Bush's policy seemingly fails to grasp that Kim's greatest concern is his own survival. Threats to overthrow him only increase his desire for nuclear weapons.

Kim must be led to believe that his best chance for survival lies in giving up his nuclear program. That means not only telling him that many bad things will happen to him if he continues, but also that good, or at least neutral, things will happpen if he submits to verifiable monitoring.

I am not really sure why this blog site is considered conservative. Most of the positions taken on this site tend to side much more with other blogers that are considered liberal, such as Brad DeLong and Matthew Yglesias, than with the, at least of late, positions taken by conservatives such as the budget deficit doesn’t matter, that the trade deficit is a sign of things going well in the US economy, that being a tax cut and spend conservative is a good thing, that Iraq was worth invading because there maybe just maybe might be weapons of mass destruction there, but Iran and North Korea should be ignored even though they definitely have weapons of mass destruction, that a massive new unaffordable Medicare drug benefit is a good idea, that going to Mars while running massive deficits is a good idea, that offshoring jobs to India is a good thing, etc.

The opinions expressed on this site tend to be much too reasonable and make too much sense to be considered conservative by today’s standards of conservatism.

I really don't see why we should change anything now. Kim Jong Il has done nothing to suggest he's any more trustworthy now than he was in, say, 1994. He has a history of manufacturing crises to try to extract concessions, and the Bush Administration has been fairly good at not rising to the bait.

I don't really think obliging him is a wise idea -- and I fail to see what favorable outcomes changing course now could possibly provide.

The Bush Administration has tried to form an international consensus and has had some success along these lines with the so-called six party talks. That is, regional players are with the U.S. and the administration generally on this issue. However, we are seeing nuclear blackmail in action and it isn't pretty. Furthermore, it's not clear that North Korea's essential demands would change much if the U.S entered into bilateral negotiations. They would still want security guarantees that we shouldn't give and subsidies that would only feed the blackmail fires.

What effect would a Security Council resolution have in any event? North Korea will still remain under the same kind internal economic pressure that has been its trademark for so many years. North Korea has been more than willing to breach its agreements in the past. Will it suddenly become clear that this time we're serious because the UN has officially issued some condemnation? China is the only country with real influence over North Korea as they are on Chinese life support essentially. Perhaps China will get serious if they are convinced that Japan and South Korea will go nuclear themselves if something isn't done relatively soon about North Koreans.

Military planners might disagree that military action would necessarily be disasterous to Seoul. The North Korean artillery placements within range of Seoul are well known to U.S. and South Korean forces and many believe that they could be neutralized with air power very quickly. Any actual land based assault would be very difficult however.

Rewarding people for their intransigence is always counter productive and Turtle Bay displays of unanimity typically are pointless. There are very few countries capable of actually doing anything about the problem other than talking.

So what countries ARE capable of actually solving the problem without talking? There are legitimate gripes about the inadquacies of the Agreed Framework and NK lies and brinksmanship in general, but having that in place and using it as the groundwork for further diplomacy rather than dissolving the whole thing with no real backup plan isn't much of a solution.

If everything so far has failed, then what are the policy prescriptives that WILL solve the problem?

Since 2001, when the new administration paralyzed talks and screwed South Korea's Sunshine Policy, we have only seen inaction. Policy paralysis has gotten us to the point where NK is about to test a bomb.

So unless that is a recipe for success, let's get over the Anything But Clinton stance already.

Stay the course. Kim Chong Il cares about nothing so much as the survival of his regime. He'd love to be able to extort greater something-for-nothing concessions from, well - practically everyone - energy, trade, foodstuffs, from China, South Korea, Japan. He's terribly frustrated that his previously effective saber rattling has proven ineffective with the Bush administration. He's terrified of a kinetic strike against his regime. Both of these concerns he feels he can address with nukes.

