would you disagree that one could be both a king and a totalitarian? If not, was the Shah not both?

One could be a king and totalitarian. The Saudi royalty may qualify, judging by the pervasiveness of totalitarian laws in Arabia.

But was the Shah a totalitarian? A Google search on "shah totalitarian" shows up some sites that say so. But I'm having a bit of trouble finding supporting evidence. The only detail I can find is SAVAK oppression of dissidents, but non-totalitarian autocrats do that, too. Both types seek to protect the regime's PR, but totalitarians uniquely seek also to protect the "cult doctrine" that I addressed earlier.

I will amend an earlier remark: not all fascists had it in for the US. IIRC, Francisco Franco didn't seem to be all that bothered by us. It's possible the Shah was some breed of fascist. It's also possible that a lot of people are dumbing down the meaning of "totalitarian."

I will do some research and see if I can find evidence of the Shah's totalitarianism - I'll start with an Iranian expatriate friend of mine. This discussion may be dead by the time I get results; I'll email "Wh" and "peter" and anyone else who expresses interest when I do.

One thing we know for sure: the Shah did not belong to either of the totalitarian movements (Communism, Islamism) that want to take over the entire world, and thus take out the US. That is why we were able to get a foot in the door with him (not to mention having a common enemy in the Soviets).

I'd appreciate hearing anything you find.

I'm well aware of India's Cold War pro-Soviet tilt. And I'm also aware that the country's non-aligned posturing - not to mention the fact it wasn't a Communist state, but a socialist democracy - meant that it still couldn't depend on a Soviet nuclear shield in the event of another Chinese invasion. Hence India still had a major imperative for going nuclear - and obviously, Pakistan's possession of nukes now makes India's need to hold onto its arsenal doubly important.

Suggesting that I don't care about the NPT altogether is a bit of strawman. The treaty has had its uses. What I'm taken aback by, however, is the inability of its most devout adherents to notice its significant flaws.

First, since the NPT was signed, four different countries have gone nuclear, including one signatory. And if a fifth (another signatory) is to be stopped in a peaceful manner, it'll be due to the threat of international trade sanctions rather than the enforcement of the treaty. When it comes to preventing countries that possess the human and financial resources to go nuclear from doing so, the NPT has been almost useless.

Second, when it comes to unrecognized existing or wannabe nuclear powers, the NPT, by its nature, makes no attempts to draw political distinctions. It doesn't differentiate between dictatorships and democracies, between sponsors and non-sponsors of terrorism, between countries who want nukes only for self-defense and those who want them as an aid in pursuing an expansionist foreign policy.

Hence we have the absurd situation of NPT die-hards such as yourself demanding that a democratic India, which maintains its nuclear arsenal only for purposes of self-defense against two nuclear-armed dictatorships, and which has a solid record on non-proliferation matters, give up its nuke program. Even as the NPT and related organizations have proven toothless in stopping three other nations from going nuclear - and by itself, would be toothless in stopping several more.

Regarding energy needs, if India is serious about becoming a global manufacturing center in addition to a services hub - and all signs indicate that the country has this objective - then major increases to base load capacity are going to be needed. And even if coal and natural gas were economical choices for meeting these energy requirements, there's still the matter of obtaining these resources. India's coal resources, while not insignificant, aren't adequate for meeting its future electricity needs. Natural gas, meanwhile, would have to come in large part via pipelines from Iran and Myanmaar, not exactly two nations that we're fond of at this moment. Or India could try opting for oil, in which case $85/barrel becomes a greater possibility.

It's not without reason that China is hell-bent on boosting its nuclear energy production, and it's not without reason that India wants to follow the same route. Be honest here: Your objection to the latter has little to do with economics or energy needs, and everything to do with your undying faith in the NPT.

Btw, the Susan Sarandon routine is getting a little trite, but keep it up if it amuses you.

Eric,

First, you write that "since the NPT was signed, four different countries have gone nuclear, including one signatory."

Considering that some-180 nations have signed the NPT, one renegade -- North Korea -- isn't a bad record at all.

You also write: "When it comes to preventing countries that possess the human and financial resources to go nuclear from doing so, the NPT has been almost useless."

Wrong. During the 70s and 80s, the NPT kept South Korea, which was at times marginally aligned, from going nuclear. The NPT, along with the US nuclear umbrella, kept much of Western Europe and Japan from going nuclear.

Second, you write: "when it comes to unrecognized existing or wannabe nuclear powers, the NPT, by its nature, makes no attempts to draw political distinctions. It doesn't differentiate between dictatorships and democracies, between sponsors and non-sponsors of terrorism, between countries who want nukes only for self-defense and those who want them as an aid in pursuing an expansionist foreign policy."