But having them, he knows only that he can deter a US strike - an option that was never seriously on the table in any case due to the loss of life in Seoul from his retaliatory counterfires. And anyone who thinks that we could in a few hours eliminate that kind of firepower has never gone artillery tube plinking - I have, and it's dreary, tedious work.

He has to know that an actual nuclear strike on anyone: South Korea, Japan, the US would result in the end of his regime - the only thing that matters to him. As a casus belli nothing could be more morally forthright.

So long as we don't go wobbly, he will discover to his dismay that he has labored hard only to create an unuseable weapon.

Mark, do you really believe that what are
currently considered "liberal" views to be
"reasonable and make too much sense"?

Allowing Saddam Hussein to stay in power
and continuing to murder thousands each
month?

To resign our national sovereignty to an
organization that imagines Cuba, China,
Lybia and the like proper models of
"Human Rights"?

That only the bureaucrats in the Federal
Government are wise enough to provide for
our financial security after we retire?

That a perfectly valid response to institutional
racism called "affirmative action" has NOT turned
into a farce used by racial fascists to extort
millions of dollars from government and
private sources alike?

That inadequate science "supported" by
execrable mathematics "proves" that unless
human behavior changes, the planet faces
thermal runaway?

And that those same "scientists" are sure
that conservation and "alternative sources"
will provide sufficient energy to maintain
our current [sorry about the pun :-}] level
of civilization?

I could go on but you are most likely to
unreasonable to consider "non-doctrinaire"
points-of-view.

The criticism of the Bush administration's policy assumes that there was a diplomatic strategy that could have eventually led to NK giving up on going nuclear. Why assume this? Why does Kin Jong Il want nukes? Two reasons: 1) as an economic bargaining chip. As in 1994, NK knows that it can create a crisis situation rather easily by playing the nuclear card. They then use this card to bargain for greater concessions (since domestic resources and international aid after the Cold War is minuscule) and 2) to provide (what is now viewed by many as guaranteed) security on the cheap. NK (as well as Iran) already had this view of nukes (that once you acquire them states like US are unlikely to intervene in your country), but the actions of the US have, if anything, reinforced this view. North Korea is an increasingly weak state in a neighborhood that includes increasingly more powerful countries (including two they do not trust in the least—the US and Japan), so their incentive to acquire nukes is extremely high. My bet is that even if they return to the bargaining table they will make minimal concessions in exchange for aid and some kind of security guarantee, all the while maintaining a program (much as they did in 1994). Nuclear acquisition is basically a foregone conclusion IMO in North Korea. The real question is to what degree is this really a problem. On the one hand, a nuclear North doesn’t shift the balance of power in the region. They are still deterrable both conventionally and unconventionally. The real problem would likely be the trading of nuclear arms and/or technology to terrorists or non-nuclear states (ala Pakistan). One answer might be that even this scenario can be controlled due to the fact that any nuclear device used by terrorists would have a return address to the North Korean regime. Again, given Kim Jong Il’s desire first and foremost to retain power, this may be enough of a disincentive to refrain from transferring material and/or know-how to unsavory groups/states. However, this is without a doubt the biggest obstacle. But in terms of a nuclear North Korea posing a direct physical threat to the US or its neighbors I think this is overblown. The regime desires this weapons out of a position and sense of weakness and the desire to survive. Taking the offense would be unlikely under any number of scenarios. But to blame Clinton or Bush for failed strategies is somewhat suspect--it assumes there was a scenario in which NK would give up on the acquisition of these weapons and I have serious doubts about this...

Most of the positions taken on this site tend to side much more with other blogers that are considered liberal, such as Brad DeLong and Matthew Yglesias, than with the, at least of late, positions taken by conservatives such as
...

the trade deficit is a sign of things going well in the US economy: It's not often argued that the trade deficit is a good thing, but there is a very plausible argument that it's neutral. Drezner is more concerned about the trade deficit than some, but he's no alarmist.

that Iraq was worth invading because there maybe just maybe might be weapons of mass destruction there, but Iran and North Korea should be ignored even though they definitely have weapons of mass destruction: I don't think anyone on the right has ever taken that position.

that a massive new unaffordable Medicare drug benefit is a good idea: Republican politicians may have supported it, but I don't know any conservative or Republican pundit who supports the Medicare drug benefit.

that going to Mars while running massive deficits is a good idea: Huh? No one (including Bush) has mentioned this in years.

that offshoring jobs to India is a good thing: You're kidding, right? Dan Drezner's biggest claim to fame in the blogosphere is his support of outsourcing.

I disagree with the idea that past diplomacy with North Korea including the Agreed Framework was a failure

The main purpose of the Agreed Framework was to prevent NK from using its plutonium program to make bombs. In that it succeeded and without the agreement NK would have become a major nuclear power in the 90's. Until the Bush administration suspended oil shipments in 2002 the main Yongbyon plant was kept in mothballs.

It is true that NK may have cheated by attempting a uranium-basesd program but the evidence for that is murky as pointed out by Selig Harrison in Foreign Affairs:
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050101faessay84109/selig-s-harrison/did-north-korea-cheat.html
Reading that article it's striking how much of the case for the North Korean uranium cheating resembles the WMD claims made with respect to Iraq. Even if a uranium program existed we don't know that it was a seroius threat; ie large enough to produce one or more nuclear bombs. By contrast it was estimated that the plutonium facilities were capable of producing weapons-grade fuel for tens of bombs a year.

Ultimately with a regime like North Korea there are no ideal solutions. You have to be pragmatic and concentrate on the biggest threats: which in the case of North Korea were the plutonium facilities. Scrapping the Agreed Framework because of suspicions of uranium cheating was a huge mistake and a classic case of jumping from the frying pan into the fire. It hasn't solved the smaller problem but has made the bigger problem a lot worse.

Suzanne, welcome. I look forward to reading your future posts.

Your argument seems to hinge on the assertion that bilateral negotiations between the US and NK will somehow lead to an international consensus to contain NK. Where's the evidence for this? It seems much more likely that other countries would be delighted to have the US resume '90s-style payoffs of the NK regime, so they don't have to become involved at all. Your argument for direct US/NK talks seems to boil down to "we haven't tried that this decade", but I don't see why we'd expect a better outcome if we did so.

The current six-party approach has one huge advantage, namely engaging China in the stability of the region. Do the Chinese really want to see a nuclear Japan or South Korea? Do they think there's any chance of avoiding that once NK openly declares their nukes? In this case, US policy has been to organize the "neighborhood watch" rather than to directly act as the policeman. It's hard for me to see why that's inappropriate - clearly the ball is in China's court here. No attempt to contain, inspect or reform NK will succeed unless China is on board for it.

Suzanne, I love your site. Belgravia Dispatch put me onto you folks.

That said, I agree with others on this thread. Stay the course. Don't go wobbly. The question is, how bad do things have to get before China does something about it.

Sorry, but if you think a little weasel like lil' Kim can be trusted to honor whatever bargain he
"signs" with the US, you are, to be kind, engaging in wishfull thinking. That policy was tried with Clinton remember, and it failed spectacularly. It's funny, here we have the president attempting to solve a problem multilateraly and he is lampooned for it. If he were engaging in bilateral talks, people would be calling him a unilateralist.

The key to North Korea is China. And how do you get at China, well, if lil' Kim wants nukes, then you gently suggest to the Chinese that Japan, Taiwan and South Korea would also want nukes to defend themselves. Big stakes, you bet, but the best of only bad choices to begin with. We'll see how much leeway lil' Kim gets afterward if China starts feeling some heat and is confronted with the reality of a nuclear Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, not too mention India, Pakistan and Russia.

"In this case, one of the few routes conceivably open is to try to build an international consensus, probably in the form of a UN Security Council resolution, that North Korean proliferation is intolerable."