This isn't about being an NPT die-hard. It's about the US staying true to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, so that other supplier nations can't use our flouting to justify what they think is in their crude interest. It's about trying to meet the treaty's minimum obligations: Help NPT signatories with their civilian nuclear programs, but don't help non-NPT signatories so others won't follow.

I don't view the NPT as a "total disarmament" treaty. I view it as a _non-proliferation_ treaty. And, of course, like all treaties, it has serious flaws. I pointed out Article V before. Article IV is just as bad.

But to say that democracies or American allies should be given an NPT-pass, while non-democracies should not, is absurd. You must really believe in democratic peace theory in the long term. I have serious doubts. You must be certain that there's no chance that someday India could be a peer competitor with the US -- that India will be a Britain-like ally with a billion people. I'm not so certain.

But if you think that the USG can maintain double standards for who should and shouldn't get nuclear weapons, and still take global non-proliferation seriously (read: Iran, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, all of which already have some plutonium and/or HEU stocks), then we have no common ground here. Period.

Bottom-line here: If India gets a pass on the NPT here, be prepared someday not only for Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt to get nuclear weapons, but also for American allies like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to go nuclear. Be prepared for that world.

Third, you write: "Regarding energy needs, if India is serious about becoming a global manufacturing center in addition to a services hub - and all signs indicate that the country has this objective - then major increases to base load capacity are going to be needed."

Sure, India in the long-term will have major energy needs -- especially base-load. But so long as India is outside of the NPT, it's not in our interest to help them.

For short- and medium-term peak load needs, I do not think that nuclear energy is necessarily the answer. I think if India de-nationalized its civilian nuclear sector and allowed it to compete with other energy alternatives, market forces would move it towards nonnuclear alternatives. In the medium-term, India has under 40 trillion cubic feet of proven natural gas reserves. In the medium-term, former PM Vajpayee authorized a 50000 MW hydroelectric project in 2003. Immediatley, India has 17 gigawatts of coal-fired capacity and another 3 gigawatts under construction.

Show me something that suggest indigenous energy resources can't deal with India's short-term and medium-term peak load needs.

India also needs to deal with its onerous nonnuclear energy-sector bureaucracy. It needs to deal with power-distrubtion theft in major cities. It needs to expand its power-grid to difficult-to-reach rural areas. Civilian nuclear energy won't solve these systemic issues.

If India thinks it needs nuclear energy in the long term, then I think it needs to ante up and give something up. I think the US can play hardball here. Chrissakes, India wants a permanent seat on the Security Council. Should we just give them that, too?

But you would have the US bend over backwards to help a nation that it's far from certain will be a billion-person sized Britain. We'll see.

1. I don't see the fact - or rather, the possibility - that the NPT has kept responsible, industrialized democracies such as Germany, Spain, and Japan from going nuclear as some kind of great accomplishment. I'm largely indifferent as to whether countries like these possess nuclear weapons, and I'm starting to think that a nuclear Japan might actually be a good thing.

2. You kind of have a point about NSG standards, though I should add here that China, and to a lesser extent Russia, has flouted the idea in the past. But this still avoids the broader point that countries hell-bent on obtaining nukes seem quite capable of sidestepping the current nonproliferation regime. As Iran is demonstrating, the bribe of aid and the threat of trade sanctions are the onyl effective non-military means to keep such countries from going nuclear in the future, even if they have signed the NPT.

3. Regarding the issue of India's energy requirements, I'd suggest taking a look at this paper:

http://www.csis.org/saprog/0505_Shaw.pdf

Take note of how low India's per capita electricity consumption is right now, and also the author's argument that while nuclear power isn't a panacea for the country's energy challenges, it should play a greater role in its future electricity production.

4. I'm amazed that you actually think the Bush Administration's decision was nothing more than an act of charity. There's a lot of clear-cut economic value to be derived from putting a lid on India's future oil demand, and on opening the door to American companies to bid on nuclear reactor projects within the country.

It also wouldn't hurt if the Iranian mullahs' coffers weren't filled with billions in revenues from the natural gas pipeline that's been proposed. There's already substantial opposition to the pipeline within India as a result of the fact that it goes over Pakistan, and the Bush Administration's nuclear offer might be enough to turn the government against it.