Yeah, that's the ticket. A Security Council resolution. If only we could have slapped one of those on Iraq, that would have solved everything. So here's how it works. The UN declares that NK must give up its WMD programs and submit to inspections. Kim does what any self-preserving totalitarian would do and allows in the inspectors, all the while playing hide-and-seek with the good stuff, but not so much that the Security Council is pissed off enough to do anything about it. This goes on for seven years. Then little Kim precipitates a crisis forcing the UN inspectors to leave and forbidding them re-entry later on. This goes on for four years. Then the UN gives him "ONE LAST CHANCE...OR ELSE" to prove (burden is on him) that he no longer has WMD programs. Then when he blatantly fails to do so, the UN will have no choice but to give him the "OR ELSE" end of the stick. Right? After all, it's inconceivable that a lodestar of incorruptibility (Kojo who?) and humanitarian causes (Darfur where?) such as the UN is going to let the selfish, craven interests of its constituent members prevent it from enforcing some of the most severe resolutions it has ever issued. I mean, c'mon, that could never happen. Yep, a Security Council resolution. That'l git her done.

Or we could just send Jimmy Carter back to broker another appeasement...I mean, "Bilateral Agreement." That seemed to work pretty well last time.

You advocating a return to Clinton's policy?

Fascinating how all the right wingers here are for "staying the course". It's as if they believe that by sheer will alone they can get N. Korea to do what they want.

Stunning, really.

Are you truly "fascinated", or is that the familiar whif of smug condescension in the air? "Look at all the stay-course-conservatives, aren't they fascinating?"

I'm sure that you had an actual point in there somewhere, an argument all its own that would have won the rest of us over by dint of its sheer, why-didn't-we-think-of-that brilliance, but really, who has the time to talk to these people?

How do you divide liberal and conservative policy on this issue, Hal? What if everyone was really trying for a solution that worked? No, that couldn't be true, because you're obviously not a conservative and you don't agree with staying the course. So the rest of us are wingers. Does "your side" have a policy recommendation here, or are you content to continue to merely hurl invective from the sidelines, like drunks at a AAA hockey game?

What the stay the course people are trying to say is not that we can bend Kim to our will (kept looking up in the comment thread to find that argument, couldn't, ergo: Strawman - classic use, by the way), but ackowledging that we have no levers, diplomatic or military, that are likely to be either efficacioius or of benefit proportional to the risk.

The policy of "malign neglect" therefore is to encourage Kim to realize that we cannot be bothered by his saber rattling - the path I suppose you'd advocate (can't tell, you don't bother to enlighten us) would do the reverse.

The current policy has been a massive failure so far and there is no reason to believe that "staying the course" is going to achieve anything. There is no indication that China has either the capacity or the will to force North Korea to abandon its nuclear program. The more the administration dithers the more nukes NK is going to acquire and the harder it will be to eliminate their nuclear program.

And yes , given the nature of the NK regime and the policy alternatives, the Agreed Framework was a success. It prevented NK from going nuclear in the mid 90's and succeeded in addressing the main threat of the plutonium program. By contrast the present policy has seen NK leave the NPT, throw out inspectors, re-process thousands of plutonium rods and perhaps develop half a dozen bombs. The more bombs NK acquires the stronger its bargaining position becomes and the harder it is to eliminate its nuclear program.

The more bombs NK acquires the stronger its bargaining position becomes

How does the number of nuclear weapons affect their bargaining position exactly? Whether they have one or a hundred the strategic landscape will already be altered and therefore tactics and bargaining will have to change. States are unlikely to risk escalation simply because NK has only one nuke.

"Stay the course"???
The course that has led to no dimunition whatever in the pace of North Korea's nuclear weapons program?

Procedure matters less than substance. China's ability to put the screws the North Korean economy matters less than America's existential threat to the regime. The one good hope--and it's a lousy one--of derailing the nuclear program is (or was) to offer North Korea a non-aggression commitment and positive incentives to bolster this most evil of regimes.