6. Is India going to end up being a billion-person-sized Britain? I don't know. The country still has a ton of problems to deal with, the largest being the proclivity of its people to elect corrupt populists of one stripe or another. But even if it doesn't, there's still a good chance that it could be a billion-person-sized Argentina or Malaysia, and that's nothing to scoff at.

India currently has the 10th-largest economy in the world, and there's a decent chance that it'll be in the top 5 within the next 20-25 years. Considering the problems we might have in the future with India's northern neighbor, a country that's only a couple of years away from making the top 5, drawing closer to it isn't such a bad idea.

Ms. Chimera,

Pardon, please, on my using a default as to your gender.

Do I support the NPT? I have three issues - 1) it's due for a rethinking as subsequent events have changed it's underlying assumptions, 2) it's enforcement is in the hands of a UN agency and subject to all the corruption and mismanagement attendent, and 3) it takes money out of my pocket as a VBM nuclear engineer for NO GOOD REASON.

As to base loaded nuclear, sure, base load is the most convenient and economical arrangment for large, capital-intensive, low fuel cost generation like nuclear, but that is not an a priori restriction to their application. Consider EdF in France - with 70% nuclear capacity, their nukes HAVE to load follow, and do so successfully.

In addition, the initial operations of a new Indian nuke may be load-follow, but load growth with soon move it to base load operation. That calculation is, again, a matter for the Indians to decide. New reactor designs are fully capable of load follow operation - I know because the Asian plant I'm building now is required to do so and we are meeting that owner's requirement easily. In fact, I was just tuning the computer control system for it

All in all, worthy debate, Ms Chimera. Interesting and cogent arguments on your part, but unconvincing. I will take a further look at NSG requirements though.

Whitehall,

No prob about presuming my gender. It's a male-dominated world. But that was nice of you to apologize. You're quite the gentleman.

1. No offense, but part of the reason your VBM's nuclear operations needs the Indian market is because Western nations have generally moved to decrease reliance on nuclear power over the last few decade. The US hasn't ordered new nuclear reactors in years. France is set to phase out aging reactors. Also, the deregulation of the US and some European energy markets has allowed alternatives to nuclear -- especially natural gas and LNG -- comepete on a fair and more level playing field.

I'm sorry that money is not flowing into your pockets because of this, but there are good reasons -- proliferation and security, economics, and international politics -- for waiting on nuclear.

2. I disagree with your assessment of EdF. According European Commission decision 2002/164/EC:

(82) Due to its geographical position, its high voltage connections to France, Germany, Italy and Austria and the flexibility of Swiss hydraulic power, Switzerland is a turntable for peak load for its own and other European utilities' seasonal and daily requirements. In this respect, Switzerland is particularly important for French electricity supply of peak load. 80 % of EDF's total output in 1999 was generated in nuclear power stations. Nuclear power generation is steady and, therefore, suitable for base load. However, nuclear power generation is also rather inflexible and thus not suitable to satisfy peak load demand. Electricity exports from Switzerland to France account especially for peak load, exports from France to Switzerland, however, mainly for base load.

Energy consultants Mycle Schneider and Antony Froggatt, writing for Greens-EFA Group in the European Parliament, comment:

No wonder that the equivalent of a dozen reactors operate only for export and France remains still the only country in the world that shuts down nuclear reactors on certain weekends because it cannot sell their power -– not even for dumping prices.

Can you cite evidence to contradict the European Commission's assessment of French base-load export and peak-load import?

3. Without knowing more about the specific load follow reactor design your working on for your VBM, as well as the demand dynamics of the Asian nation's market in which your reactor is being designed, I cannot really comment on it. Unless you can point me to specs and projected operational analyses, or at least mention the nation, I can only point out that evidence suggest your stellar EdF case isn't so stellar.

As for you, Eric, where do I begin... Responding to your points directly:

(1) As regards the NPT, if you're going to preferentially treat democracies in a world full of non-democracies, then be prepared for a world where nations not only like Iran, but also Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria think they should be treated by your hypothetical nuclear-armed Japan. You seem to focus on transnational terror a lot: Imagine the state of transnational terror in the world you're favoring.

So, you basically think it's okay for democracies to have nuclear weapons. Well, I hope non-democracies like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria see it your way too. Otherwise, we cannot afford to maintain double-standards.

(2) Sure, China and Russia have flouted the NSG. But they're coming around now. Russia gave up on Tarapur, freaking out Dehli. Do we really want to assume the cost of giving other NSG members to back out just to help India, a non-NPT nuclear power?

(3) That same report notes: "nuclear power production is almost twice as expensive as fossil fuel energy [$1000 to 1200 capital cost per kilowatt for an advanced LWR plant, as compared to $600 per kilowatt for gas-fired combined cycle plant with gas delivered at $4-5 per million BTU]." This is why, in the short to medium term, India's decision to increase nuclear electricity production can wait until the time (if and when) make nuclear electricity actual competitive.

(4) India is destined to compete with China on a lot of fronts: politically, economically, militarily. What's India really giving us; what's India giving up? IMO, India is playing the USG like a flute. Will India build a Navy and Maritime force to stand with us to protect Taiwan?

(5) Yes, India's economy will grow. They need us more than we need them right now. The USG has leverage. You say I'm an NPT die-hard. Why are you an India die-hard?

All right, boys, I agree with Whitehall: This has been an interesting debate. That's fine if y'all aren't convinced. Y'all haven't convinced me. But, being the Indian-descent Southern Belle that I am, I shall allow your gentlemen to have the last word. All good things must come to an end. So with online debates.

Miss Chimera

You're of Indian descent? That makes two of us. Assuming that you're still reading this, here's one last response:

1. Maintaining a preferential stance towards stable, trustworthy democracies on nuclear matters on a case-by-case basis will only encourage dictatorships to go nuclear if they feel threatened by a particular democracy's decision to do the same. Countries get singled out for preferential treatment on defense matters by third parties all the time; provided that they don't feel threatened, their neighbors live with it.

And as I've been stating repeatedly, the NPT isn't going to stop Saudi Arabia, Syria, etc. from obtaining nukes if they really want them. For God's sake, just look at the whole Iranian farce. Only economic bribes and threats - and in some cases, the withdrawal of military support by a foreign power - will work. Which is why the argument that providing support for the civllian nuclear program of a non-NPT signatory/nuclear power will encourage other countries to go nuclear is to me - dare I say it? - a chimera.

2. As I hope you've noticed, the US has made its willingness to aid India's civillian nuclear program conditional upon India seperating its civillian and military nuclear facilities, and placing the civillian facilities under international monitoring. That's a far cry from helping the country build up its nuclear weapons arsenal, nor is it a disastrous precedent.

3. I'm curious as to whether the numbers for a gas-fired plant include just the costs of the gas and the plant, or also the costs building a multi-billion dollar pipeline or two to transport the stuff. Also, if you insist that India take the natural gas route, be prepared to see the country purchase the stuff from two very unsavory regimes, one of which tops the State Department's terrorist sponsor list.

4. To understand what India gives us, just ask yourself what Pakistan provides China. Sometimes, simply being a geopolitical challenge/threat/pain in the ass to a rival is reason enough for support.

And again, in the case of the US and India, look closely at what this "support" amounts to. It doesn't amount to billions in foreign aid a la Egypt or Israel; all it's amounted to is the willingness to let American companies sell stuff to India that we weren't willing to let them sell before.

Finally, though my remarks and ethnic descent might lead you to think otherwise, I'm not an "India die-hard". For example, I don't object to American support for Pakistan (support that, unlike India's, includes economic and military aid), and I'm not in favor of giving India a permanent UNSC seat with veto powers. I just don't think it's a good idea for either the US or India to let Cold War animisoties and nuclear-related tunnel vision to stand in the way of furthering mutual interests.

Miss Chimera and Eric,

I think that Miss Chimera is reading too much into the EC report. EPRI did a detailed study of EdF's experience with load following in their fleet of PWRs - I haven't been able to find it on-line but please believe me, I studied it extensively in my professional capacity at PG&E when we were considering load following for Diablo Canyon. Of course, we never did load follow for sound economic reasons but technically, it was absolutely possible except for at the tail end of a fuel cycle when too much water needed to be flushed through the reactor. That limited the power swings with our installed control rods.

As to the cost of nuclear, I think Miss Chimera is confusing overnight capital cost with net power costs. I'd recommend some of my articles here:
http://www.energypulse.net/centers/author.cfm?at_id=183

My recent experience has been with an Advanced BWR in Taiwan. The Power Generation Control System is designed to handle 40%-100%-40% power swings, either locally or from the system dispatcher's office. It takes a hour or two to make a methodical swing but step load changes and even a net load reduction (100% power to hotel loads) are possible. The generator can also operate in frequency control mode, ie pure automatic load following to control and set grid frequency. I must say, it is one sweeet system (pardon me taking too much pride in my work!)

As to the discussion between Eric and Miss Chimera on the diplomatic tradeoffs, I have complete faith in the wisdom of Secretary of State Rice. I'm sure that she has balanced our negotiating position and we (and they) got a square deal.