North Korea certainly won't be so foolish as to issue offensive nuclear threats. And the fortunately the range of sensible military options available to the US was already, before NK got the bomb, severely restricted. We're no worse off.

The one great fear is a transfer of nuclear weapons to a non-state actor. But why would North Korea buy into the risks that attach to making their fate hostage to an agents they don't control?

It looks as if the long-predicted era of spread of nuclear weapons to several new powers is at hand. Just how wild and crazy will be our reaction to the emergence of these new nuclear players?

"Stay the course" and all the other options most likely have the same outcome: North Korea progressing from less than a dozen barely deliverable nuclear weapons to several more. As this happens states will remain the dominant actor on the world scene, and among them the United States will remain the dominant power. Nothing that important will change.

So, apart from dreamy retrospections on the superiority of Bonnie Prince William's policy in the 90's, what is your current policy prescription? Still haven't heard one.

Does "your side" have a policy recommendation here, or are you content to continue to merely hurl invective from the sidelines, like drunks at a AAA hockey game?

Well, given that many right-wingers start a discussion of North Korea by blaming Bill Clinton for it (as they blame him for everything else), its a bit amusing to hear a complaint about abuse ..

I think that multi-party talks are a good idea, though.

A Security Council resolution. If only we could have slapped one of those on Iraq, that would have solved everything. So here's how it works. The UN declares that NK must give up its WMD programs and submit to inspections. Kim does what any self-preserving totalitarian would do and allows in the inspectors, all the while playing hide-and-seek with the good stuff, but not so much that the Security Council is pissed off enough to do anything about it. This goes on for seven years. Then little Kim precipitates a crisis forcing the UN inspectors to leave and forbidding them re-entry later on. This goes on for four years. Then the UN gives him "ONE LAST CHANCE...OR ELSE" to prove (burden is on him) that he no longer has WMD programs. Then when he blatantly fails to do so, the UN will have no choice but to give him the "OR ELSE" end of the stick.

Yes, thats what happened in the real world inhabited by right-wingers. But bear with me a little while as I recount an imaginary, rather-far fetched reality.

In that reality, the dictator does indeed let inspectors in. The nuclear inspectors more or less certify that Iraq is free of a nuclear weapons program. The other WMD inspectors say it will take a few weeks more to complete their task.

In that reality, the US president refused to let the inspectors complete their task. He warns of dire consequences, goes ahead and invades. It turns out the country has to WMDs at all. None. Amazing as it seems, the UN weapons inspectors were correct. Some of his supporters mouth directly for years on how weapons were moved to Syria until the government's own official report removes even that excuse.

Fortunately, that is only an alternate far-fetched reality. Surely no American President would dare to exaggerate on such a vital matter of war and peace ?

Multi-party talk, Jaffe - great idea, totally concur. Turns out we are both aligned with the current policy of the US government.

Of course not SP - there's no threat from North Korea at all. We can all go back about our business.

"Of course not SP - there's no threat from North Korea at all. "

I was making no such claim, and I don't believe it anyway . Maybe you're confusing me with 'Unruffled'. I was merely trying to get Gary back to reality on the psat (you know, for making reality-based conclusions, rather than faith based ones).

"The one great fear is a transfer of nuclear weapons to a non-state actor. But why would North Korea buy into the risks that attach to making their fate hostage to an agents they don't control?"

Odd, since we were told that was the exact threat posed by Iraq : transferring its vast (but non-existent) WMD stockpile to Al Qaeda.

The one good hope--and it's a lousy one--of derailing the nuclear program is (or was) to offer North Korea a non-aggression commitment and positive incentives to bolster this most evil of regimes.

As you say, it's a lousy one.

The non-aggression commitment is, of course, worthless. We're certainly not going to withdraw forces from the region, and anything else is just words on a piece of paper. North Korea may claim they want this, but it can't be serious.

The "positive incentives" simply serve to prop up an awful government, guilty of starving and/or imprisoning millions of people. Well, that's not all they do -- they also tell North Korea and other countries that they can extort us.

"How does the number of nuclear weapons affect their bargaining position exactly"
If NK has more weapons:
1)It has more weapons to proliferate while still mainting some for its own use.
2)Any US threat to eliminate all its weapons by military means becomes less credible.
3)Having spare weapons allows it use some for a series of tests to send a message. That may be what it's doing right now.

As for solutions to the problem there isn't enough space to get into it in detail here but this is a good Slate article about a proposal by Congressman Curt Wheldon:
http://slate.msn.com/id/2085155

No guarantee that it will work of course but chances are a good deal better than the current shambles that is the Bush administration North Korea policy.

The main purpose of the Agreed Framework was to prevent NK from using its plutonium program to make bombs. In that it succeeded and without the agreement NK would have become a major nuclear power in the 90's. Until the Bush administration suspended oil shipments in 2002 the main Yongbyon plant was kept in mothballs.

Excuse me? Wasn't the reason Bush suspended oil shipments because NK admitted that they weren't living up to their end of the deal?

Someone is blaming the wrong party for this, and I don't think it's me.

The non-aggression commitment is, of course, worthless. We're certainly not going to withdraw forces from the region, and anything else is just words on a piece of paper. North Korea may claim they want this, but it can't be serious.
-David

Something else to consider- NK may not care much about US forces in the region, but China does, and China is what is sustaining NK right now. Please consider the possibility that China may be using NK as a proxy, or at least supporting them as a way of indirectly distracting the US from other matters.

"Wasn't the reason Bush suspended oil shipments because NK admitted that they weren't living up to their end of the deal?"
Actually that is a matter of dispute. Read the Harrison article I linked above which says:
"Washington's accusation of Pyongyang was delivered during a visit to the North Korean capital by James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. Kelly told a key North Korean official that he had evidence of a uranium-enrichment project. According to Kelly, the North Korean official, First Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju, acknowledged the existence of such a program at the time. But Kang has subsequently denied this; what he actually told Kelly, according to Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun, was deliberately ambiguous: that North Korea is "entitled" to have such a program or "an even more powerful one" to deter a pre-emptive U.S. attack. According to Paek, Kang also stated that North Korea is entitled to pursue an "ncnd" (neither confirm nor deny) policy concerning the specifics of its nuclear capabilities, just as the United States does--especially since the two countries remain belligerents in the technically unfinished Korean War."

As the article explains the main provisions of the Agreed Framework dealt with the plutonium program and the North Koreans did keep their end of the bargain till the oil shipments were suspended. Their uranium activities ,whatever they were, may well have been a technical violation of the framework but that wasn't a good reason to scrap the entire framework thereby allowing North Korea to become a defacto nuclear power with possibly up to 6 bombs. You have to keep your priorties straight and distinguish between minor problems and major ones.

This post as I read it was to ask since Bush's strategy has failed what should the United States do now to prevent the North Koreans from continuing to arm themselves with more nuclear weapons. I propose the following: since the country with the biggest influence(its economic lifeline) on North Korea is loathe to use it primarily because they do not want to deal with the economic costs of what happens when North Korea collapses and its suits them to have something to tweak the US aims with in regard to East Asia, we force their hand.
The PRC must understand that the financial costs of supporting the North Korean regime by hoping to avoid dealing with the costs its collapse in the future are not exclusive. The PRC must understand that the fact they are supporting an irrational regime does not preclude them from an attack with nuclear weapons by said irrational state. The United States should begin immediate talks with Taiwan, Japan and South Korea on how to create their own nuclear arsenals by transferance of US nuclear weapons as a counter weight to both Beijing and North Korea. Talks must begin over how to pay for the collapse of North Korea. Failure to accept nuclear weapons and deal with the financial costs of reintegrating North Korea into the world means they are responsible for their own safety. Then let us see how the PRC reacts. It is the only way to call the PRC bluff that the weapons of North Korea will not be used on them, the costs of economic integration of North Korea can be pushed into the indefinite future and they have no responsiblity to reintegrate North Korea into the world.

The PRC must understand that the fact they are supporting an irrational regime does not preclude them from an attack with nuclear weapons by said irrational state.

China thinks NK is the US's problem, not China's problem. So long as NK *is* the US's problem, it is in China's interest for NK to continue to be the US's problem, as China has ambitions of becoming preminent in the western pacific, and the main obstacle to that is the US.

In order to resolve the problem, the US has to find a way to make NK China's problem. The 6-way talks are a step in that direction, but not enough.

What exactly is irrational about the North Korean regime from a strategic perspective (as far as their foreign policy goes)--their moves seem quite rational (and effective) from where I am sitting...

over at belgravia dispatch, greg djerijian kind of eviscerates this post. it's one of the trackbacks and it's worth checking out.

What exactly is irrational about the North Korean regime from a strategic perspective (as far as their foreign policy goes)--their moves seem quite rational (and effective) from where I am sitting...

The irrational part is that Kim only has the ability to slightly hurt the US, and even then, only indirectly, by attacking our allies or overseas bases.

OTOH, the US can make North Korea something only spoken of in the past tense.

Most governments do not seek confrontations with nations when they are in the position of the former, instead of the latter.

Solar Pons:

I'm afraid I can't take advice on getting back to reality from someone who tries to rewrite history. You wrote:

"It turns out the country has to [sic] WMDs at all. None. Amazing as it seems, the UN weapons inspectors were correct."

UN weapons inspectors never said Iraq was free of WMD, and that Saddam was in violation of resolution 1441 was clearly stated by the UN itself. These are not my opinions; these are facts. Your ludicrous rebuttal post is based on either deep ignorance of these facts or the kind of intellectual dishonesty popular among certain overweight documentarians. You may be able to convince "reality-based" Michael Moore fans that Iraq had been declared a WMD-free zone before the war, but, hey, they add an entire new dimension to the concept of gullibility. If you want to argue that Bush exagerrated the threat from the Iraqi WMD that every intelligence agency thought they had, then fine. That's a valid issue that reasonable people can disagree on. But when you insist on inventing ridiculous claims with no basis in fact, then you just come off as a partisan hack. The point I made, which, from either ignorance or obstinance, you failed to comprehend, is that with its 12-year history of feckless resolutions on Saddam, the UN has demonstrated that it will not enforce the resolutions it issues. After watching Saddam give the finger to UN for 12 years and never face any existential consequences (from the UN at least), what reason does Kim have to fear this paper tiger?

And by the way, I find it humorous as someone who has never voted for anyone but a Democrat to be called a right-winger. I guess I shouldn't be surprised, given its prevalence, at the kind of juvenile, black-and-white worldview that can't concieve of anyone but a right-wing radical criticizing the UN.

And by the way, I find it humorous as someone who has never voted for anyone but a Democrat to be called a right-winger.

Welcome to the 'big tent', friend! The other former lefties are over by the 'Neocon' sign, restrooms are down the hall on the left, the bar is to the right. Have fun, and remember- the first person to snicker when Robertson and Falwell start talking has to get the bar tab.

;-)

The irrational part is that Kim only has the ability to slightly hurt the US, and even then, only indirectly, by attacking our allies or overseas bases.

OTOH, the US can make North Korea something only spoken of in the past tense.

Most governments do not seek confrontations with nations when they are in the position of the former, instead of the latter.

There is nothing irrational about his policies as you have stated them. From a position of weakness Kim has found a quite effective way to get economic concessions out of more powerful states (ala the Agreed Framework) as well as procure a weapon that all but insures that his rule will not be threatened by direct invasion. Kim has not sought the kind of confrontation whereby the US will be forced (or justified in any way) to use a nuclear strike to make "North Korea something only spoken of in the past tense". Acquiring these weapons (even in small amounts) is enough to deter the United States from taking direct military action against the regime--regardless of whether NK's missiles can actually hit US targets. Are you suggesting that Kim does not believe that the US will be deterred by the threat posed to its nearby allies?

Kim may be a despostic, maniacal leader, but that does not mean that his strategic behavior has been anything short of rational...

The only means of eliminating North Korean nukes is to eliminate North Korea. And the Nork regime has been trying for years to do just that, through traditional Nork incompetence, but the Chinese won't let them collapse.

At some point the Chinese won't be able to keep the Norks going without sending several hundred thousand fraternal humanitarian aid volunteers across the border, with a new Nork leader, to run the place for the Norks. They've done that before.

We might be able to get China's decaying regime to stop propping up the Norks, but that will be difficult as a change of Nork regime would set an undesirable precedent (undesirable by the lights of China's ruling elite).

Few understand just how incompetent the Nork regime is at running the place. They're just a buncha gangsters. Kim Il Sung ran the place so badly after Chinese intervention in 1950 that they (and the Soviets) made him accept a co-ruler and ruling faction to keep the place going well enough to support the intervention forces. Kim got rid of the new guys a few years after the Korean War ended.

Look, there is no North Korean army any more. It's just a means of ripping off money and resources for the mostly uniformed gangsters. There is no discipline. The conscript enlisted aren't being fed much, or at all. The tipoff to the collapse of the Nork military was when conscript enlisted started carrying their personal weapons off base to rob people with.

Jim Dunnigan of Strategy Page didn't believe me on this until I sent him stories about Nork conscripts knocking over Chinese banks in Manchuria. The stories mentioned how the Chinese garrison on the border had been reinforced up and told to stop the Norks from doing that.

Nork coal mines have been flooded. Industrial production has pretty much ceased. Rail service to areas outside the core cities has pretty much ceased. The electric power cables formerly powering the trains in the areas no longer receiving rail service have been ripped out and sold for scrap to buy food with. The railroads themselves (bars, ties and spikes) in those areas are being ripped up for sale too. Rail service is now pretty much limited to corridors from ports to the most important cities, and to areas around Pyongyang.

And most of the aid nominally being sent to North Korea doesn't get there. That delivered to China for transhipment to North Korea is mostly sold to the black market from the docks in China. This has been the case for years. Much to most of the aid which is directly delivered to North Korea is instead sent to China for sale to the black market.

There is a vast amount of Chinese complicity in all this corruption, and that extends upwards into the Chinese ruling class.

Did I mention that China's regime is decaying?

I repeat, negotiations concerning North Korea's nuclear program are useless. They're just a means of placating those who believe in negotiations as a matter of faith.

As was said several times above, the key to North Korea is China. Without their cooperation, we'll never get what we want from Kim, regardless of any "deals" we think we've cut with him. That was the whole point of the six-party talks: get China to the table so they could apply pressure. But that hasn't worked out.

Bilateral talks, on the other hand, are a proven failure and eliminate any hope of Chinese pressure from the get-go. So with bilateral talks, instead of the current situation where NK is developing nukes, we'll instead have a situation where NK developes nukes while we bribe them to pretend they're not. That's clearly a loser as well.

So I think we're going to be forced into our own nuclear option -- that is, we're going to have to announce that if NK tests a nuclear weapon, we will be forced to give nuclear weapons to Japan and South Korea. For protection and deterrent purposes only, of course.

If that doesn't get China's attention and cooperation against NK, our next announcement is that we've further evaluated the situation and we think we'll also have to give nukes to Taiwan. For protection and deterrent purposes only, of course.

We've still got some aces up our sleeve -- it's a shame that China's refusal to cooperate means we'll probably have to play them.